

11 Reflections on *Reference and Reflexivity*

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In *Reference and Reflexivity*, John Perry tries to reconcile referentialism with a Fregean concern for cognitive significance. His trick is to supplement referential content with what he calls “reflexive” content. Actually, there are several levels of reflexive content, all to be distinguished from the “official,” referential content of an utterance. Perry is convinced by two arguments for referentialism, the “counterfactual truth-conditions” and the “same-saying” arguments, but he also acknowledges the force of two Fregean arguments against it, arguments that pose the “coreference” and the “no-reference” problems. He sees these as genuine problems for referentialism and does not share Howard Wettstein’s (1986) view that semantics has “rested on a mistake,” the mistake of thinking that semantics is obliged to come to grips with “cognitive significance” and, in particular, to explain the fact that coreferring terms can differ in cognitive significance and that terms lacking in reference can still have cognitive significance. Perry points out that “there is nothing in [the arguments for referentialism] to show that the official content, rather than the reflexive content, is the key to understanding the cognitive motivation and impact of utterances” (Perry 2001, 193).¹ In other words, “a theory of direct reference provides no argument for ignoring reflexive content, and, properly understood, has no motivation for searching for such an argument.” Thus Perry uses the notion of reflexive content to complement referentialism with a theory of cognitive significance.

Frege drew a fundamental distinction between the reference of a term and the means by which its reference is determined. In his view, however, it is not the references themselves but the means by which they are determined that enter into propositions (“Thoughts”) expressed by sentences in which the terms occur. So we might call Frege an ‘indirect reference’ theorist. Echoing the introduction to Kaplan’s “Afterthoughts” (1989a), Perry stresses that ‘direct’, as it occurs in ‘direct reference’, does not imply that “the mechanism of reference is unmediated by the relation of fitting identifying conditions” (188). Identifying conditions can play a significant role in direct reference

semantics even though they are not propositional constituents, that is, make no (direct) propositional contribution. Even though indexicals (including demonstratives) and proper names contribute their referents, an utterance containing such a term can have, in addition to its referential content, reflexive content involving the condition for identifying the referent.² So, for example, if you utter, "I am hungry," your utterance has as its referential content the singular proposition³ that you are hungry as well as the reflexive content that the speaker of that utterance is hungry. This explains how it is that, if I hear your utterance without knowing who produced it (I might hear it coming from a distant street corner), I am still in a position to know that it is true if the person producing it is hungry.⁴ And, if someone calls me on his cell phone and says, "I'm going to give this man your sandwich. He is hungry," if he is referring to you, the content of the second part of his utterance is the same as that of your utterance of 'I am hungry'. But I might not know that. Still, I know that his utterance is true if the man he is referring to is hungry, and I could coherently suppose it to be true even if, though he is referring to you, I don't think your utterance of 'I am hungry' is true.

This is a simple illustration of Perry's approach. It would be unfair to complain that he doesn't present a systematic defense of his syncretic view, which he dubs the "reflexive-referential" theory. His aim is to sketch its main features and explain how it works. I will not be focusing on it directly, but instead on some of Perry's underlying assumptions and arguments. First, there are his two arguments for referentialism, neither of which seems to show what he thinks they show. Then there is his account of identity statements, which provides an excellent example of how his reflexive-referential theory is supposed to work but also seems to illustrate some difficulties for it. Next, I will look at certain claims Perry makes about the contents of allegedly referential singular terms: proper names, and indexicals and demonstratives. This discussion will invoke the familiar distinction between reference by an expression and reference by a speaker in using an expression. It is easy to confuse the first, which is semantic, with the second, which is pragmatic. Indeed, in the next section I will take up the semantic-pragmatic distinction itself and Perry's conception and application of it. In that connection, I will look at why he attributes contents to utterances rather than to sentences and at the roles played by context in his account. Finally, I will raise some questions about his view of propositional attitude reports and its relation to his account of semantic content and of cognitive significance.

One disclaimer: I will not be discussing many of Perry's interesting and suggestive ideas about what he calls information games, cognitive paths, and notional networks. Indeed, it may very well be that these objections, however valid, have more termino-

logical than substantive implications for these ideas and require merely that they be recast.

The Arguments for Referentialism

Perhaps because his aim is to combine referentialism with a theory of cognitive significance, Perry does not critically evaluate the two arguments he endorses in favor of referentialism, the arguments from counterfactual truth-conditions and from same-saying. Consideration of them will point to the importance of distinguishing speaker reference from semantic reference and to the risks in relying on intuitions about what is said.

In expounding the argument from counterfactual truth-conditions, Perry stresses that “we need to keep clearly in mind the difference between the conditions under which an utterance is true, and the conditions under which what is said by the utterance (or, perhaps better, what the speaker says, in virtue of making the utterance) is true” (85). As he points out, “we can separate these, by considering counterfactual circumstances in which the utterance is false, but what is said by the utterance is true.” This is illustrated by an example from Kaplan (1989b, 512–513), who points to Paul and utters, “He now lives in Princeton, New Jersey.” If Kaplan had uttered the same words but pointed to someone else, someone who lived in Santa Monica, California, and who he mistook for Paul, what Kaplan would have said would have been false. But he would have said something else. What he actually said would still have been true, even though he wouldn’t have said it. The counterfactual circumstances with respect to which what Kaplan actually said would have been false are those in which Paul, the man Kaplan actually pointed to, did not live in Princeton. Similar examples can be given involving proper names and their alleged associated descriptions (5).

This argument does not show that indexicals and demonstratives are directly referential but, at most, that they are rigid.⁵ Being rigid may be necessary for being directly referential, but it is not sufficient. For all this argument shows, names and indexicals, instead of contributing their references to propositions expressed by sentences in which they occur, could just as well have rigid descriptive contents, just like rigid definite descriptions, such as ‘the square of 3’ or ‘the actual inventor of the zipper’. So the counterfactual argument does not show that indexicals or names are directly referential. As far as reference is concerned, the most that it shows is that the *speaker’s reference* in *using* an indexical or a name is rigid. That is, if a speaker who makes a statement uses a name or indexical to refer to a certain individual, were he to have used it to refer to someone else, perhaps because he mistook that person for the one he actually referred

to, he would have made a different statement; his actual statement could have a different truth value only if the individual he actually referred to were different.

As for the same-saying argument, it is basically an appeal to intuition. Perry relies on the fact that “we need to say things whose truth or falsity turns on the same objects having the same properties, or standing in the same relations” (5). For example, regardless of what descriptions (or identifying conditions) different people associate with the name ‘Clinton’ when uttering, say, “Clinton likes pickles with his hamburgers,” they “have said the same thing if what [they] each say is true if Clinton likes pickles with his hamburgers, and false if he doesn’t.” Unfortunately, this argument assumes that if two speakers ascribe the same property to the same individual, they are saying the same thing altogether. Intuitively, that may often seem to be a distinction without a difference, but sometimes substituting one term for another, coreferring term does make an intuitive difference. Ask typical nonphilosophers to compare utterances of sentences like these:

(1a) Eminem is insecure

(1b) Marshall Mathers is insecure

and they are likely to indicate that what a speaker says in uttering (1b) is different from what someone says in uttering (1a). Even people who know that Eminem is Marshall Mathers, but know that others don’t, are disinclined to suppose that speakers of (1a) and of (1b) are saying the same thing. Intuitively, there is a difference between saying that Marshall Mathers is insecure and saying that Eminem is insecure, even though the same property is ascribed to the same individual and the two utterances are true under the same actual and counterfactual circumstances. Intuitively, different things are said, at least according to people not prejudiced by philosophical theories. The claim that (1a) and (1b) have the same “official” content depends on who’s officiating.

