TRANSITIONAL MODES OF DEMOCRATIZATION AND DEMOCRATIC OUTCOMES

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Does the way that states transition from authoritarian rule affect democratic quality and duration? The literature offers competing claims among scholars concerning the role the mode of transition plays in influencing posttransitional democracy. The authors reconcile these claims. First, they classify democratic transitions into four transitional modes, and hypothesize that cooperative transitions result in higher levels of democracy that last longer than other transition types. A method to quantitatively test the mode of transition (the independent variable) against democratic quality and longevity (the dependent variables) is developed. The results provide strong confirmation that states that transition through cooperative pacts are associated with higher levels of democracy and a lower risk of reversion compared to other transition types.

How do modes of democratic transition affect a country’s political development and prospect for consolidation? Studies on democratic transitions are divided in their views on the importance of the mode of transition from dictatorship to democracy. Transitions are the necessary precondition to creating a democracy, but do they have lasting consequences and help us understand if a new democracy will survive and eventually consolidate? To assess the impact of the mode of transition on democratic success, we examine in greater detail an important question in the democratization literature: do modes of transition from dictatorship to democracy matter (Munck and Leff 1997)? In order to determine whether transitions matter...
we construct two complimentary questions. First, does the way in which states transition to democracy affect democratic quality? That is, do certain types of transitions result in a more rapid democratic deepening than others? Second, is democratic duration a function of transitional modes? Are some modes of transition more likely than others to result in a reversion to authoritarian rule? The bifurcation of these issues is important since duration is not synonymous with quality and some democracies achieve a rapid deepening despite being democratic for only a few years.

In recent years there has been a move away from asking how transitions happen in favor of discussing democratic consolidation. This study suggests understanding transitions remains important. First, a large part of the world is undemocratic. The majority of Africa, the Middle East and large parts of Asia are gripped by authoritarian regimes, often brutal and repressive. Next, the transition literature falls short in creating generalizable conclusions about the influence of transition type on democracy. This study sorts these issues out, in an effort to understand systematic and explicable patterns of transitional legacies and to create generalizable conclusions regarding modes of transition on the success of democracy. This project constitutes a first step in identifying problematic transitions in order to understand the unique circumstances which accompany democratic breakdown and also builds upon the important works of earlier scholars.

This paper makes three contributions to the literature. First, we attempt to progress the literature towards solving an important debate among scholars as to whether modes of transition matter. Our research will show that transitions are both “defining and formative” events that have lasting consequences on the quality and duration of democracy. Second, we create a parsimonious categorization from which to classify transitioning states, and argue that transitions occur through one of four methods. Third, we develop a theoretical explanation as to why opposition-led transitions are the most viable path to democratic installation. Certain features of transitions
initiated and led by opposition groups are geared towards democratic success compared to other transition types.

**LITERATURE REVIEW**

The general consensus in the literature suggests that democratic transitions are formative and defining moments for a new democracy, and that the mode of transition helps explain the shape the new democracy will take upon emersion and whether or not it is likely to consolidate. By the account of some scholars, who posit a path dependency analysis of democratization, the mode of transition from authoritarian rule has far-reaching implications for the prospects of democratic consolidation (Linz 1981; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Karl 1990; Di Palma 1990; Huntington 1991; Karl and Schmitter 1991; O’Donnell 1992; Linz and Stephan 1996; Munck and Leff 1997). Due to its effects on the post-transitional regime and on the pattern of elite competition, the institutional rules crafted during the transition and on elites acceptance or rejection of these rules are formative (Munck and Leff 1997, 345). Yet, consensus ends here.

Scholars argue the merits of certain transitional modes over others. A review of the democratization literature reveals two general hypotheses about the effects of pacted transitions. According to O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) a pact is defined as an “explicit, but not always explicated or justified, agreement among a select set of actors which seeks to define (or, better, to redefine) rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the “vital interests” of those entering into it” (37). This study defines pacts more generally as a negotiating unit, comprised of incumbent and opposition groups, attempting to bargain the transition away from authoritarian rule to democracy. Some argue that pacted transitions offer the most viable path to the installation of democracy (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Karl 1990; Karl and Schmitter 1991; Higley et al. 2002; Higley and Burton 2006).
Alternatively, others claim *pacted* transitions negatively affect democratic consolidation and deepening by depressing the level of competition or contestation across political parties in the subsequent democracy (Karl 1987; Przeworski 1991; Hagopian 1996). For example, Przeworski (1991) argues “the danger inherent in such substantive pacts is that they will become cartels of incumbents against contenders, cartels that restrict competition, bar access, and distribute the benefits of political power among the insiders. Democracy would then turn into a private project of leaders of some political parties and corporatist associations, an oligopoly in which leaders of some organizations collude to prevent outsiders from entering” (90-91). Along these same lines, Karl (1987) suggests pacts tend to demobilize new social forces and circumscribe the participation of certain actors in the future.

Still others argue transition through revolution or breakdown of the *ancien régime* is the least problematic transition due to the opposition being able to impose demands for unrestricted elections and the inability of the old elites to interfere in the democratization process. Karl and Schmitter (1991) argue that revolutions produce enduring patterns of domination but not necessarily democratic ones, while Munck and Leff (1997) suggest *reform through rupture* is the least difficult type of transition since it results in a complete break from the past and allow the opposition unrestricted elections. However this quick transformation to democracy is potentially troublesome since it reduces the incentives for elites to foster cooperative relationships and consensus with others during the transitional period.

We are left with conflicting accounts about how the transitional period impacts the new democracy. We empirically test these divergent views in the hope of arriving at an optimal level of generalizable conclusions. The contradictory descriptions of regime transition typology on the prospects for democratic consolidation leave many unanswered questions, partially due to a lack of empirical analysis and conceptual imprecision. The existing research is largely descriptive or based on country-specific case studies. These case studies have shed light on the nuances of transitions but it is inherently difficult to apply the findings in one country to another although many lessons can be drawn. Coupled with a cross-national statistical analysis, the two approaches can complement one another and provide us with a new understanding of transitions that has previously eluded us. Further, the differing approaches to transitions are rooted in structuralist, strategic choice,
in institutional, or political economy approaches, often to the exclusivity of one over the other (Guo 1999). Our goal is to progress the literature to its next logical step—cross national statistical analyses that incorporate the various approaches. This allows us to assess the merits of the aforementioned claims. This study proceeds under the following assumptions: (1) regime transitions occur through a variety of ways that can be specified and categorized into four types; (2) consensus exists that the mode of transition directly affects the prospects of democratic consolidation—that some modes are more likely to lead to democratic deepening than others; (3) that it is possible to conceptualize and measure democratic quality and duration and empirically test it against any given mode of transition, and (4) identifying problematic transitions helps us to understand the dynamics most likely to lead to democratic breakdown and the reversion to authoritarianism. In this study, we explore (1) and (3). Assumption (2) is taken for granted and (4) is an area left for future research.

