Rethinking Revolutions: The Cold War in the Third World*

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The article critiques recent research on the foreign policies of late 20th-century revolutionary movements, and attempts to identify some basic elements in the ideology and organization of these policies. The author finds the search for foreign great power allies to be a vital element in the foreign policy practice of revolutionaries, and seeks to analyze how Great Power interests and local revolutionary aspirations interplayed in different cases (China, Iran, Angola). In conclusion, the author looks at how the Cold War international system influenced the chances for revolutionary success, and finds that the character of the Soviet–American conflict in many countries enhanced the potential for revolution by making it impossible for established regimes to monopolize foreign support.

1. Introduction
In early October 1945, Communist Party leaders from all over North China met secretly in the city of Zhangjiakou to figure out how to deal with the US threat to their revolution. After the US takeover of the coastal cities a few weeks earlier, some local cadre were enraged and wanted to fight the Marine Corps units head-on. Others argued that it would be suicidal to challenge the USA, and wanted to withdraw to the interior. In addition, a few military leaders were shocked that the Soviet Union did not provide more assistance to the Chinese party. Finally, there were those who believed that both the United States and the Soviets were friendly to the political aims of the Chinese Communists. The general commander of the area, Nie Rongzhen, had a difficult time maneuvering among these differing views and arriving at a decision which would neither split nor damage the party or its forces (Nie, 1984, vol. 2, pp. 282–301). In spite of their geographical isolation, the Communist cadre who met in Zhangjiakou were no newcomers to foreign policy. Their lack of foreign experience was more than matched by their keen understanding of how foreign actions might impede or assist their local and national political aims. The outcome of their deliberations was of major importance in constructing the Cold War international system in their region (Westad, 1993, pp. 106–121). Still, the cadre in Zhangjiakou – or their counterparts in other Third World revolutionary movements – are rarely the focus of interest of students of foreign policy or international history.

There is much to gain by rectifying this omission. Not only would increased attention to the foreign policies of revolutionary parties strengthen our understanding of international politics, but such new insights would also assist in widening our knowledge of the politics of revolution and its consequences. As Theda Skocpol points out:

...attention to international contexts can help us to explain at least as much about the structure and orientation of social-revolutionary regimes in the third world as analyses of their class basis or propositions about the inherent logic of modernization and the violence and disruptiveness of various revolutions (Skocpol, 1988, p. 158).

This essay has two purposes. In its first and critical part my purpose is to look at the characteristics of revolutionary foreign policy in some Third World countries since World War II. I will also, briefly, suggest some reasons for the relative lack of scholarly interest in this area of political history.

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The second and exploratory part is a probe into the international dimensions of the causes for revolutionary success. How did the Cold War as an international system influence the outcome of revolutions – what advantages and disadvantages did the character of the postwar great power rivalry offer to revolutionaries and their opponents?

2. Revolutionary Foreign Policies Reappraised

One of the unique characteristics of the 20th century US ‘empire’ is the multitude of its chroniclers. The number of scholarly foreign policy analysts – be they diplomatic historians, IR experts, or area studies specialists – has well surpassed the average number of most countries’ central government officials. Although their scholarly output has been impressive, all these fields of research have suffered from a lack of diversity of orientation and from long periods of stagnation in developing their conceptual frameworks.

It was, for instance, first during the 1960s, influenced by the war in Vietnam, that the view that anti-capitalist Third World revolutions were always inspired and often directed by the Soviet Union started to lose ground among scholarly analysts. It was replaced by a new interest in looking at the social and economic causes for political radicalization, which led to the move of much scholarly talent to area studies, and to new interpretative advances, especially in social history and sociology. Lately, in the 1980s, younger scholars have started employing our new-found understanding of the causes for popular adherence to revolutionary movements to reanalyze the politics of these movements.