Identity Statements and Reflexive Content

Whereas the referential content of an utterance is the proposition it expresses, its “official” content, as best I can tell a reflexive content of an utterance is any proposition derived from the referential content by replacing one or more constituent with its identifying condition. So, for example, a reflexive content of an utterance of ‘I love you’ is the proposition that the speaker of that utterance loves the addressee of that utterance. Similarly, a reflexive content of an utterance of ‘I love Sally’ is the proposition that the speaker of that utterance loves the person the convention exploited by that use of ‘Sally’ permits the speaker to designate (108). These are propositions one could

know to be true without knowing the referential contents of the relevant terms, but Perry is making a much stronger claim about reflexive contents. He suggests that in certain cases they comprise the contents of utterances when the referential content does not capture all, or even much, of what the speaker is trying to convey.

Identity statements provide an excellent example. They figure centrally in Frege's puzzle, illustrated by the sentences in (2).

(2a) Marshall Mathers is Eminem.

(2b) Eminem is Eminem.

These have the same referential content but differ in their information value, hence their cognitive significance. It is important to note that this difference does not depend on the triviality of (2b), that it is of the form ' $a = a$ '. Suppose that Eminem adopted a new stage name, 'Sniff Kitty'. Then (3a) and (3b) would also differ in cognitive significance from (2a).

(3a) Marshall Mathers is Sniff Kitty.

(3b) Eminem is Sniff Kitty.

Indeed, the sentences in (1), as well as 'Sniff Kitty is insecure', would also all differ in cognitive significance. In any case, Perry thinks that identity statements are a special case, because of their triviality: "In the case of identity statements, the triviality (true or false) of the referential content triggers a default mechanism; the default, referential, candidate is trivial, so we look for something meatier at the intentional or reflexive level" (163). So if you utter (2a), whose referential content is a necessarily true but trivial singular identity proposition about a certain white rapper, you are implicitly making a further claim. This claim is an informative, contingent claim to the effect that your use of the two names exploits conventions that together permit one to designate the same individual. That is Perry's version of it, anyway. Another, simpler candidate for the relevant reflexive content, one that requires less familiarity with Perry's account of names, is the proposition that the referent of 'Marshall Mathers' is (identical to) the referent of 'Eminem'. This too is an informative, contingent proposition that is distinct from the official, referential content of an utterance of (2a).

Why does Perry think there is something special about identity statements? "In the most central cases," he writes, "referential content will get at the information the speaker wishes to convey. What is said is what is said about the subject-matter; it is how the world has to be for the statement to be true, given the facts about meaning and reference" (119).⁶ But there are exceptions. "The very nature of language gives rise to sentences the meaning of which guarantees they will not fit the general picture.

Identity statements using names and indexicals are a case in point. They will virtually never be used with the intent of conveying their referential content, which will always be necessarily true or necessarily false" (119–120). Identity statements are one example, but there are obvious others, such as those in (4):

(4a) Marshall Mathers is as wealthy as Eminem.

(4b) Shaquille O'Neal is no taller than The Big Aristotle.

In Perry's view, "the referential content is the *default* candidate for what is said, but in certain circumstances other levels of content can be, as I will put it, raised to *subject matter*. In cases where referential content will always be trivially and necessarily true or false, the default is overridden. Identity statements trigger the mechanism that replaces the default. We raise some salient empirical content to subject matter" (121).

It is not clear why Perry thinks that this phenomenon is in the "very nature of language." It sounds more like a Gricean quantity implicature—ostensibly asserting a triviality can best be explained on the supposition that one means something that is more informative. Nevertheless, although "language has a core function, which is not to convey information about utterances, or about words, or about languages, or about meanings, or about context, but about the things the words stand for, their subject matter, the reflexive contents are possible because of the architecture of language" (119). It seems to me that they pertain to the nature of language use. I take it that in attributing the possibility of reflexive contents to the architecture of language, Perry is alluding to meaning rules and the identifying conditions they determine for reference; however, insofar as speakers can use a sentence to convey contents other than its semantic content—for example, by exploiting the very fact that they are uttering that sentence—their communicative intentions and their listeners' ability to identify these intentions play a role too. But this takes us beyond semantics to pragmatics.

Even so, Perry is tempted to loosen his conception of "official content" when he writes, "It seems that our concept of what is said is simply too useful to be confined to referential content in all cases. Semantics makes available a system of contents, reflexive and incremental. We choose among them, pragmatically" (163). This way of looking at things is puzzling. How can how "pragmatic" choice affect semantic content? Why should the official content depend on what is useful, or on what speakers are likely to mean? Rather than suppose that what is said is not always confined to referential content, it seems more sensible to suppose that what a speaker says is not always what he means. If Perry is right that utterances of identity sentences are generally made with some further aim than to assert their necessarily true or necessarily false contents, the more natural explanation, in the fashion of Grice, is that the speaker is

saying one thing and meaning something else. There is nothing inherently problematic about the fact that with certain sentences this is typically the case.⁷

This way of looking at the matter has an interesting consequence for Perry's picture, for, when a speaker says one thing and means something else, the flow of information is from the first to the second.⁸ When Perry introduces the notion of reflexive content, he makes it sound as though it comes in prior to referential content, not as what is being conveyed but as something that can be gleaned from an utterance even if one is not in a position to identify the referents. In his explanation of the informativeness of identity statements, on the other hand, reflexive content comes in after referential content. To appreciate the difference, compare the following two situations. First, suppose you read a postcard that says, "I wish you were here," but the signature and the name of the addressee are badly smudged. Then the referential content is unavailable to you. Still, you can glean from its reflexive content that the speaker wished, at the time of writing, that the intended reader were where the speaker was. However, this is not what the writer was trying to convey. If nothing had been smudged (and if, say, the postcard was addressed to you), you could have grasped the referential content by way of exercising your linguistic competence on the reflexive content, that is, that he (the writer) wished you were there. Now consider a quite different case. Suppose you see a friend walking in the rain and offer her a ride in your car. After she gets in, you say, "I could have been Gene," suggesting to her that she could have mistaken you for your evil twin Gene. Here the reflexive content of your utterance, of 'I' in particular, does enter into what you are trying to convey, to the effect that the person speaking to her then could have been Gene. This is quite different from the situation with the partially illegible postcard.

Compare the two roles of reflexive content. In the one case, reflexive content plays a kind of transitional, computational role between meaning and referential content. Ordinarily, one is able to ascertain the referential contents of utterances containing indexicals, and one does not stop to contemplate their reflexive contents. Moreover, the reflexive content is not what the speaker intends to be conveying (and he does not specifically intend the hearer/reader to take it into account in figuring out what he intends to be conveying). The postcard example is the exception that proves the rule, since in that situation the reflexive content is as far as the reader gets. In the evil-twin example, reflexive content plays a very different role, because it is what the speaker intends to be conveying. In this case, the hearer recognizes the speaker's intention to be conveying something distinct from the referential content, and recognizing that requires recognizing the referential content first. This is more like a case of conversational implicature.⁹

Let me conclude this section with a point that echoes my doubt about the same-saying argument discussed in the previous section. Perry treats identity statements (and other trivially true or trivially false statements) as a special case because their referential content is typically not the conveyed content. But there are other special cases in which what intuitively is the official content is not the referential content but not the reflexive content either. Here is a (false) identity statement and a counterfactual identity statement in which the speaker is likely to be conveying something other than either referential or reflexive content:

(5a) Marlowe was Shakespeare.

(5b) Marlowe might have been Shakespeare.

These are statements that claim that Marlowe was, or might have been, the author of the works of Shakespeare, not that he was the person the convention exploited by that use of 'Shakespeare' permits the speaker to designate (or anything of the sort). Then there are statements like these:

(6a) In 1964 Cassius Clay became Muhammad Ali.

(6b) In 1964 Muhammad Ali became Cassius Clay.