A THEORY OF TRANSITIONS

A regime transition is the “interval between one political regime and another” (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 6). A democratic transition is therefore the interval between an authoritarian polity and a democratic one. In defining democratic transitions, the “transfer of power” is usually identified as the key element, which by definition equals democratization and consists of two distinctive phases. The essential ingredient of a democratic transition is that political authority is derived from the free decision of an electorate (Linz, 1993; Przeworski, 1986; Welsh, 1994). Transition refers to the intermediate phase which begins with the dissolution of an old regime and ends with the establishment of a new one (Cortona, 1991). Democratic transitions consist of two simultaneous but to some extent autonomous processes: a process of dissolution of the authoritarian regime and a process of emergence of democratic institutions (Przeworski, 1986; Welsh, 1994). “The key difference between authoritarian regimes and their democratic successors is that the rules of the latter guarantee opposition groups the right to challenge incumbent rulers and policies, and to replace those rulers through competitive elections. Such competition assumes broad suffrage
TRANSITIONAL MODES OF DEMOCRATIZATION

rights, free speech and association, and guarantees of basic civil liberties. Democratic transitions can be considered to have occurred when authoritarian governments are forced to yield power to ones that operate within this set of rules” (Haggard and Kaufman, 1995). Therefore, in this study, democratic transition is defined as a political process of movement aimed at establishing a democratic political system, initiated either from above or below or a combination of both, promoting democratic values and goals, tolerating opposition, allowing bargaining and compromise among different political forces for the resolution of social conflicts, institutionalizing the pluralist structures and procedures by which different political forces are allowed to compete over the power, regularizing transfer of power, and engaging in the fundamental transformation of political structure.

In this study, we classify the transition along two main dimensions: 1) the relative balance of power among incumbent and opposition elites during the transition, and 2) the smoothness of the transition. Dimension 1 has a profound influence on Dimension 2. The balance of power or the relative power advantage of competing groups shape the nature of the transition process and often change during that process. If those who resist change dominate the government and radicals prevail in the opposition, a democratic transition may not be possible. Democratic transitions are facilitated if pro-democratic or moderate groups are dominant in both the government and opposition. The strategic interaction between these groups is therefore of central importance in the transitional process.

Where opposition groups and incumbents are relatively equal in power, the transition tends to be characterized by bargaining and negotiation. This is because neither side can be certain of victory should the transition progress through uprising. Where there is a large disparity in power, the resulting transition is often violent, in the event that negotiations break down. For example, unless a relatively powerful opposition can force a relatively weak incumbent government to transition the state, then certain of victory, the
more powerful opposition will initiate regime overthrow through violent means (revolution). In the case of a dominant incumbent regime unwilling to negotiate a democratic transition, the only means of removal is through foreign intervention, when a more powerful state forcefully removes the incumbent government. Transition by regime collapse (revolution) and foreign intervention, by nature are violent transitions characterized by greater disparities in power between incumbents and the opposition, while negotiated transitions are characterized by less asymmetry of power. However, power is rarely, if ever, equal. Even during negotiated transitions, one side holds the upper hand. In these transitions, it is the party with the upper hand that exerts the most influence in the bargaining process away from autocracy. This has profound consequences on the rules adopted in the new democracy.

Ward and Gleditsch (1998) show how “smooth” transitions toward democracy associate with lower risks of war, while “rocky” (or violent) transitions associate with increases in war. They note that “a possibly rocky process of democratization or transition towards a fragile democracy need not necessarily imply that countries become immediately more peaceful” (53). Alternatively, smooth monotonic transitions associate with the lowest risk of war and greatest benefit (59). That is, smooth transitions result in higher levels of democracy during the posttransitional phase. Building on the work of Ward and Gleditsch, we argue that rapid transitions (collapse and interventions) associate with lower levels of democracy during the posttransitional phase and are more likely to revert to authoritarian rule than are peaceful transitions, characterized by an atmosphere of cooperation and pacts. This requires further explanation.

Violent transitions pose certain problems in the democratization process. In collapse, opposition groups unite in their desire to bring about the fall of the authoritarian regime and often appear divided after the fall in the
struggle over the distribution of power and the creation of the new regime. In Nicaragua, Iran, Portugal, and Romania, the abrupt collapse of authoritarian regimes led to struggles among opposition groups (Huntington 148) that had previously demonstrated unity to overthrow the government. In Nicaragua and Iran, democratic moderates lost out; in Portugal it was only after a protracted struggle between military factions, mass mobilization, demonstrations, and strikes did it settle on a democratic course. These “dangerous” types of transitions result in institutionalized states that rely heavily on force during their revolutionary stage; the institutions and norms which emerge reflect this (Ward and Gleditsch 1998, 53). Rapid transitions reveal the harshness of the environment from which they emerge. Overthrowing a dictatorship and establishing a democracy typically means dismantling the prior system of government and starting anew. Rapid transitions result in greater uncertainty because they require a systemic effort in the creation and evolvement of democratic institutions and the rule of law. While the collapse itself occurs quickly, the rebuilding of the state is a lengthy process carried out in an uncertain environment characterized by intense power struggles. The result is a higher occurrence of authoritarian reversion.

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The record of foreign interventions leads to mixed results. Some share the same features as revolutions, displaying great instability during the posttransitional stage, such as Iraq and Afghanistan. In all foreign interventions, as previously mentioned, opposition groups are not strong enough to bring about the collapse of the authoritarian regime which can generally only occur through the military action of a dominant foreign force. As a consequence, the resulting power struggle after the fall is often intense, prone to civil unrest and legitimacy problems. There are exceptions though. In Panama, the United States restored a democratically elected regime by ousting the “election stealer” and democracy proceeded smoothly after intervention. The World War II interventions display a similar pattern, such as Japan and Germany. In these cases, U.S. military occupation led to major
social, political, and economic reconstruction for the purpose of creating a
democratic government. The circumstances of the time (i.e., the Cold War)
cannot be discounted as contributing factors to successful democratization.
In recent times, foreign interventions have led to quite different results. In
Haiti, foreign intervention by the United States resulted in civil unrest and
the quick collapse of democratic rule. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the new
governments face legitimacy problems; tribal and ethnic divisions continue
to plague each country and the outcome of representative government is
unclear at this point. Although foreign interventions typically come with
large sums of aid for rebuilding the target country, it appears that additional
factors to successful democratization are also needed such as a homogenous
culture and the military and financial commitment of the intervening country
towards democratic success.