Paradoxically, foreign policy concerns – which originated so much of the radicalization of the scholarly approach to foreign revolutions – has not yet benefited much from the reinterpretation of revolutionary politics. We still know very little about how the revolutionary parties developed their images and understandings of foreign affairs. We also have just a rudimentary understanding of how foreign policy figured in the political tactics of revolutionary leaders. Finally, in most cases we do not know much about the organization or influence of the foreign affairs apparatuses inside the parties. Still, it is possible to start discerning some tentative conclusions from the emerging literature – primarily in order to stimulate discussion and to point to the multitude of problems in need of further research.

Seen from Asia, Africa, and Latin America the postwar international system was far less static than when viewed from Washington or from Moscow. The Marxist, radical nationalist, or Islamist movements which challenged their countries’ regimes all at one time or another believed that powerful foreign supporters would come to their aid, and that these potential allies’ international position was in ascendance. This belief opened for attempts from the side of revolutionary leaders at gaining domestic political advantages and international legitimacy through foreign contacts.

These activities were in no way confined to the foreign powers which the revolutionaries felt a special affinity to – as the Soviet Union in the case of the Chinese Communists or some Arab states in the case of the Iranian Islamists. Although political inspiration from abroad often played a role in the emergence of revolutionary movements – particularly in the form of providing alternative visions, or, as Thomas McCormick puts it, belief in an ‘external world’ outside the capitalist world system – the movements still had to cast their nets far wider in their search for potential allies (McCormick, 1989, pp. 91–92, 118–122). Revolutionary leaders often considered contacts with the USA particularly important – and difficult to come by.

Instead of the image of self-assuredness and outright fanaticism of purpose which Western governments gave Third World revolutionary parties, evidence shows that the parties’ leaders had fairly realistic assessments both of foreign strength and of their own positions. Most revolutionary leaders understood with remarkable clarity that if their movements were to be successful, they would have to succeed within a capitalist world system dominated by a succession of powerful and intervention-prone
US administrations. At critical junctures in their revolutions, leaders like Mao Zedong, Ho Chi Minh, and Fidel Castro let their respect for US military strength and for Washington's capabilities for intervention decide which policy to go with. They knew that if the regimes they opposed could count on comprehensive US military support, then the political aims of the revolutionary movements could easily slip out of reach.4

At the same time the revolutionary movements were forced to spread their own efforts thin in their political competition with domestic opponents. Revolutionary parties were often badly organized, and suffered from internal conflicts and lack of leadership. Hard pressed by their political opponents, the central units therefore often missed or misused their opportunities for making international contacts. In turn, these failed overtures made foreign governments overlook the tenacity and ultimate political success which grew out of the local party units' conviction, cohesiveness, and adaptability (Hunt & Levine, 1990, pp. 12–34).

In spite of their attempts at making foreign allies, the revolutionaries often lost out in the initial competition for international support, and therefore faced the possibility of foreign intervention against their forces. Most of the parties used a combination of three strategies to avert such a disaster – nationalist mobilization, alternative alliances, and propaganda directed at the interventionist power.5 Of these three, the first is the most easily observable, while the second may have been the most productive, and the third the most interpretatively meaningful strategy.

Nationalist mobilization – the attempt to use anti-foreign sentiments among the population to organize widespread public manifestations against intervention – has been the most immediate defensive weapon used in many Third World revolutions. In the literature, nationalist mobilization has been seen as the most successful revolutionary strategy against foreign intervention – the Chinese Communists' campaign in 1947–48 and the Iranian Islamists' efforts in 1978 are often cited examples.6 I would argue, however, that the use of anti-foreign sentiments has always been of greater importance in terms of domestic politics than as an instrument of foreign policy. Contrary to what revolutionary leaders believed, their efforts had at best limited effect in foreign capitals. But in segments of their own populations – particularly in the cities – the mass demonstrations and the written propaganda contributed effectively to the view that the regimes were tools for foreign influence.7

Having been unable to win support from the dominant foreign power, revolutionaries often tried to obtain aid from other powers. In spite of the 'self-sufficiency' rhetoric heard from many Third World movements, this search for alternative foreign sponsors has been a crucial element in most revolutions of the late 20th century. The perception that such aid was necessary sprang from several different sources. One was the obvious hope of balancing the threat of intervention in favor of the regime with a similar weapon of one's own. Another was the idea that foreign allies were vitally important if one was ever to succeed in establishing a revolutionary regime – and that international contacts were an integral part of the movement's present claim to legitimacy. Third, the ideological affinity which often existed between revolutionary parties and foreign regimes led some leaders to believe that they could achieve foreign policy cooperation and material assistance based on shared political values and similar world-views.8