Intuitively, (6a) seems true and (6b) seems false. I am not claiming here that intuitions about (5) and (6) are correct. The point, rather, if these intuitions are incorrect, as referentialism predicts, then intuitions cannot be taken at face value as reliable evidence about what is said or about semantic content. One can't rely on them when they support one's view and dismiss them when they do not.

Are Singular Terms Inherently Referential?

Perry's strategy for solving the problem of cognitive significance for proper names, indexicals, and demonstratives is to attribute to uses of them (and to utterances of sentences containing them) reflexive as well as referential contents. Whereas referential contents are their "official" contents, their reflexive contents account for their cognitive significance. Here I will not try to assess the internal merits of Perry's reflexive-referentialism but rather will focus on two of his underlying assumptions. In the next section, I will take up his assumption that utterances of sentences, not sentences themselves, have semantic contents, but in this section I will question his assumption that names, indexicals, and demonstratives are inherently referential. The most obvious problem with this assumption is that these terms have nonreferencing uses, uses that nonetheless seem perfectly literal. It is not obvious how a refer-

entialist is to explain this. Also, when indexical or demonstrative reference depends on the speaker's intention, it is not clear how to explain that as a semantic rather than pragmatic phenomenon. We should not be misled by the ambiguity of the phrase 'indexical reference', which can mean either reference by an indexical or reference (by a speaker) in using an indexical; 'demonstrative reference' is similarly ambiguous and also suggests that the reference involves a demonstration. After a brief discussion of names, we will look more fully at questions pertaining to indexicals and demonstratives.¹⁰

Proper Names

Perry's discussion of proper names is limited to standalone occurrences of them, when they are generally used to refer. He does not consider their predicative use or, in particular, their occurrence within quantifier phrases. He uses a few examples of such phrases, for example, 'that David Lewis' (56), 'the David in question' (103), and 'two David Kaplans' (108, 111), but in his account of names he does not mention them. They pose an obvious problem for referentialism, because they seem to involve perfectly literal uses of proper names and should not be dismissed arbitrarily as peripheral.¹¹ So Perry needs to show either that proper names are systematically ambiguous or that these other uses are not literal. Perhaps he would argue that they are a kind of a reflexive use.¹²

Perry posits "permissive conventions" to explain how proper names refer. Now it is obvious that when an individual is named, an association is established between the name and the individual, but what follows from that? Perry thinks it shows that names (directly) refer. His argument is simply this: "the conventions of language assign names directly to objects, and the propositions containing the names are about those objects" (4). This argument is based on two claims he makes later, that linguistic conventions for proper names "associate them with objects, rather than conditions on objects" (102) and that assigning a name to an individual establishes a permissive convention enabling us to designate the individual named (103).¹³

Obviously names are associated directly with objects—somebody names them. But it hardly follows that propositions containing names are about those objects, that these are singular propositions. That is an entirely separate question. Also, it is far from clear that naming an object establishes a permissive convention for designating. Naming is a conventional act establishing that a certain object has a certain name—this much is a matter of convention—but there does not seem to be an additional convention for referring or any need for one. Compare the naming conventions with the convention for having a Social Security number. Aside from the fact that you get your Social Security

number from the government rather than your parents, having a certain Social Security number is the same sort of conventional fact as having a certain name. Even so, we generally do not refer to people by their Social Security numbers. Still, it is easy to imagine circumstances in which we would—say, if names were kept secret and we were introduced to people by their Social Security numbers, or if Social Security numbers were much easier to remember than proper names (imagine that proper names were all at least a hundred syllables long and we didn't use nicknames). In those circumstances, we would expect people to refer to one another by their Social Security numbers. And no special convention would be needed to permit that—people would just do it and recognize when others do it. Similarly, there could be conventions giving names to individuals even if the names were not used to refer to their bearers (maybe they would be used only on things like address labels, luggage tags, and tombstones). If they came to be used to refer, no additional convention would be needed to explain that.

Indexicals and Demonstratives

Perry distinguishes “automatic” indexicals (Kaplan called them “pure” indexicals), such as ‘I’ and ‘today’, from “discretionary” indexicals, notably third-person pronouns and demonstratives (60). His account of their meanings and of how these determine reference relative to context presupposes that these terms are all inherently referential (this does not entail that they always succeed in referring). However, although that may be true of automatic indexicals, discretionary indexicals all have nonreferring uses.¹⁴ Here are a few typical examples of such uses:

- (7) Most golfers wear tacky clothes, but *they* don't realize it.
- (8) Always savor your first sip. *That's* usually the best one.
- (9) (Fire chief: The fire may have been caused by an arsonist.)
Police chief: If so, *he* will be arrested and prosecuted.

These uses of ‘they’, ‘that’, and ‘he’ are not referential, but they all seem to be perfectly normal, literal uses.¹⁵ But, if they are used literally, whether or not they are used referringly, then these terms are not inherently referential. To show that they are requires showing either that they are systematically ambiguous, with both referential and non-referential meanings, or that their nonreferring uses are not really literal. This is a very simple and obvious argument, but, as far as I know, it has never been directly rebutted. Rather, referentialists either ignore nonreferring uses or, if they mention them, just stipulate that their account does not apply to such uses, as if this excuses them from giving a uniform account of the meanings of these terms or else showing either that

these terms as ambiguous or that their nonreferring uses are not literal. Perry doesn't mention them.

Moreover, Perry agrees with Kaplan and many others that the "reference" of a discretionary indexical depends on the speaker's referential intention. If so, how can the reference in question really be semantic rather than merely just a case of speaker reference?¹⁶ In explaining why some indexicals are discretionary, Perry writes, "The designation of an utterance of 'that man' . . . is not automatic. The speaker's intention is relevant" (62). Several men may be standing together, and "which of them I refer to depends on my intention" (notice that Perry switches from "the designation of an utterance of 'that man'" to "which of them I refer to"). But this is already getting into the domain of pragmatics, as is implicit when he explains, "If I intend to secure uptake on the part of my listeners, and them to think of the person to whom I am at least trying to refer, I must do something to make the man salient" (62), unless the object of reference is already salient.¹⁷ If the speaker's referential intention plays a key role and its fulfillment (the hearer's recognition of it) requires something's being salient or being made salient, the relevant intention is part of the speaker's communicative intention, and we are beyond semantics. I will expand on this point in the next section.

The resulting picture is a far cry from Kaplan's official doctrine that demonstratives have characters that can be represented as functions from contexts to contents. That doctrine works smoothly only for pure or automatic indexicals, where values of a short list of contextual parameters determine content. Speaker intention is not another contextual parameter. The meaning of a discretionary indexical or a demonstrative imposes a constraint on the speaker's referential intention, but even within a context there may be several individuals any of which the speaker might intend to use a certain indexical or demonstrative to refer to. Perry takes this "directing" intention, as Kaplan called it (1989a, 582), to be "the intention to refer to an object X simply in virtue of the meanings of one's words and the context, both pre-existing and supplied by the speaker" (60). However, if in the context there are different candidates for being the reference, then obviously context can't determine the reference.¹⁸

Now consider the distinction Perry draws between two types of context, "narrow" and "wide."¹⁹ It corresponds to the distinction between automatic and discretionary indexicals. Narrow context consists specifically "of facts about which things occupy the essential roles involved in the utterance, which I will take to be the agent, time and position" (59), whereas wide context is anything else relevant to determining what the speaker is trying to convey. Determining of this sort is what the audience does to ascertain what the speaker is uttering, saying, or trying to convey. This is *epistemic* determination. In contrast, the role of context in the narrow sense, to provide

values of parameters for determining the reference of context-sensitive expressions, is *constitutive* determination.