Negotiated transitions, in contrast, are characterized by their compromise
nature and are void of violence; however, the balance of power in these transitions
is important and largely missing from the existing literature. In peaceful transitions,
whether incumbent elites take the lead in reform or where incumbent elites and
opposition groups negotiate a transition, they reflect contending forces agreeing
to forgo their capacity to harm each other and guarantee not to threaten
each others vital interests (Karl and Schmitter 1991; 281). Viewing peace-
ful transitions as a series of accords—including agreements between the
military and civilians over the establishment of civilian rule, agreements
between political parties to compete under the new rules of governance,
and social contracts between state, business, labor, property rights and the
distribution of benefits, is helpful in understanding the non-violent nature
of these transitions. Similarly, and unlike violent transitions, the existing
system of government is reformed rather than rebuilt.

An important distinction among peaceful transitions is the balance of
power among incumbents and opposition groups. Easter (1997) argues
that the structure of old regime elites, as they emerge from the breakdown
phase, determines institutional choice in the new democracy. It is clear
that one important outcome of negotiations between the regime and the opposition is the establishment of electoral rules which influence founding elections (Sutter 2000) and the subsequent development of democracy. Variation in structure is determined by the continuity in the internal integrity of the old regime elites and by the extent to which old regime elite’s retain access to their power resources. Under incumbent-led transitions (which we refer to as regime conversion), those in power are expected to design reform and electoral rules to favor their party and continued rule in the new democracy. Consolidated old regime elites come through the breakdown phase structurally intact (Easter 1997) under conversion and do not experience severe cleavages or internal fragmentation. In these cases, opposition forces are too weak to force old regime elites to alter the means of acquiring power. As a result, old regime elites successfully retain their monopoly of power resources in the transition phase. For example, if incumbent led pacts tend to depress posttransitional competition, then it becomes more difficult to achieve democratic deepening. This suppression of competition under incumbent-led pacts is detrimental to the survival of the new democracy. To the extent that opposition groups are not offered a place at the table in the new democracy, dissatisfaction is likely to be high and the consequences grave. If opposition groups fail to affect change under the reformed system, they may feel that a complete removal of the regime is their only remaining option.

Alternatively, under opposition-led transitions (which we refer to as cooperative transitions) opposing forces are primarily concerned with transitioning the state; their common interest is democracy and stability. Opposition forces successfully mobilize mass support to dislodge incumbent elites from their positions of power. Old regime elites are forced to negotiate a transition to democracy (cooperate) and compete for power in the same manner as new political actors. Additionally, opposition-led transitions often constitute numerous competing groups who seek a role in the new democracy, along with incumbent elites, and this results in a more level playing field.
more level playing field, whether through the adoption of electoral rules that maximize the ability of parties to obtain seats in the legislature or through various other power-sharing arrangements. As a consequence, we argue regime cooperation is the transition type most likely to lead to the highest posttransitional levels of democracy and longevity.

Hypotheses

Our study suggests that cooperative transitions are more beneficial than other transition types. We argue that cooperative transitions result in the highest levels of democracy in the immediate posttransitional environment and associate with the longest survival rates. We formulate the following hypotheses to test our claims:

H₁: Cooperative transitions will result in higher average levels of democracy in the posttransitional phase compared to other transitional modes.

H₂: Cooperative transitions will have the greatest survival rate within 10 years of transition compared to other transitional modes.

Cooperative transitions reflect the ideal trajectory of governance in democratic growth. In this prototype model, three stages of development associate with the process of state change: (1) the transition itself, reflected by lower levels of democracy; (2) transitional growth, reflected by increasing levels of democracy as the state builds stronger institutions of government, rule of law and a robust civil society emerges; and (3) democratic consolidation, typified as a “safe zone” for democracy with the likelihood of reversion to authoritarian rule almost zero. Similar to Kadera’s (2001) use of the population model that implies a state’s power naturally expands over time until it reaches the maximum level of resources to sustain its population, the application of the model to democratic government reflects increasing levels of democracy up until consolidation, when democratic levels continue to rise, but at a much slower pace. Here, democratic growth under peaceful transitions is expressed as:

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dD/dt = \alpha p
\]

and is reflected in Figure 1.
RESEARCH DESIGN

Mode of Transition—the Independent Variable

The literature on modes of transition is diverse. First, scholars categorize democratizing states into varying modes of transition, for the purpose of classifying historic and contemporary cases into these modes (Dahl 1971; Linz 1978; Linz 1981; Share 1984; Share and Mainwaring 1986; Share 1987; Linz 1990; Karl 1990; Huntington 1991; Karl and Schmitter 1991; Munck and Leff 1997). The classification of different modes of transition is then used to examine the effects on democratic deepening (Dahl 1971; Huntington 1984; Karl 1990; Huntington 1991), and the diverse problems and tradeoffs faced during the transition and consolidation periods (O’Donnell 1989, 1992; Valenzuela 1992) as well as the causal link between transition type and the kind of democracy that emerges (Linz 1981).

Building on the previous work on modes of transition, we devise four transition categories (see Figure 2). The reason for devising these categories is not for the sake of creating additional terminology, but rather to merge...
together transitional modes for consistency and to create generalized categories which reflect the balance of power among incumbents and elites. Creating more generalized transitional modes allows us to aggregate prior modes into broader categories and classify the majority of transitioning states. For purposes of classifying cases, we develop the following categories:

1. Conversion—when the elites in power take the lead in democratization and the government is stronger than the opposition. “Regime-led reform,” “regime-initiated liberalization,” or “change from above” all constitute terms that describe the central feature of this mode of transition. In these transitions, the incumbent elites are willing to initiate a change and seek reform, and lead the reform process. Sometimes, a faction within the ruling elite prompts an opening to reform from above, or elites agree upon a multilateral compromise among themselves. Thus, the relative power of reformers must be stronger than that of standpatters in order for the transition to occur, and those in power are willing to take the lead and play the decisive role in ending that regime and changing it into a democratic regime. In many cases, incumbents transition (or convert) the state with no input from opposition groups; however, often opposition groups play some role in the transitions although they are weaker than incumbents. As a result, incumbent-led negotiated pacts can be viewed as a sub-category of regime conversion. Such countries include Spain, Brazil, Taiwan, Hungary, USSR, Bulgaria, and Chile (Transformation, Huntington; Transaction, Transaction, Cooperative, Collapse, Foreign Intervention).
TRANSITIONAL MODES OF DEMOCRATIZATION

Share/Mainwaring; Reforma, Linz; Pact, Karl and Schmitter; Reform through Extrication/Revolution from Above, Munck and Leff).