Faced with the prospects of foreign intervention, most revolutionary parties placed a strong emphasis on anti-interventionist appeals to groups within the foreign power's political system. In 1947 and 1948 Mao Zedong spent days on end agonizing over how to mobilize the anti-interventionist communities which he was certain existed in US politics and in the US armed forces.9 The most extreme example is perhaps Daniel Ortega and his FSLN comrades, who made direct appeals to US politicians – one of the cornerstones in the defense of their revolution (Pastor, 1987, pp. 206–208).

Revolutionary leaders often saturated their appeals for non-intervention with offers of political or economic cooperation with the interventionist power. The Iranian islammist
leaders attempted to stave off US intervention on behalf of the Shah by offering a continued economic and political relationship with Washington (Bill, 1988, pp. 270–286).\textsuperscript{10} The Chinese Communists went out of their way to underline how they wanted to give US companies and US schools the opportunity to set up activities in their liberated areas (He Di, 1989, pp. 31–50).

So far, both great power decision-makers and scholarly analysts have generally written off these appeals: The Cold War framework made appeals for cooperation by parties who threatened friendly regimes or who were ideologically alien to the great power unlikely to be heeded. But were there any reasons to believe that these appeals were more than tactical maneuvers by beleaguered revolutionaries? The evidence not only from the Chinese and the Iranian revolutions, but also from Vietnam, Angola, and Nicaragua shows that in the thinking of the revolutionary leaders there was more room for cooperation with hostile great powers than contemporary observers admitted. In spite of years of adversity and piles of unfriendly propaganda, revolutionary leaders were surprisingly willing to let bygones be bygones if only the foreign power did not attempt to thwart their political victory.

In addition to these general points about the foreign policy behavior of Third World revolutionary parties, it is necessary in order to understand the processes involved to raise a number of issues relating to the function of organization and ideology within the parties. As observed by Charles Tilly, among others, it is in these two areas that modern revolutions receive their distinctive features (Tilly, 1985).

Foreign policy-making was in almost all cases supposed to be strongly centralized in revolutionary parties. As we have seen, the central leaderships believed international affairs to be vital to their revolutionary strategies, and they therefore claimed that local units were in special need of tactical guidance on such sensitive issues. At the same time the claim of having foreign allies or at least that the international situation was to the party’s advantage played an important part in the revolutionaries’ search for domestic legitimacy and support. Such claims were also important to inner party morale – local setbacks became less disastrous in the light of real or imagined advances on the international arena. Foreign news and the correct understanding of the international situation were therefore major concerns to party information services and party training.

To deal with these inner party needs – as well as with advising on and in part conducting external contacts – most parties set up central foreign affairs groups directly connected to the party leaders. These groups were staffed by younger members with foreign experience, but without independent political influence within the movement. The groups were headed by politicians who combined knowledge of foreign affairs with a personal closeness to the movements’ leaders, like Zhou Enlai in the Chinese CP or Lopo do Nascimento in the Angolan MPLA. It has been argued that the very composition of the foreign affairs staffs of revolutionary parties showed that foreign policy was an area of no particular significance within these movements. To me it seems, however, that the type of personnel found in the foreign affairs staffs may as well imply that party leaders held the reins on foreign policy so tightly that the external affairs apparatus was not the place to be for those who wanted to play an independent role in policy-making.\textsuperscript{11}

The hold which revolutionary leaders tried to establish over the conduct of foreign policy makes the study of these leaders’ backgrounds, their personal views, and their styles of leadership more important in the analysis of external affairs than in other areas of the study of revolutions. In these terms, what did this highly diverse group of leaders have in common? First of all, almost every one of them had substantial foreign experience of their own.\textsuperscript{12} Second, they all tended to think of the revolutions they led in distinctly international terms – as part of global processes. Third, they were looking forward to playing an international role as leaders of revolutionary states – as aiders and inspirers of revolutions in neighboring
countries. Last, they led through inspiration and through their associates’ personal commitment to them as visionary leaders. The mix of personal expertise, aspirations, and personal control often led to a highly volatile foreign policy, in which tactical changes abounded.