The stark difference between constitutive and epistemic determination suggests narrow versus wide context is a distinction in kind. However, something Perry says in the course of introducing the distinction suggests that it is one of degree: "Any indexical will identify an object by a role that it plays in the lives of the speaker and his listeners. And all of these roles will in some way connect with the utterance the speaker makes, for this is the starting point of the cognitive paths on which the speaker real. But given that, the roles vary tremendously in how intimately they are related to the utterance" (59). However, whereas the reference of an automatic indexical is determined by linguistic meaning as a function of context, the reference of a discretionary indexical (or rather, as I will argue, what the speaker refers to in using it) is a matter of the speaker's intention, not a function of context. Contextual information, information that is mutually salient, is what the speaker exploits in forming his intention to use a certain expression to refer to a certain individual and what his listeners rely on in order to identify that individual, but it does not play a constitutive role. In the course of forming an intention to refer to something and choosing a term to refer to it with, to make his intention evident a speaker exploits what is antecedently salient in the speech situation or makes something salient by demonstrating it or with the words he uses (the gender of a pronoun, the nominal in a demonstrative phrase, or even predicate in the sentence), but this is to enable his listeners to determine (ascertain) what he is referring to. It involves what Perry calls the "pragmatic use of context," whereby we "interpret the intention with which the utterance was made" (60). But it is important to realize that (wide) context does not determine what the speaker's intention is but merely helps the hearer figure it out. Of course, for this intention to be reasonable, the speaker needs to utter something in that context such that his audience, taking him to have such an intention and relying on contextual information that they can reasonably take him to intend them to take into account, can figure out what that intention is.

Now consider how salience figures in Perry's account of the content of a demonstrative phrase: the "basic content of [an utterance of 'that ϕ '] is the identifying condition, being the salient ϕ to which the speaker of [that utterance of 'that ϕ '] directs attention" (77). It is clear that Perry takes the property of being salient to be part of the meaning of demonstrative phrases. Yet the role of salience is clearly pragmatic. A speaker who wishes to use a simple demonstrative or demonstrative phrase to refer to something needs to make sure that the intended referent is salient not because the meaning of 'that' requires this but because otherwise his audience would not be able to figure out what he is referring to. If he uses the demonstrative to (try to) refer to something that

isn't salient, he is not misusing the word 'that', in the sense of using it to mean something it doesn't mean (as he would if, say, he thought 'surreptitious' meant what 'syrupy' means). Rather, he would be committing the pragmatic mistake of trying to refer to something that his listener would have no reason to take him to be referring to. It would be like correctly using arcane words knowing full well that one's audience was unfamiliar with them. Obviously it is not part of the meaning of arcane words that they be uttered only to people who understand them.

The moral here is that there is no fact of the matter, independent of the speaker's referential intention, as to what a discretionary indexical refers to.²⁰ There is no question as to what the reference is beyond what the speaker intends to refer to and what his audience takes him to refer to (different members of his audience might take him differently). It is only because there is generally no discrepancy between the two that there seems to be a fact of the matter, hence that we can describe (the use of) the discretionary indexical as itself referring rather than merely as being used to refer. Again, we should not be misled by the ambiguity of the phrase 'indexical reference', which can mean either reference by an indexical or reference (by a speaker) in using an indexical.

Attributing semantic properties to utterances of sentences and to specific uses of their constituents, in particular, any discretionary indexicals (including demonstratives) that occur in them, commits a version of what Barwise and Perry called the "fallacy of misplaced information," that is, "the idea that all the information in an utterance must come from its interpretation" (1983, 34). In this case, the fallacy is the idea that utterances have semantic contents in their own right, as opposed to the semantic contents of uttered sentences and the contents of speaker's intentions in uttering them. This is a fallacy because the fact that a certain expression is being used on a given occasion, and with a certain intention, is a pragmatic fact. It, and any further facts attendant on it, do not provide a source of linguistic information but, rather, a basis for inferring the speaker's communicative intention. Intentions don't endow expressions with semantic properties. Expressions have semantic contents, perhaps relative to contexts, independently of the speaker's intention in using them. Otherwise, the speaker would have to know *his* intention in order to know *their* semantic contents.

Here's another way to put the same point. Sentences and their constituent expressions have semantic properties. That is, they encode information that competent speakers know. This information can be contextually variable, but it is still information associated with expressions considered as linguistic types (tokens of linguistic types carry no additional *linguistic* information).²¹ Utterances of sentences do not encode

information but provide the persons to whom they are directed with evidence for speakers' communicative intentions. This is a very different way of carrying information, and the information so carried plays a very different role. Whereas someone who understands a sentence grasps its semantic content (relative to the context) by virtue of associating certain information with it (and, where necessary, applying values of contextual parameters into lexically mandated slots), to understand an utterance is to identify the communicative intention with which it is made, and that is a matter of inference, not of reading off information.

A corollary of the previous point is that the meanings of discretionary indexicals are not utterance-reflexive. Of course, the intention with which such a term is used is, trivially, an intention the speaker has in making the utterance, but that does not literally make the (constitutive) determination of the reference utterance-reflexive: the indexical itself refers only in the Pickwickian sense that the speaker uses it to refer.

Why Utterance Semantics?

Perry attributes various sorts of contents to utterances. But do utterances really have various contents, and in a way that is semantically relevant? Also, to some extent, it seems that what Perry distinguishes as different contents are really different ways of characterizing the same content, from different perspectives or to different degrees of specificity.²² Finally, it is not clear why he attributes all these contents to utterances and why, in particular, he is unwilling to attribute semantic contents to sentences rather than only to utterances of them. As I see it, his picture of how the different contents come into play encourages a misleading view about the nature of utterances and their relations to what speakers do in producing them and what hearers do in understanding them. Indeed, it tends to blur an independently motivated semantic-pragmatic distinction, one that Perry himself appears to recognize. Although he stresses the difference between what a speaker says and what a speaker conveys in saying it—or what might otherwise be inferred from the fact of the utterance—it seems to me that in certain ways he underplays this difference.

Utterances and Speech Acts

Treating one utterance as having various contents obscures the fact that there are different acts with different contents. Suppose, for example, that an utterance is not literal, as with a likely utterance of 'Bees are electric dewdrops'. Then what the speaker says and what the speaker asserts are two different things. Which is supposed to be the content of his utterance? If it is what the speaker asserts, some such thing as that

bees on flowers deliver shocking sensations when touched, then the utterance content would count as semantically relevant even though the utterance is not literal. That can't be right. But, if it is what the speaker says, that bees are electric dewdrops, then the speaker's communicative intention can't play a role in determining what that is, because the intention comes in only at the illocutionary level. Perry does not mention the distinction, familiar from speech act theory and originating with Austin (1962), between locutionary and illocutionary acts, but he does have occasion to invoke speakers' communicative intentions (as well as salience, another pragmatic notion) as determinants of utterance contents, as in his account of discretionary indexicals. At any rate, the distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts applies to most utterances, and acts of each type have contents. To be sure, one and the same utterance is the performance of both a locutionary and an illocutionary act (more than one if there is an indirect illocutionary act being performed along with a direct one) and is a perlocutionary act, too, but still it is misleading to speak simply of utterance contents as if there were no such distinction to be drawn. Only the content of the locutionary act is relevant to semantics, and this is what is said, strictly speaking. However, intuitions about what is said tend to be insensitive to the locutionary/illocutionary distinction, and to the distinction between what is said and what is merely implicit in what is said.²³

Do Semantic Contents Belong to Utterances?

Syntactic and phonological features belong to linguistic expressions, not to utterances of them. So, for example, speakers with different accents can utter an expression in different ways, thereby producing different-sounding tokens of the expression, but the expression still has the same phonological features. Why should semantic features be any different? In particular, why attribute semantic contents to utterances of expressions rather than to the expressions themselves, as is commonly done, even by referentialists?²⁴ Here is Perry's explanation: "Contents belong to particular utterances, and should not be confused with meanings, which belong to types of expressions. Meanings are the rules that assign contents to the uses of expressions—that is, to particular utterances" (17). Why does Perry suppose that utterances, rather than sentences, have contents? Because meanings "may exploit contextual factors, and assign different contents to different utterances of the same expression. So content is an attribute of individual utterances" (70).