(2) Cooperative—democratization is a result of the joint action by government and opposition groups. “Pact,” “negotiated transition” or “compromise” describe the central feature of this mode of transition. Change occurs within and outside the incumbent elite and reforms occur through joint cooperation between incumbents and the opposition. Within the government, there is a balance between reformers and standpatters such that the government is willing to negotiate a change of regime, but unwilling to initiate a change of regime—usually it has to be pushed and pulled into formal or informal negotiations with the opposition. Within the opposition, democratic moderates are strong enough to prevail over revolutionary radicals or extremists, but they are not strong enough to overthrow the government. Both the government and opposition must recognize their incapability to unilaterally determine the future and therefore see virtue in negotiation. The incumbents or the ruling elites must be able to see their interests protected and secured in the foreseeable regime change, or at least not threatened by the change of regime, and thus willing to negotiate with the opposition to take such a strategic choice. The government must recognize that the costs of constant suppression, intolerance, and non-negotiation are too high or unbearable in terms of increased repression leading to further alienation of social groups from the government, intensified conflicts within the ruling coalition leading to self-destruction, increased possibility of a hard-line takeover of the government, and significant losses in international legitimacy. The political process leading to cooperative transition is thus often marked by a hauling back and forth of strikes, protests, and demonstrations on the one hand, and repression, police violence, and martial laws on the other. Cycles of protests and repression eventually led to negotiated agreements between government and opposition in all cases such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Uruguay, Bolivia, Honduras, El Salvador, South Korea, and South Africa. (Transplacement, Huntington; Extrication, Share/Mainwaring; Reform through Transaction, Munck and Leff; Pact, Karl and Schmitter; Reform from below, Munck and Leff).8

(3) Collapse—Opposition groups take the lead in bringing about democracy, and the authoritarian regime collapses or is overthrown. “Opposition-led
overthrow” or “change from below” describes the central feature of this mode of transition. In collapse, reformers within the regime are weak or non-existent while standpatters are dominant in government and strongly opposed to regime change. Since the possibility of initiating reform from above is almost totally absent, democratic transitions consequently result from the opposition gaining strength and the government losing strength until the government collapses or is overthrown. The involvement and support from public masses is another necessary condition for the transition. The opposition is able to control the transition with little or no control exerted by the incumbent elite who are too weak to control the process, such as when the masses rise up in arms and overthrow the government through violence. In collapse, the unwillingness of the military to defend the old regime is another crucial factor in ending the old regime. Collapse encompasses a transition led by a revolution or coup d’état. Such countries include Portugal, Greece, Argentina, Philippines, Romania, and East Germany (Replacement, Huntington; Ruptura, Linz; Breakdown/Collapse, Share/Mainwaring; Revolution/Imposition, Karl and Schmitter; Reform through Rupture, Munck and Leff).

(4) Foreign Intervention—foreign military interference is used to remove the authoritarian regime and occurs when a dominant external power topples the ancien régime. Interventions by foreign military invaders share many of the same traits as replacement: incumbent reformers are virtually non-existent and the current regime is opposed to change, as witnessed in Iraq. In the case of regime collapse, rulers who are forcibly removed from power often face death, exile, or incarceration (e.g., Hussein who was executed, or Noriega from Panama who has been incarcerated since his removal from power in 1990). Foreign Intervention has brought about regime change in countries such as Grenada, Panama, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Similarly, foreign interventions have been referred to by other scholars as Intervention (Huntington); and Imposition (Karl and Schmitter). Iraq in 2003 typifies removal by foreign intervention. Saddam Hussein and his regime held a tight grip on power for over 30 years. No opposition was tolerated under Hussein, thus there did not exist a domestic group capable of removing him from power. Change could only occur through a dominant external foreign power, in this case a coalition led by the United States. Similar to regime collapse, the rulers of regimes violently removed from power often face less than desirable
TRANSITIONAL MODES OF DEMOCRATIZATION

fates (e.g., Hussein who was executed, Noriega in Panama 1990 who has been imprisoned since his capture).

Between the four classifications presumably lie a large number of mixed transitions, encompassing features of more than one mode of transition. Because regime transitions are complex historical events, certain transitions are difficult to classify, such as Chile. Munck and Leff (1997) categorize Chile as reform from below, Huntington (1991) as transformation, and Karl and Schmitter (1986) somewhere between imposition and pact. Other cases bear similar difficulties, such as Argentina, Greece, Peru, and Zambia. Nonetheless, with each case a trigger event can usually be identified as the starting point for the democratization process. We use that event as the decision rule to classify the mode of transition for any given country.

For example, in Chile, the key event occurred in October of 1988, when General Pinochet submitted himself to a yes or no vote on his continued rule. Having made commitments to restore democracy and encouraged by economic growth, Pinochet viewed the elections as an opportunity to restore legitimacy to his rule in the anticipation that voters would continue his government in power; however, he miscalculated voter sentiment and lost the election 55 percent to 43 percent. In terms of classifying Chile’s transition, the following is noted: prior to the plebiscite, Pinochet’s government is stronger than the opposition group and is the impetus of change. After losing the election, Pinochet’s government leads the reform process, albeit under growing pressure, as evident in Pinochet transferring power to Patricio Aylwin, the new democratically elected president, in 1990. Pinochet’s power then continues as he retains the post of commander-in-chief of the army until 1998, when he assumes a seat in the Chilean Senate. In Chile, the process of democratization commenced through ruling elite action, although the outcome is unintended. Thus, Chile is classified as conversion. Appendix A lists the classification of third wave transitions.

In identifying transitions from authoritarianism to democratic rule, we use the updated Political Regime Change dataset. The dataset, originally created by Gasiorowski (1996) and updated by Reich (2002), contains a categorical regime classification for over 150 countries from the founding of a modern nation-state through December 1998, with regimes identified as democratic, semi-democratic, or authoritarian. For purposes of this study, we focus on democratic transitions beginning with the Third Wave.
in 1973. In order to classify transition modes as Conversion, Cooperative, Collapse or Foreign Intervention, we carefully examine historical sources for each country to determine how regime change occurred, and also rely on Huntington’s (1991) classifications in *The Third Wave* and the Polity IV Country Reports (2002). In total, we examine regime change in 57 countries and measure democracy scores over 570 country years.

**Democratic Quality—the Dependent Variable**

The dependent variable in the study is the level of democracy (i.e., quality) within each democratizing country over a 10-year period. To analyze a country’s level of democracy, we use the Polity IV (2004) index. Democracy indices identify the degree to which a country is either democratic or authoritarian and therefore suitable to a study concerned with measuring both the quality of democracy and its longevity—Polity IV allows us to do both.