But it is also necessary to go deeper than to the study of individual leaders and their behavior. We need to ask questions concerning ideas and perceptions, concerning ideologies – the same type of questions which the most skillful students of Western foreign policy have asked of their subjects. More specifically, we should look at the role preconceived notions of foreign powers, images of foreign behavior, and adherence to formalized political ideologies played in the making of foreign policy in Third World revolutionary parties.

It is impossible now even to start formulating any answers to most of these questions. When answers do emerge, they will be constructed through knowledge drawn from a series of new and old disciplines – history, sociology, social anthropology, cultural psychology, and more.

I will, however, make some comments on the issue of formal or official ideology and foreign affairs, since generations of international relations theorists have made this the great mystery of revolutionary foreign policy.13 The idea has been that adherence to Marxism–Leninism or fundamentalist Islam somehow strongly limits the revolutionary party’s choices in international affairs. Through some kind of mechanism the party’s foreign policy is automatically subsumed under the aims dictated by official ideology, and a whole set of ‘natural’ alliances and given conflicts is produced. As Richard Lowenthal puts it in the case of Marxist–Leninist parties of the 1940s and 1950s, ‘any extension of Communist rule meant the extension of the Soviet sphere of power’ (1977, p. 232).14

Lowenthal and other International Relations theorists treat ideology much as a byproduct of the political struggle – a ‘mask and a weapon’, to use Clifford Geertz’s terms (1973, p. 201). But this approach to ideology has not proved very fruitful in explaining political change. The attempts to understand ideology in relation to a cultural system – the approach utilized by Geertz and others – are enabling us to start viewing the relationship between politics and ideology in a different light (Geertz, 1973, pp. 193–233).15 Ideologies – even those which one seeks to express – are ways to make sense of one’s immediate surroundings. In a political sense, they therefore always deal with basics, not peripherals. Third World revolutionaries sought to understand and to abolish social and cultural oppression, economic underdevelopment, and foreign domination. The act of revolution – the political overthrow of the regime and its replacement by a revolutionary state – was intended to solve these immediate problems. In the hierarchy of aims and measures, making revolution was always on top.

In international affairs the party of revolutionaries was therefore likely to seek cooperation with the foreign power which could most effectively assist in achieving their revolution. In most cases the priority the party gave to the overthrow of the regime dictated pragmatism in foreign policy; international initiatives could not be allowed to endanger the revolution itself. Besides, in international politics ideological soulmates were hard to find, and when found they could often be discovered to be dealing with their own foreign policy problems in ways which adversely affected the interests of the revolutionary party. When exercising their international options the revolutionary leaders had little choice but to act not on the postulates of a global agenda but on the imperatives of domestic politics.16

The case of the Chinese civil war shows how the priorities set by revolutionary ideology led to pragmatism in foreign affairs. Before the onset of the Cold War, Mao and Zhou Enlai believed that they could work with the United States even if fighting with the Guomindang regime continued. After Washington confronted the CCP in 1946 – and while Mao and Zhou worked intensely to secure an alliance with Moscow – the Communist leaders still tried to avoid conflicts with the USA, holding that Washington would have to seek a settlement with the
party after it had taken power. War, when it did come in Korea in 1950, was not a product of revolutionary ideology, but primarily the result of military security concerns in Beijing (Hao & Zhai, 1990, pp. 94–115).