This rather sketchy argument ignores Kaplan's well-known distinction between utterances and sentences-in-contexts (1989b, 522) and his arguments that favor attributing semantic contents to sentences-in-contexts rather than to utterances. He argues

that if semantics is to help explain entailment and formal validity in respect to sentences containing indexicals or demonstratives, it cannot very well take utterances as its subject matter. Citing such obvious facts as that “utterances take time, and [one speaker’s] utterances of distinct sentences cannot be simultaneous” (1989b, 546), Kaplan argues that utterance semantics would get the wrong results. He proposes a somewhat idealized conception of context to make allowances for sentences that can be true but cannot be truly uttered (‘I am not uttering a sentence’), sentences (or sequences of sentences making up an argument) that take so long to utter that their truth values can change during the course of the utterance, and sentences that are too long to utter at all. Sentences have contents, relative to contexts, but contexts here are not to be taken as contexts in which sentences are actually uttered. Contexts must be construed more abstractly. As Kaplan points out, utterances of sentences such as ‘I know a little English’ or ‘I am alive’ are always true, even though their contents are not. Similarly, utterances of sentences such as ‘I don’t know any English’ and ‘I am deceased’ are always false—they cannot be true relative to a context in which they are uttered—but these sentences can still express truths relative to contexts. For some reason, Perry does not mention, much less rebut Kaplan’s arguments (or others’) that favor attributing semantic contents to sentences-in-contexts rather than to utterances.²⁵

These arguments and special examples aside, there are general reasons for being wary of utterance semantics. Perry makes clear that by ‘utterance’ he means an intentional act by a speaker (or by extension, a writer or even gesturer), not a token of a linguistic type.²⁶ But, if one would rather attribute content to the intentional act of uttering a sentence than to the sentence being uttered, one might as well attribute the content to the speaker’s intention.²⁷ So, in regard to Perry’s claim that utterances have multiple contents,²⁸ it would seem that these putative utterance contents are really the contents of different intentions on the part of the speaker (except for those that are really sentence contents). But if that’s the correct way of putting things, then to say that utterances have multiple contents is just to say that they can be made with multiple intentions, each with its own content (presumably intentions don’t have multiple contents). So, insofar as putative contents of utterances are really contents of intentions, the different contents are really contents of distinct items.

Also, utterances are often nonliteral and/or indirect and perhaps almost always not strictly literal.²⁹ Presumably it is not the business of semantics to account for the contents of utterances that are not strictly literal, because in such cases the speaker is trying to convey something that is not predictable from the meaning of the uttered sentence (or, if it is ambiguous, from its operative meaning), relative to the context. Otherwise, anything that a speaker means would count as semantic content, however

far removed it is from what the sentence means. But semantic content is independent of whether an utterance is strictly literal or not. Indeed, it is independent of any linguistic errors (misspeaking, linguistic misunderstanding) on the part of the speaker. So it might as well be regarded, in the usual way, as a property of sentences, albeit relative to contexts.

Semantics and Pragmatics

Perry accepts a semantic-pragmatic distinction, but it is not clear how, or under what conditions, his different levels of utterance content count as semantic or pragmatic.³⁰ In fact, it is not clear what for him counts as semantic and what as pragmatic. In the only place where he is explicit about it, Perry writes, “there is an intuitive distinction between what someone literally said and what is conveyed when we take into account why she said it. Traditionally, the first is included in semantics, the second in pragmatics” (48–49). He then briefly mentions the speaker’s reasoning in choosing what to say and the hearer’s reasoning in figuring out why she said it. He describes the hearer’s reasoning as “a species of inference to the best explanation.” If we accept Grice’s conception of communication (Perry never mentions Grice), presumably what makes it special is that it is reasoning the speaker intends him to engage in, partly on the basis that he is intended to.

I share this conception of the semantic-pragmatic distinction.³¹ In my view, the semantic-pragmatic distinction fundamentally concerns two different types of information associated with an utterance of a sentence. Semantic information is linguistically provided (encoded in the sentence), though it can be sensitive to narrow context; pragmatic information is generated by, or at least made relevant by, the act of uttering the sentence. This way of characterizing pragmatic information generalizes Grice’s point that what a speaker implicates in saying what he says is carried not by what he says but by his saying it and sometimes by his saying it in a certain way (1989, 39). The act of producing the utterance exploits the information encoded but by its very performance creates new or at least invokes extralinguistic information. This extralinguistic information (wide context) includes the fact that the speaker uttered *that* sentence and did so under certain mutually evident circumstances and with a certain communicative intention for the hearer to identify under those circumstances.

From this perspective, viewing utterance content as semantic tends to fudge the semantic-pragmatic distinction. That is because the pragmatic fact that a speaker uttered something and did so with a certain intention affects the content of an utterance. Perry’s contention that the “official” content of an utterance is referential might seem take this into account, but, as argued in the previous section, the fact that with

demonstratives and most indexicals reference depends on the speaker's communicative intention indicates that reference in using them is not a merely semantic matter. That is, speakers use them to refer—they do not refer by themselves.

Also, it seems that Perry's liberal construal of what counts as semantic is driven partly by a controversial underlying assumption. He implicitly assumes that for any utterance of a sentence, the semantic content must be a complete proposition. This explains why, I think, when something needed to yield a complete proposition is missing from the sentence, Perry posits an unarticulated constituent to fill the gap.³² There is no reason, however, to assume that sentences, just because they are syntactically well-formed, must be semantically complete.³³ In contrast, assertive utterances of complete sentences do express propositions. So Perry's view that unarticulated constituents play a semantic role even when they're not lexically or syntactically mandated requires holding that semantic contents are assigned not to sentences but to utterances.

Demonstratives and Utterance Semantics

These observations about semantics, pragmatics, and reference suggest a way of out a certain dilemma posed by sentences containing multiple occurrences of a demonstrative. As Kaplan recognized, such occurrences poses challenges for both utterance semantics and for the sentences-in-context approach. Manuel Garcia-Carpintero (1998) has taken up these challenges, though his aim, as a proponent of utterance semantics, is merely to show that it fares no worse than sentences-in-context semantics. He considers the following examples. Suppose that, while pointing first to one tree branch and then to another, a speaker utters (10) or (11).

(10) *That* is an elm and *that* is a beech.

(11) *That* is older than *that*.

She may be referring to two different trees or, perhaps, unwittingly to one and the same tree twice. This poses a problem, for it seems that the two occurrences of the same word 'that' in the same sentence are used in the same context. Recognizing the problem, Kaplan treats the two occurrences as having distinct characters; however, Garcia-Carpintero argues, this implausibly treats them as, in effect, occurrences of two different words (as when Kaplan uses subscripts in his formal semantics). Garcia-Carpintero also considers two other strategies, what Braun (1996) calls the "context-shifting" strategy, which treats the occurrences as being in different contexts, and Braun's own "three-meaning" strategy, which treats 'that' as having a fixed meaning but variable character, depending in part on associated demonstration, and finds

them, depending on their precise formulations, either empirically inadequate or at least as problematic as utterance semantics (and in some cases merely notational variants thereof). So he concludes that utterance semantics is no worse off than the sentences-in-context approach. But how well off is either one? Leibniz and *Candide* may have thought that this is the best of all possible worlds, but it doesn't follow that this world is a good one. Similarly, Garcia-Carpintero has not shown that either utterance semantics or the sentences-in-context approach is a good one, at least if the latter attributes (context-relative) references to demonstratives themselves. The way out, as I have suggested, is not to ascribe references to demonstratives or to their uses, but to say, simply, that speakers use them to refer. This means, of course, that (utterances of) sentences containing them do not have referential propositions as their semantic contents.