The data we use covers all countries of the world, from 1973 (or the date they came into existence) to 1995.\(^{10}\) The dependent variable is referred to as “PY” in the model (for Polity Year), an ordinal measure, and it reflects levels of democracy within each country over an interval (years 1-10 after the coded date of the mode of transition—see Appendix 2). Level of democracy calculates from an index based on each country’s Polity Score IV annual rating for political competition and executive restraints. It ranges from -10 to 10, with -10 representing the least democratic states and 10 representing states with the most democratic political institutions. The weighted indicator is comprised of three components: the presence of democratic institutions and procedures, institutional checks on the executive exercise of power, and political participation.

We acknowledge that any scaled measure of democracy is not a perfect measurement but these are the constraints in conducting a cross-national statistical analysis of this sort. Further, of all the measurements of democracy, Polity IV is as widely accepted as any other and are used extensively in international relations and comparative politics. More importantly, all of the indicators used to construct the aggregate measure are accessible and well documented. Polity scores are designed to provide a scaled description of “polities,” based on “authority patterns” described by Eckstein...
and Gurr (1975). The observed data are indicators related to executive recruitment, “directiveness” and responsiveness, constraints on the executive and political participation. The Polity IV scores use five expert-coded categorical indicators, all capable of being ordered: (1) Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment, (2) Openness of Executive Recruitment, (3) Executive Constraints/Decision Rules, (4) Regulation of Participation, and (5) Competitiveness of Participation.

Although it is technically an indicator of “freedom,” this rating correlates at upwards of .85 with other accepted measures of democracy such Freedom House scores. Polity data are also used to measure democracy in many respected studies (e.g., Hartman and Hsiao 1988; Nagle 1985; Scoble and Wiseberg 1988; Ward and Gleditsch 1998) and, together with Freedom House scores, are the only annual time series democracy indicators available, and therefore the only ones suited to a study of democratic quality. The dataset containing the Polity IV scores for all independent countries for the period 1973-1995 allows us to examine the entire period of the third wave for all regions of the world.

Polity scores measured over time are consistent with the concept of democratic sustainability and consolidation. Higher levels of democracy reflect greater relative levels of democratic quality. Measuring Polity scores over time captures reversion, stagnation and progression against the mode of transition. For example, a country with a Polity score of 10, measured in year 10, is a strong indicator that reversion to authoritarianism is highly unlikely (i.e., democracy is institutionalized). Alternatively, a state with Polity Scores of 6, 5, 3, -2, -2 in years 1, 3, 5, 7, 10 after transition effectively captures a democratic reversal. However, we note that inferences about the quality of democracy should reflect the fact that democracy is a latent variable, measured indirectly with a limited number of imperfect indicators and hence subject to measurement error.

For the dependent variable, we do not start measuring Polity IV scores when the actual process of liberalization starts; it is simply not possible, nor necessary, to do this since Polity IV reflects a “transitional process” score for many nations rather than a democratic rating as the process of state change starts. Polity scores for some countries (especially those gradually liberalizing) show a softening of the authoritarian regime but cannot be considered democratic until the first national election. For example, an
incumbent elite-led process may begin years before the first democratic election, such as in Taiwan when then-President Chiang Ching-kuo liberalized the system and allowed opposition parties to exist starting in 1986. Alternatively, where change is rapid, the overthrow of the government is often followed by elections in a matter of months (East Germany went from a Polity score of -9 in 1988 to a 10 in 1991). The difficulty in measurement is apparent in these cases; elite-guided transformation processes often reflect a steady softening of the authoritarian regime, leading to gradual democracy ratings, while in a collapse, Polity scores reflect a democratic rating within a couple of years.

To measure the dependent variable with Polity IV scores, we start from the first democratic national election. This is also an artifact of the data source. In Taiwan, for example, we qualitatively evaluated the mode of transition and determined the trigger event as Chiang’s liberalization policies beginning in 1986. Since Chiang was the incumbent ruler and led the reform process with the ruling party, the mode of transition was incumbent led; at the time, there was little input from the opposition. As a result, Taiwan transitioned by conversion. The reform process accelerated over the next five years and the first national election was held in December of 1991. We then reviewed the Polity scores for Taiwan during this period. On the eve of reform, in 1986, Taiwan had a Polity IV score of -7. From 1987-1991, the Polity score improved dramatically to a -1, which reflected a softening of the authoritarian regime, a direct result of Chiang’s liberalization policies. Finally, in 1992, after the first national election, the Polity score increased to 7, clearly indicating a democratic polity. We begin measuring the dependent variable in 1992 which is consistent with our coding rule of starting from the first democratic national election. To clarify, the mode of transition (the independent variable) is determined by the trigger event (a singular or series of events that starts a country’s movement towards democracy), while the first national election is used as the measurement starting point of the dependent variable. Clearly there is a lag between the two; however it is a reasonable way to

There were democratic elements within the 1979 Iranian Revolution (the trigger event being a regime collapse) that quickly lost out to authoritarian theocratic elites.
TRANSITIONAL MODES OF DEMOCRATIZATION

proceed because it provides consistency in coding of both the independent and dependent variables.

Our cutoff point for a democracy is a Polity IV score of 5. While this is the lower end of what constitutes democracy, its sine qua non is competitive elections. Excluding cases that never reach a democratic threshold is not problematic as we are only concerned with understanding how the mode of transition influences the resultant democracy—both its quality and sustainability. For example, there were democratic elements within the 1979 Iranian Revolution (the trigger event being a regime collapse) that quickly lost out to authoritarian theocratic elites. Since Iran never achieved a first democratic election, it is not included in the dataset. In this regards, we weed out transitions that do not culminate in a first competitive national election, even where those transitions possessed some democratic elements.