What Is Said, Saying What Is Believed, and Cognitive Significance

In this section, I will briefly take up Perry's view on belief reports, with its assumption that, if a speaker is being sincere, what is said is what is believed. I will question this assumption as well as Perry's view that belief reports contain separate information about what is believed and how it is believed. Also, I will wonder whether Perry's view on belief reports is consonant with his views about cognitive significance.

Perry appears to equate "what is said" or "the proposition expressed" by an utterance, at least if it's a statement, with the content of the belief being conveyed by the speaker, at least if the utterance is literal. Like many others he simply "assume[s] that what a sincere speaker says is what he believes" (19). There is, however, good reason to doubt that the content of every statement is even a possible belief content. Suppose the content of a statement is a singular proposition. Then, as Schiffer (1977) has argued, it cannot be the complete content of a belief. Singular propositions are perfectly good propositions all right—they just aren't the sorts of things that we believe. That is, they do not comprise complete contents of possible beliefs. If they were things we can believe, then (assuming that proper names are directly referential) to believe that Eminem is rapper and to disbelieve that Marshall Mathers is a rapper would be to believe and disbelieve the same thing (and without committing any logical mistakes). So would, to take a perhaps more familiar and more puzzling example, believing that Paderewski had musical talent and to disbelieving that Paderewski had musical talent. It seems, then, that utterances of (12a) and (12b) can both be true, as can the pair in (13).

(12a) Dubya believes that Eminem is rapper.

(12b) Dubya disbelieves that Marshall Mathers is a rapper.

(12c) Dubya believes that Marshall Mathers is a rapper.

(13a) Peter believes that Paderewski had musical talent.

(13b) Peter disbelieves that Paderewski had musical talent.

One strategem for explaining this is to suppose that believing is a three-term relation between agents, things believed, and ways of believing them, and that in a belief report of the form ‘*A* believes that *S*’, in which only the first two terms of this relation are explicitly represented, the way of believing that *p* is an unarticulated constituent of the belief report. Perry still endorses this approach (96–99), a version of which was advanced by Crimmins and Perry (1989) and then developed in detail by Crimmins (1992).

In this way Crimmins and Perry reconcile referentialism with intuitions about the truth conditions of belief reports. They suppose that the ‘that’-clauses of standard belief reports merely specify what is said to be believed and that how it is believed (the notions and ideas involved) is merely implicit in the belief report. The “how” is included as an unarticulated constituent, and is semantically relevant, affecting the truth or falsity of the belief report. Thus they disagree with Salmon (1986), who contends that this information does not enter into the semantic content of the belief report but is merely “pragmatically imparted,” as well as with Soames (most recently in his 2002, chs. 6 and 8). Although this view conflicts with common intuitions about the truth conditions of belief reports, Salmon and Soames maintain that these intuitions, the antisubstitution intuition in particular, are responsive to pragmatic factors, not just to the strictly semantic contents of belief reports. So, for example, if (12a) is true, then so (12c), but it would be misleading to utter (12c) rather than (12a).

One apparent problem with Crimmins and Perry’s view is that there is no syntactic basis for the claim that belief reports implicitly refer to ways of taking propositions (or to notions and ideas of constituents of propositions). Presumably Perry would insist that there can be elements of semantic content that do not correspond to anything in the syntax, but this, as we saw in the previous section, requires an unduly liberal conception of semantics. Then there are Schiffer’s (1992) well-known objections to the Crimmins and Perry view, which Schiffer (1977) himself had originated as the “hidden-indexical” theory.³⁴ The main virtue of this view is that it comports comparatively well with common intuitions. In contrast, as Perry remarks, the Salmon and Soames “bite-the-bullet” approach “requires accepting that many *prima facie* false

belief-reports are true" (97). It seems to me, however, that having no syntactic basis for ascribing an extra argument place to belief reports, merely in order to preserve intuitions about truth values, just reflects a different taste in bullets.

In any case, both views assume that the 'that'-clause of a true belief report fully specifies the content of one of the agent's beliefs. But this "specification" assumption, as I call it (Bach 1997), is questionable and conflicts with intuition too. So, for example, it seems that to believe that Marshall Mathers is a rapper is not to believe the same thing as that Eminem is a rapper. This is the simplest and most straightforward explanation of the apparent fact that a great many people who believe that Eminem is a rapper do not believe that Marshall Matters is a rapper. Both of the referentialist views mentioned above deny that this is a fact and locate the difference not in what is believed but in how it is believed.

Once we accept the intuition that believing that Marshall Mathers is a rapper and believing that Eminem is a rapper is to believe two different things, it is a short step toward conceding that when someone utters, "Marshall Mathers is a rapper," he is saying something different from what he would say if he uttered "Eminem is a rapper." This conflicts with referentialism, and with Perry's same-saying argument. But we saw in the section "The Arguments for Referentialism" that the intuitive support for that argument isn't all that strong—intuitively, ascribing the same property to the same individual is not necessarily to say the same thing.

An alternative for referentialism is to deny that what is said must be what is believed. After all, if what is said is a singular proposition, it can not be what is believed. It is only on the assumption that the 'that'-clause of a true belief report fully specifies something that the agent believes that it even seems plausible to suppose that belief reports report not only what someone believes but how he believes it.³⁵

To all this Perry might reply that believing that Eminem is rapper and believing that Marshall Mathers is a rapper have not only referential but also reflexive contents. He might suggest that although their referential contents are the same, their reflexive contents are different. He could say that our intuitions about truth values are sensitive to both. But then Perry would need to explain how beliefs can have two kinds of contents (and not merely one content characterized in different ways), how it is that notions and ideas, as representations with contents, themselves comprise (reflexive) contents of beliefs, and how the reflexive as well as the referential contents of attributed beliefs get into the (referential) contents of belief reports.

I will close this section with a question. In Perry's view, belief reports implicitly provide information about how what is believed is believed. This information is about the

notions and ideas under which the agent is being said to believe it. So suppose that someone reports correctly that Mother Goose believes that Jack loves Jill. Then they are tacitly referring to certain of Mother Goose's notions of Jack and Jill (and to her idea of the relation of loving). Now suppose that Mother Goose asserts, "Jack loves Jill." In Perry's view the cognitive significance of this statement consists not in its referential content but in its reflexive content. But this concerns information about permissive conventions for using 'Jack' to refer to Jack and 'Jill' to refer to Jill. This may be the cognitive significance of Mother Goose's statement to her listeners, but clearly it is not its cognitive significance for Mother Goose. So my question is how, in Perry's view, does the cognitive significance of a statement to the hearer tie in with the notions and ideas that the speaker has of the constituents of the proposition expressed by the statement?

The same question arises regarding discretionary indexicals and demonstratives. As Perry explains, in connection with an example involving two uses of demonstratives in which the same object is unwittingly referred to, "the reflexive contents of the beliefs are not the same as the reflexive contents of the statements that express them—given the reflexive nature of the contents they could not be" (95). He suggests that in this case two different "perceptual buffers" are associated with, respectively, the speaker's uses of 'this' and of 'that'. Here he says that the buffers "govern" the uses of the demonstratives, which he describes as a "causal connection." It is not clear, however, how this causal connection is effected independently of the speaker's intentions.

Perry's strategy for explaining cognitive significance runs into a special problem with the second-person pronoun 'you'. As Richard Heck has pointed out, "there is no such thing as a second-person belief. . . . Of course, I can identify someone descriptively, as the person to whom I am now speaking, and may have beliefs whose contents involve that descriptive identification. But that is not what I mean to deny. . . . The phenomenon of the second-person is a linguistic one. . . . The word 'you' has no correlate at the level of thought" (2002, 12). That is, although there is a linguistic rule that determines its reference, relative to a context, as the addressee, there is no corresponding second-person way of thinking of someone. (Perhaps Martin Buber would disagree.)

All these examples illustrate my question: if the reflexive content of the use of a referring term provides its cognitive significance for the hearer, what is the connection between this reflexive content, which is a linguistic matter, and the ways in which the speaker using the term thinks of the referent?³⁶ For most terms, there is no unique way of thinking of the referent that is systematically correlated with the meaning of the term or the reflexive content of its use.

Summing Up

I have argued for a number of points regarding Perry's reflexive-referentialism and his way of stating it. Here are the main ones:

(1) Perry's arguments for referentialism and the intuitions they're based on are rather shaky. The argument from counterfactual truth-conditions conflates being rigid with being directly referential and depends on intuitions that are insensitive to the distinction between linguistic reference and speaker reference. The argument from same-saying relies on selective intuitions. Contrary intuitions compete with the intuitions that support the referentialist conception of "official" content.

(2) In particular, there is solid intuitive resistance to referentialism about identity statements and about belief reports involving proper names and/or indexicals. Intuitions about what is said and about what is believed individuate things said and things believed more finely than referentialism allows.

(3) Referentialism holds that the semantic ("official") contents of proper names, and of indexicals and demonstratives, are their references. All of these expressions, however, have nonreferring uses, which Perry does not consider, much less reconcile with his referentialism. As for indexicals, only the references of pure indexicals are determined as a function of context, in the *narrow* sense. So the problem arises of how, when a discretionary indexical (or demonstrative) is used to refer, its semantic content could be affected by the speaker's referential intention. As part of his communicative intention, this intention plays a pragmatic role (in forming his referential intention and choosing a term to use to implement it, the speaker exploits context in the *wide* sense, information that the audience relies on it to identify the intended referent). But if reference is determined by the speaker's intention and this intention plays a pragmatic role, then the term does not refer—it is only used to refer.

(4) Perry's formulation of reflexive-referentialism is cast in the framework of utterance semantics, as opposed to a semantics of sentences-in-context. Unfortunately, he does not explain why he favors the first over the second, and he does not address the well-known difficulties for utterance semantics posed by Kaplan and others. Also, relying on a notion of utterance content tends to obscure the fact that a given utterance involves the performance of several speech acts, each with its own content. People's intuitions about "what is said" tend to be insensitive to these theoretical niceties and tend not to distinguish what is said, which is the content of the locutionary act, from the contents of illocutionary acts, which are matters of speakers' communicative intentions and can be performed directly or indirectly, literally or nonliterally. Besides, it

seems that any contents that seem attributable to utterances are really contents of sentences (relative to contexts) or of speaker's intentions, in which case the notion of utterance content has no autonomous role to play.

Reference and Reflexivity develops and consolidates many of John Perry's ideas regarding the nature, types, representation, and flow of information about particulars. Many of these ideas are very suggestive, but I have not examined them here. Instead of looking at Perry's big picture, I have focused on some of the claims and assumptions in the philosophy of language that underlie this picture as he presents it. I am not suggesting that he couldn't frame it differently and even more effectively.

Notes

1. All page references to Perry are to Perry 2001.
2. It should be noted that Perry, like most direct reference theorists, focuses entirely on singular terms and ignores the problem of cognitive significance for general terms and kind terms. It is not clear how his account would generalize to such terms.
3. Singular propositions, which have individuals as constituents, are commonly contrasted with general propositions, which are quantificational. It is worth noting, as Perry does (28), however, that this distinction is not exclusive, because a proposition may be particular with respect to one argument slot and general with respect to another, as with the proposition that most National League pitchers fear Barry Bonds.
4. We can go further and abstract from the time of the utterance. If I see a scrap of paper with the words 'I am hungry' on it and have no idea not only who wrote them or when, I am still in a position to know that it is true if the person who those words was hungry at that time.
5. Although Kaplan's phrase 'direct reference' is widely used, the presence of the word 'direct' strikes me as redundant, at least from a Russellian point of view. For if an expression refers at all, it refers directly. If it doesn't refer directly, it doesn't refer at all but merely denotes, as with definite descriptions, which Russell analyzes as quantificational. Of course, Kaplan (1989a, 1989b) is concerned to contrast his view with Frege's, on which *both* names and descriptions refer indirectly and their senses, not their references, enter into Thoughts expressed by sentences in which they occur. So the distinction between direct and indirect reference does clarify the difference between Kaplan's and Frege's view, but on neither of their views, nor on Russell's, do some terms refer directly and others indirectly. In other words, the distinction between direct and indirect reference is useful for contrasting different types of theories but not, within any given theory, for contrasting different types of referring expressions.
6. This reminds one of Frege's observation that "If words are used in their ordinary way, what one intends to speak of is their reference."
7. Our intuitions certainly can't be trusted in this regard (see Bach 2002b and Thau 2002, ch. 4). Intuitions about literal content are especially unreliable when there is a recurrent pattern of non-

literality associated with particular locutions or forms of sentence, as with what I call *standardized nonliterality* (Bach 1987/1994, 77–85) and the more commonly recognized phenomenon of *standardized indirection* (Bach and Harnish 1979, 192–219), including what Grice called *generalized conversational implicature* (1989, 37–39), as amply illustrated by Levinson (2000).

8. This doesn't mean that real-time processing occurs in that order (see Bach 1994, sec. 8, and 2001a, sec. 3). See also O'Rourke 2003.

9. Actually, there are two kinds of case here. In one, what is conveyed is merely the reflexive rather than the referential content. The individual constituents of the singular proposition (what is said) do not enter into what is conveyed. In the other case, what is conveyed is, in effect, an annotated version of what is said. It too is a singular proposition, but one containing additional information. It is an example of what I call a "conversational implicature" (Bach 1994), because it is a beefed-up version of what is said.

10. I will not discuss definite descriptions, except to note the following. Perry characterizes them as contributing "identifying conditions" rather than the individuals thus identified to propositions expressed by sentences in which they occur (26). He also characterizes identifying conditions as "modes of presentation" of individuals (102). This suggests a Fregean picture, on which descriptions have both a sense and a reference, though of course Perry rejects such a picture for proper names (Frege assimilates the two, counting definite descriptions as *Eigennamen*). More important, he implicitly rejects Russell's theory of descriptions, according to which they are quantifier phrases. This is a bit puzzling, because Perry holds that sentences containing definite descriptions express general propositions (26).

11. Burge anticipated such an attitude when he described the "appeal to 'special' uses whenever proper names do not play the role of individual constants [as] flimsy and theoretically deficient" (1973, 437). He too was arguing for a unified account of names, one that can handle their various uses.

12. I have defended the view that proper names have reflexive meanings, that they express the property of bearing themselves (Bach 2002a). By employing the same pragmatic strategy that Kripke (1977) uses to explain away the apparent semantic significance of the referential-attributive distinction regarding definite descriptions, I argue that names are not essentially referring terms. Kripke applies this strategy to argue that the fact that definite descriptions are commonly used referentially does not show that semantically they refer; I argue likewise for proper names. It is interesting that this is the same sort of strategy that two of the most prominent Millians, Salmon (1986) and Soames (2002), use to explain away the antisubstitution intuition about names in attitude contexts, for they, too, exploit the fact that people's intuitions are often insensitive to the distinction between the semantic content of a sentence and what it is used to convey. It is ironic that the very distinction these referentialists exploit to save the Millian view can be used to undermine its intuitive basis.

Why does it often seem to people that names themselves refer? When you use a name to refer, generally the property of bearing the name does not enter into what you are trying to convey. For example, if you say, "Aristotle was the greatest philosopher of antiquity," presumably you are not

suggesting that having the name 'Aristotle' had anything to do with being a great philosopher. Rather, you intend the property of bearing that name merely to enable your audience to identify who you are talking about. In this respect, proper names are like most definite descriptions, which are incomplete and generally used referentially. When we use them to refer to specific individuals, the properties they express are incidental to what we are trying to convey.