Methodology

Both hypotheses are meant to measure the affect the mode of transition has on democracy. In H1, we are concerned with democratic quality ratings and in H2, we are concerned with democratic duration. The core model specifications are represented in the following equations:

\[
H_1: \text{PY}_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1(\text{Transition Type}) + \beta_2(\text{Region}) + \beta_3(\text{Institutional Choice}) + \beta_4(\text{Prior Regime Type}) + \beta_5(\text{Prior Dem History}) + \beta_6(\text{per capita GDP}_t) + \beta_7(\text{GDP}_{gr}) + \varepsilon
\]

\[
H_2: \text{Transition}_i(t) = \lambda_0(t) \exp \{\beta_0 + \beta_1(\text{Transition Type}) + \beta_2(\text{Institutional Choice}) + \beta_3(\text{Prior Regime Type}) + \beta_4(\text{Prior Dem History}) + \beta_5(\text{per capita GDP}_t) + \beta_7(\text{GDP}_{gr}) + \varepsilon
\]

where:

PY = Polity Score at time \( t \) for \( H_1 \)

Transition Type = the mode of transition from authoritarian rule (Conversion (baseline), Cooperative, Collapse and Foreign Intervention)

Region = North America (baseline), Europe, North Africa & Middle East, South America, Asia & Pacific and Sub-Saharan Africa
INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE = Parliamentary (baseline), Presidential and Mixed
Prior Regime Type = Military (baseline); Single-Party, and Personalistic
Prior Democratic History = Yes (Baseline); No
Per capita GDP$_t$ = per capita gross domestic product at time $t$
GDP$_{gr}$ = gross domestic product growth rate at time $t$

In order to test H$_1$, we use ordinary least squares regression and estimate
robust standard errors.$^{11}$ H$_2$ is estimated using the Cox proportional hazard
model to determine the probability of a democratic reversal. Survival analysis
is suitable for studying democratic reversals because they involve a qualita-
tive change in the political order of a nation (Feng and Zak 1999). Survival
analysis, applied to our model, is the study of the survival of democratic
forms of government. The control variables are employed to improve the
overall fit of the model and to minimize the risk of exaggerating the affect
of regime transition type. This helps err on the side of caution, making it
harder to turn up spurious associations and increasing confidence in the
estimates of the affect of the mode of transition (King, Keohane and Verba
1996; Brady and Collier ed. 2004).

Control Variables
Region
Region is an exogenous variable that potentially influences democratization
via forces within the region where a country resides; it is also sometimes
referred to as diffusion processes (Wejnert 2005) or snowballing effects
(Huntington 1991). We control for region because there are some geo-
graphic locations in which countries are more likely to transition than oth-
ers (consider Europe after the Cold War), and it also allows us to improve
the degree of control and to mitigate any variance attributable to regional
processes. It is difficult to parse out why transitions are more prevalent in
certain regions and some competing explanations include common culture,
similar social structure, religion, similar institutions, and comparable eco-
nomic changes. By controlling for region we hope to further understand
why certain regions have a higher probability of democratic success than
others, or alternatively, experience a greater degree of breakdown.
Institutional Choice

Institutional choice is a prolific literature when discussing democratizing countries. Hermens (1941) argues that parliamentary democracies are prone to breakdown, while others argue presidential democracies are more unstable (Linz 1978, 1994). In the “perils of presidentialism” Linz (1990) posits that certain features of presidential regimes—fixed terms in office and winner-take-all elections—contribute to rigidity in the political process, inadequate representation, dual executive and legislative authority and a fragmented party system. Some empirical research supports Linz’s thesis (Stepan and Skach 1994), some qualifies it (Mainwaring 1993, Mainwaring and Shugart 1997), and some challenges it (Gasiorowski and Power 1998). By controlling for institutional choice, we can determine if certain electoral systems are in part to blame for the breakdown of democracies or are associated with lower levels of democratic quality. Alternatively, we can determine if institutional choice has a strong effect on the probability that democracy will succeed.

Prior Regime Type

Geddes (1999) argues different types of authoritarian governments have varying effects on the incentives facing regime supporters when the status quo is challenged and classifies authoritarian regimes into three primary categories: military, single party and personalistic. According to Geddes, “…military regimes tend to split when challenged, personalist regimes… circle the wagons, and single-party regimes coopt their challengers.” Geddes argument suggests that military regimes are more likely to negotiate a withdrawal and democratize. Personalist regimes rarely leave office voluntarily; as a result, these transitions are violent such as revolution or intervention. Single-party regimes tend to survive the longest, even under severe economic crises, but when they do end, it is through negotiation.

Prior Democratic History

While we believe democratization can move ahead reasonably well even in states lacking prior democratic legacies, it is useful to control for prior democratic history. According to Feng and Zak (1999), on average, a
country with a prior democratic experience in the past is about five times more likely to have made a full democratic transition (174).

**GDP—per capita and annual economic growth rates**

Controlling for per capita GDP is important due to the controversy about whether wealth helps democracy consolidate (Rueschemeyer 1991, Diamond 1992), or merely assists democracies in surviving after a transition (Przeworski and Limongi 1997). Higher levels of per capita GDP, according to widely accepted literature, should help prevent slippage back into autocracy. Przeworski (1991) states, “...the eventual survival of... new democracies will depend to a large extent on their economic performance” (95). Rising living standards, growth of private ownership and of the urban middle classes, and improved education arguably constitute the main forces that lead individuals to support democratic procedures (Evans and Whitefield 1995). We expect to find GDP per capita positively correlated with higher levels of democracy. In addition, we control for GDP growth rate and expect that higher growth rates are associated with higher democratic quality and increase longevity.

**ANALYSIS**

The key argument in our analysis is that cooperative transitions will result in the highest levels of democracy and endure the longest. We run three OLS regression models to determine the affect of regime transition on democratic quality over time. We construct measurements at years 1-3, 4-6 and a 10-year average on the dependent variable (Polity IV). The purpose of these models is to capture the relative effects of transitional mode on the average quality of democracy over a 10-year interval. Ten years is not an arbitrary cut-off point. In the dataset, all countries that survive as democratic for 10 years remain democratic. This finding is consistent with a study by Svolik (2008) who quantitatively demonstrates that the age of a democracy is associated with an increase in the odds of its survival (155). In Table 1, Model 1 reflects the average of Years 1-3 of the dependent variable; Model 2 averages years 4-6; and Model 3 is the 10-year average.

Under Model 1, there is no discernable effect of the transition type
### Table 1: OLS Regression Results for Democratic Quality—10 Years After Transition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transition Type</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Conversion</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Cooperative</td>
<td>1.15 (0.72)</td>
<td>2.73*** (1.07)</td>
<td>1.99** (0.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Collapse</td>
<td>-0.46 (0.83)</td>
<td>1.83 (1.63)</td>
<td>0.85 (1.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Foreign Intervention</td>
<td>2.61 (1.86)</td>
<td>1.86 (3.49)</td>
<td>0.65 (3.44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Region</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Europe</td>
<td>-0.42 (1.22)</td>
<td>-1.02 (1.60)</td>
<td>-0.82 (1.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- North Africa &amp; Middle East</td>
<td>0.99 (1.55)</td>
<td>-3.73 (3.54)</td>
<td>-2.27 (2.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- South America</td>
<td>2.09** (0.88)</td>
<td>2.82** (1.21)</td>
<td>2.46** (1.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Asia &amp; Pacific</td>
<td>-0.70 (1.46)</td>
<td>-0.12 (1.44)</td>
<td>-0.31 (1.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>-0.41 (0.97)</td>
<td>-2.27 (1.81)</td>
<td>-2.92** (1.23)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional Choice</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Presidential</td>
<td>-1.16 (1.33)</td>
<td>-1.52 (1.39)</td>
<td>-0.90 (1.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Mixed</td>
<td>0.41 (1.06)</td>
<td>-0.06 (1.56)</td>
<td>0.33 (1.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prior Regime Type</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Single Party</td>
<td>0.27 (1.18)</td>
<td>1.37 (1.99)</td>
<td>1.19 (1.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Personalistic</td>
<td>1.74 (1.21)</td>
<td>.80 (2.25)</td>
<td>2.03 (1.58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prior Democratic History</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Yes</td>
<td>0.65 (0.91)</td>
<td>0.86 (1.21)</td>
<td>0.32 (.89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>per capita GDP</td>
<td>0.0003*** (0.0001)</td>
<td>0.0003*** (0.0001)</td>
<td>0.0004*** (0.0001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth rate</td>
<td>0.61 (2.04)</td>
<td>-0.37 (4.92)</td>
<td>-3.80 (6.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>4.64* (2.41)</td>
<td>3.35 2.29</td>
<td>3.84* (2.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R^2</strong></td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses) from OLS models. Significance levels: *** < .01; ** < .05; * < .10 (two-tailed tests).  
Model 1 reflects the Year 1,2,3 Polity average of the dependent variable.  
Model 2 reflects the Year 4,5,6 Polity average of the dependent variable.  
Model 3 reflects the Years 1-10 Polity average of the dependent variable.  
Models 1-3 use Conversion as the Baseline.  
Unit of analysis is the transition.
on democratic quality, although cooperative pacts approach statistical significance. Early in the transitional phase is likely to be characterized by uncertainty as the rule of law emerges, actors position themselves and new institutions of government are formed. During the immediate post-transitional phase, GDP is highly significant—a $100 dollar increase in GDP per capita leads to a .03 increase in Polity. Although not reaching statistical significance, regime collapse and presidentialism have negative coefficients.

Model 2 reflects post-transitional years 4-6. Cooperative transitions are statistically significant at the .01 level, and provide strong confirmation for H1; that peaceful opposition-led transitions result in higher levels of democracy in the post-transitional phase. Substantively, cooperative transitions have Polity IV scores that are 2.73 points higher than transition by conversion. By all accounts, a shift in Polity scores of almost 3 points is substantively significant. We also suspect that other transitional modes begin to break down at this point and revert to authoritarianism. GDP continues to be highly significant, suggesting that the higher the level of GDP, the more democratic the country tends to be. South America is significant at the .05 level in a positive direction; an unanticipated finding. Presidentialism, although not statistically significant, retains a negative coefficient.

In Model 3, the 10-year average of Polity scores, cooperative pacts remain significant. Here, opposition led transitions associate with Polity scores that are 2 points higher than transition by conversion; while incumbent led pacts associate with Polity scores that are 2 points lower than cooperative transitions. South America also remains significant at the .05 level while Sub-Saharan Africa associates with Polity scores that are on average 3 Polity points lower. Per capita GDP remains an important factor in explaining democratic quality as well.

While the regression results indicate cooperative transitions associate with higher levels of democracy in the post-transitional stage, we now test the effect of mode of transition on democratic duration using the Cox Proportional Hazard Model (Table 2). OLS is not suitable to analyzing survival because the distributions of the residuals are assumed to be normal. However, for many events the assumed normality of time to an event is unreasonable. For example, it is unreasonable to assume that democratic survival times are normally distributed across transition type and country. Survival analysis makes a substitution for the normality assumption.
characterized by OLS with something more appropriate for the problem at hand (Cleves et al. 2004, 2). The dependent variable used in survival analysis is dichotomous (i.e., either the country survived as a democracy or it reverted to authoritarianism). Feng and Zak (1999) note, “The specification of the estimation as a hazard function advances the statistical methodology used in estimating democratic transitions. Because this method is robust statistically for the estimation of a limited dependent variable, the results…are more meaningful than using, say, logit estimation” (172).

Table 2: Cox Proportional Hazard Results for Democratic Duration—10 Years After

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Hazard Ratio</th>
<th>Robust Standard Error</th>
<th>z-score</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transition Type</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Conversion</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-2.14**</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Cooperative</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>-0.84</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Collapse</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Foreign Intervention</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Choice</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Presidential</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>-2.49***</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Mixed</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-1.85*</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior Regime Type</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Single Party</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-2.16**</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Personalistic</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-2.17**</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior Democratic History</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Yes</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>-2.42***</td>
<td>0.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>per capita GDP</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-4.27***</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth rate</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>-0.37</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Hazard ratio and robust standard errors (in parentheses) from Cox Proportional Hazard model. Significance levels: *** <.01; ** <.05; * <.10. The Model uses Conversion as baseline transition category and reflects the GDP per capita average over 10 years, in addition to 10 year GDP growth rate.
Censored survival times are also utilized if the event of interest does not occur for a nation-state during the study period. In interpreting hazard models a positive sign on the coefficient means that the hazard (risk of a democratic death) is higher. Alternatively, a negative coefficient implies a better prognosis (the risk of reversal is reduced).

In Table 2, the direction of the coefficient is indicated by the z-score; however, we do not list actual coefficients but rather the hazard ratio for ease of interpretation. In interpreting hazard scores, take the hazard ratio and subtract it from 1; the difference is the reduction in hazard. For example, a hazard ratio of .2 means that group 1 has an 80% smaller hazard than the baseline category. Thus, the smaller the hazard ratio, the greater the reduction in risk.

Compared to the baseline category (conversion), cooperative pacts have a 96% lower risk of democratic death and the finding is statistically significant. A state with a prior democratic history has a 99% reduced risk of democratic reversal. Other significant variables include: GDP per capita with a very strong effect (a one unit change in GDP associates with a 1% decrease in reversion); presidential and mixed systems tend to survive longer than parliamentary systems (an unanticipated finding worthy of further investigation); prior regime types consisting of single party and personalistic tend to survive longer than when the authoritarian regime was militaristic. This finding has a logical intuition behind it—stronger military regimes imply greater autonomy of the military which can be detrimental to democracy. Although Geddes argues that military regimes are more likely to transition by negotiation, it is worth investigating if these transitions are primarily by conversion, where the military retains the balance of power. This would explain the lower survival rate of these transitions.