13. The reflexive contents Perry ascribes to utterances of names include such conventions (108). Later, in chs. 7 and 8, where he develops the idea of notion networks and takes up the no-reference problem, he amends his view to allow for cases in which there is no actual object to which a name in use has been assigned (because the object is fictional or downright nonexistent). The reflexive contents he attributes to utterances of sentences containing such names are propositions about notion-networks. These do not, however, seem to be the sorts of propositions that ordinary users of names are cognizant of. Quite the contrary, it seems that the only people capable of entertaining such propositions are Perry and his readers. In effect, he is building his theory of proper names into their reflexive contents.

14. I will not be discussing demonstrative phrases (so-called complex demonstratives), but King (2001) has made a very strong case that they are quantifier phrases, not singular terms, and suggests the same for simple demonstratives.

15. Neale has made a very strong case that unbound pronouns used anaphorically function like definite descriptions, not referring terms (1990, chs. 5 and 6).

16. One of Kaplan's "Afterthoughts" was that the speaker's "directing" intention rather than demonstration is decisive in determining demonstrative reference (1989a, 582–584). I defended this view (in Bach 1992) against Marga Reimer's (1991) contention that Kaplan, in "Demonstratives" (1989b), was right the first time.

17. Perry mentions four ways of being salient: being an object of the speaker's perception or action, being an object of audience's perception, being part of an anaphoric thread, or being related to in an obvious way to a salient object.

18. Perry recognizes that not just any intention to refer to a certain individual is of the relevant sort. The relevant one is what he calls the "lowest level intention" (61)—that is, the one that relies for its recognition merely on contextual facts and not on the speaker's collateral beliefs, which he cannot reasonably expect the hearer to take into account. In the course of discussing such examples as Kaplan's Carnap-Agnew case, I have suggested a similar conception of distinctively referential intentions (Bach 1992).

19. I have noted the same distinction myself (Bach 1999, 72, and 2001b, 29), but I argue that only narrow context is semantically relevant.

20. In fact, Perry does not say that indexicals and demonstratives refer but that uses or utterances of them refer. As a matter of usage, it strikes me as a bit odd to speak, for example, of the use of 'that' as referring, and much more natural to say that a speaker uses 'that' to refer. But I am making a substantive point. This way of talking is not only is it a bit odd but unnecessary. Speakers use expressions to refer; their uses of expressions don't literally do anything. And to the extent that expressions refer (contrary to Strawson's 1950 insistence that referring is not something an expres-

sions does but only something that someone can use an expression to do), as with pure indexicals, we can say that they refer relative to contexts. But discretionary indexicals and demonstratives do not do that. And to say that uses of them refer is just a awkward and misleading way of saying that speakers use them to refer.

21. Any additional information carried by tokens is not encoded but is signaled by their specific features. For example, how a certain word is pronounced might signal the presence of an implicature. In such cases, it is the fact that the speaker pronounced it in that way that provides the basis for the hearer's inference to the implicature.

22. Perry's comment that "propositions are abstract objects we use to classify cognitive states" (20) makes me wonder whether he would regard this as a genuine issue. Although he often describes propositions as "what is believed" (or as "what is said"), this comment suggests that he thinks that beliefs and other propositional attitudes are not really relations to propositions, except in the Pickwickian sense in which temperatures are relations to numbers (relative to a temperature scale). If so, there is no real difference between believing two distinct propositions and having one belief state that can be classified more or less finely by those two propositions.

23. I develop and defend these points about what is said in Bach 2001b, 2002b.

24. Here I am alluding to the well-known views of Salmon (1986), Kaplan (1989a, 1989b), Richard (1993), Braun (1996), and Soames (2002).

25. Perry does respond to Kaplan in Crimmins and Perry 1989, but not to Richard (1993, 143–145), who argues against Crimmins and Perry's utterance semantics. However, Crimmins (1995) offers a reply to Richard, and Garcia-Carpintero (1998)—in response to Kaplan, Richard, and Braun (1996, 151f.)—argues that utterance semantics fares no worse than sentences-in-context semantics, at least with respect to the sorts of problems raised by those philosophers. The arguments below, however, suggest other, less technical reasons favoring sentences-in-context semantics.

26. He observes that tokens are epistemically basic but insists that utterances are semantically basic (37). I agree with him about tokens. In my opinion, token semantics is, well, token semantics.

27. At one point Perry writes, "Utterances are semantically basic; it is from the intentional acts of speakers and writers that the content derives" (37). But surely the contents of intentional acts derive from agents' intentions and not the other way around.

28. Perry means this literally. He doesn't mean merely that they have multiple truth conditions. He does, however, observe "the concept of 'truth-conditions of an utterance' is a relative concept" (80). That is, there is no such thing as "*the* truth conditions of an utterance." This could mean merely that the one content of an utterance can be characterized, in the form of truth conditions, to a greater or lesser degree of specificity. They could be given in terms of referential contents, any of Perry's reflexive contents, or in even weaker ways (for example, 'Trees have leaves' is true iff whatever is designated by 'trees' have whatever is designated by 'leaves'; or true iff the proposition it expresses is true). No one would object to the claim that there is no such thing as *the* truth conditions of an utterance, but Perry is making a stronger claim, that utterances literally have multiple contents associated with them.

29. As I have suggested in “Speaking Loosely” (Bach 2001a), we rarely make fully explicit what we mean. Even when we use our words literally, we generally don’t use our sentences literally.

30. Perry accepts something like Kaplan’s distinction between presemantic (or metasemantic), semantic, and pragmatic (or postsemantic) matters. He is clear on what is presemantic, namely, whatever is relevant to determining (in the sense of ascertaining) the linguistic meaning of the uttered sentence. This is an issue when, for example, there is homonymy or ambiguity. Obviously, if someone utters a sentence like ‘I saw her duck under the bridge’, it is not part of the semantic content of the sentence that the speaker is using it one way rather than other. And, as Perry explains, it is a presemantic matter which words are being used and, if there is structural ambiguity, which syntactic structure is operative (40).

31. See Bach 1999. I would make one qualification. Consider that what someone intends to convey may be nothing more than what he literally said. Even then, that he intended to convey anything at all is a pragmatic matter, to be ascertained in essentially the same way as any other communicative intention. This is why, contrary to a widespread misconception, Gricean maxims or conversational presumptions, as I prefer to regard them, are operative *whenever* we use language to communicate, not just in implicature and other indirect speech acts and in nonliteral utterances.

32. As I understand Perry, unarticulated constituents, insofar as they are not lexically or syntactically mandated, are constituents not of contents of sentences but of propositions the speaker is trying to convey. Jason Stanley (2002) argues against unarticulated constituents so construed but believes that hidden argument slots are lexically or syntactically mandated in many cases in which Perry probably would not think they are so mandated.

33. I have developed this point elsewhere (Bach 1994). See also Borg 2005.

34. Schiffer’s objections are based on what he calls the “candidate,” the “psychological reality,” and the “logical-form” problems. The first two problems concern what sorts of things the relevant modes of presentation (ways of taking propositions and ways of thinking of their constituents) could plausibly be, such that speakers could plausibly be supposed to make tacit reference to them. The logical form problem, which is related to the syntactic problem, is that there ought to be occurrences of ‘believes’ where its three-place form is explicit, but there do not seem to be.

35. As for the nature of believing itself, recently Michael Thau (2002, ch. 3), has offered reasons to doubt that there is a viable distinction to be drawn between the “what” and the “how” of believing.

36. Perhaps Récanati’s distinction between linguistic and psychological modes of presentation is relevant here (1993, ch. 4).

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