**CONCLUSION**

The conflicting accounts of transition type on democratic success are a central theme in the democratization literature. Research in this field has largely been speculative and based on country and region-specific case studies. We have attempted to progress this literature to cross-national statistical analyses, with the goal of creating optimal generalizability in findings. Our
TRANSITIONAL MODES OF DEMOCRATIZATION

central research question concerned whether modes of transition mattered—do they impact the quality and duration of democracy?

The answer is clear—not only do transitions matter, but they are highly relevant. When states transition through peaceful cooperative pacts, characterized by opposition groups and incumbents agreeing to forgo the capacity to harm each other in the interest of transitioning the state, the quality of democracy is higher in the posttransitional phase and it lasts longer. In reaching this conclusion, the results of the current study reconcile a competing claim concerning the role of pacts; in addition to providing a theoretical justification as to why the balance of power in negotiated transition is key to understanding them. We suspect the prior debate on pacted transitions overlooked a key point—relative power levels between incumbents and the opposition. Those who argued that pacted transitions offer the most viable path to the installation of democracy were quite possibly examining cooperative pacts, while those who argued that pacts depress competition were examining transition by conversion. This research has shown that in order to reach a nuanced understanding of the consequences of transitions, it is important to understand how the incentives and motivations of those transitioning the state shape outcomes. Whereas opposition groups unite in their desire for democracy and create electoral rules that allow everyone the opportunity to participate in the new democracy; incumbents with a power advantage design electoral rules that favor their continued rule.

The research agenda extending from the current project is diverse. Examining the first and second waves of democratization is important to provide greater validity to any patterns uncovered in this study. We also hope this study returns attention to the transition literature. As mentioned at the start of this paper, many scholars are now focusing on issues of consolidation, which are important, but because so much of the world is undemocratic, understanding transitions and their role in shaping democracy remains relevant. The road to democracy is often difficult and full of obstacles; thus, if we have learned anything from the path to liberal government from prior countries, our overriding goal as scholars should be to make that road easier for states still gripped by the brutality and injustice of autocratic regimes.
APPENDIX A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Trans Yr</th>
<th>Trans Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>India</td>
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<td>Burkina Faso</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Ecuador</td>
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<td>Bulgaria</td>
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<td>Chile</td>
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<td>Hungary</td>
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<td>Namibia</td>
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<td>Bangladesh</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
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<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>1991</td>
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TRANSITIONAL MODES OF DEMOCRATIZATION

Nepal 1991 2
Paraguay 1991 3
Ukraine 1991 2
Zambia 1991 2
Congo 1992 1
Estonia 1992 2
Guyana 1992 1
Mali 1992 3
Mongolia 1992 2
Romania 1992 3
Slovakia 1992 2
Taiwan 1992 1
Latvia 1993 2
Madagascar 1993 2
Niger 1993 1
Russia 1993 1
Malawi 1994 2
Moldova 1994 2
Mozambique 1994 1
Panama 1994 4
South Africa 1994 2
Haiti 1995 4
Tanzania 1995 1

1 = Conversion; 2 = Cooperation; 3 = Collapse; 4 = Foreign Intervention

Summary Statistics for Transitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transition Type</th>
<th>N = 57</th>
<th># of reversions</th>
<th>% reversion</th>
<th>Average 10-Year Polity Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conversion</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>4.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperative</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>7.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collapse</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>5.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Intervention</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>5.39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notes

1. Theorists also hypothesize that pacted transitions depress the level of inter-party competition and reduce mass participation and inclusion. For assessments of these claims, see Bonnie N. Field. 2002. Frozen Democracy? Pacting and the Consolidation of Democracy: The Spanish and Argentine Democracies Compared. Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara. Encarnación.

2. Similar to Keohane (2007), we argue for the importance of a medium (40-60 cases) in uncovering causal relationships. The advantages of a medium n is that it allows the researcher to know many cases in depth; compared to an n of say 8,000 where the researcher simply engages in coding.

3. By rapid, we mean the overthrow of the incumbent government. Consider the Philippines in 1986 for example. The presidential election was held on February 2, 1986; after having been viewed as an election stealer, Marcos was ousted from office by the 25th of February and the new government of Corazon Aquino installed. Typically under revolutions, it is possible to place a specific date on the overthrow of the existing regime.


5. Our argument implies that looking beyond electoral laws to the actors who make the choices during the transition is an important area of research. Similar to Easter (1997) we suggest a revision to the institutional arguments that presidentialism leads to failed democracy by redirecting attention from the formal rules of game to the actors who make the choice.

6. $D$ is a nation’s democratic level at a given time; $dD/dt$ is the change in a nation’s democratic level over time, and $\alpha$ is a positive constant representing the instantaneous growth rate.

7. For example, pacts refer to negotiated transitions; however, some incumbent-led transitions are not characterized by pacts. As a result, I assume pacts as a sub-set of the broader category of regime conversion.

8. When Karl and Schmitter discuss Pact, they do not distinguish between elites in power and those who are elite reformers; hence the overlap of Pact in both categories.

9. While we determine transition type according to the trigger event, we do not code the transition when the actual process starts; it is simply not possible to do this since Polity scores (the dependent variable) reflect a “transitional process” score rather than a democratic rating as the process of state change commences. For example, an incumbent elite-led process may begin years before the first democratic election (in the case of Taiwan the transition started in 1986 but the
TRANSITIONAL MODES OF DEMOCRATIZATION

first democratically held election did not occur until 1992 and Polity scores do not indicate a democratic regime until 1992 despite substantial political reform; it does reflect a softening of the authoritarian regime, however). Alternatively, where change is rapid, as in a regime collapse, overthrow of the government is abrupt and elections are often held within months (in the extreme case of East Germany moving from a Polity score of -9 in 1988 to a score of 10 in 1991). The measurement difficulty becomes apparent in these cases; elite-guided transformation processes might reflect a steady softening of the authoritarian regime, leading to gradual democracy ratings, while in a collapse, Polity scores reflect a democratic rating within a year. In order to mitigate this effect, we measure from the first national democratic election, which is consistent with the Political Regime Change dataset. The advantages of this approach are twofold. First, a regime is technically not considered democratic until a free election is held. Second, utilizing the first democratic election provides a consistent starting point from which to measures cases.

10. We use 1995 as the cut-off point for democratic transitions in order to measure levels of democracy for 10 years into the future, or through 2004.

11. OLS is used rather than logit due to the large variation in the dependent variable (Polity IV range from -10 to 10). Logit is generally suitable for variation in a dependent variable that does not exceed 4-5 values. Robust standard errors are employed to fix heteroscedasticity.

References


TRANSACTIONAL MODES OF DEMOCRATIZATION


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TRANSITIONAL MODES OF DEMOCRATIZATION


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