Below the immediate issues of ideological constraints there is another set of problems which cultural anthropologists and cultural psychologists may help us get a grip on. As shown in the cases of great power foreign policy, official ideology may sometimes obscure rather than represent the actual set of beliefs which policy-makers hold. In some Third World revolutions especially Marxist rhetoric has been used almost exclusively to legitimize a claim to power or to gain support from abroad. These claims have not only thrown contemporary foreign actors into confusion, but have also made the international contexts of revolutions like the ones in Grenada, Ethiopia, or Congo particularly hard to understand for historians. In these cases there is even more of a need to get below the cultural surface of foreign policy, and to use concepts such as rhetorical dominance and divergent rationalities to penetrate the politics of ideology.

3. Cold War and Revolutions

Revolutionary leaders, contemporary analysts and historians have all registered their surprise at the late 20th century becoming one of the great ages of revolution. On the surface it would seem as if Third World revolutionaries had the cards stacked against them. Not only did they face a capitalist international economic system – a system whose main actors had vested interests in the political stability which could secure their access to markets and raw materials. But the revolutionaries were also confronted by a hegemonic and intervention-prone foreign power with an almost global military reach. The United States had not only the will to stem the tide of revolution, but unlike other ‘superpowers’ in history it also seemed to have the means needed for successful intervention. Last, the established regimes themselves often had substantial advantages over their opponents: The support of a growing and politically well-organized business class, the use of foreign advisers, and the exclusive possession of vital military hardware, particularly of the airforce.

Why, then, did revolutionaries so often succeed? Over the last twenty years most analysts have attempted to explain the success of late 20th-century revolutions in terms of social developments in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. By looking at tensions and conflicts between different social groups these analysts have paved the way for structural theories of revolution – theories which combine popular rebellions, conflicts between states and elites, and areas of state weakness to form comprehensive explanations for revolutionary success (see Goldstone, 1980, pp. 425–453). Building on these theoretical gains, some researchers have started to look afresh at revolutionary politics at different levels, both in terms of issues and in terms of the mobilization of masses and elites.

The focus on domestic developments has been necessary and important. The research which has sprung out of it has shown that the bases for most revolutionary victories have been popular support for the causes of revolution, and that it is necessary to trace the whirlwind of change in Third World countries to its often feeble domestic social and political origins. I fully accept these requirements, even though they are still not based on any body of comprehensive comparative and historical studies of Third World revolutions.

But are domestic interpretations by themselves sufficient to explain the outcome of revolutionary conflicts? To start, it is very unlikely that the international systems which these countries formed integral parts of should not play a role in conditioning their political development. Second, foreign powers in many cases filled key roles as supporters of the regime, as noted above. If these powers had agreed to use their full military force to prevent the regime’s collapse, would not such an effort have significantly decreased the chances for revolutionary success?

In 1945 Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) believed that the ultimate victory of his
regime over the Communists was a foregone conclusion. His optimism was primarily due to his successful policy of international alliances. Not only did he have the support of the world’s most powerful nation, the United States, but he had also just concluded a comprehensive treaty with the most important emerging power in East Asia, the Soviet Union. The combined support of these two powers—a support based on their own self-interest—would, Jiang believed, be the undoing of his opponents (Westad, 1993, pp. 92–94).

Jiang was a better diplomat—and certainly a less naive maker of alliances—than most historians have given him credit for. He could not foresee that in a few years the globalization of the Cold War would make his alliance policy seem obsolete and naive. Stalin and Truman forced Jiang to choose his partner, and—as a prudent decision-maker—the Chinese leader went with the more powerful of his allies.

The unmaking of the Guomindang state’s international strategy made it more likely that it would succumb to the Communist challenge. When Jiang’s regime fell in 1949, it had become an early victim of the enforced dualism of the Cold War; the universality of the Soviet–American conflict had effectively removed the regime’s ability to use its multiple alliances against domestic insurgents. On the other hand, the Chinese Communists could avail themselves of new-found opportunities for a foreign alliance of their own, and finally establish the links with the Soviet Union which Mao had sought for more than a decade (Westad, 1993, pp. 165–178).

In the case of China, the regime was also hurt by the conflict between the political and economic demands of Jiang’s great power ally and the needs of domestic elites. As Jack Goldstone has pointed out, pressure from foreign allies may hasten the collapse of states facing a revolutionary challenge. This is particularly true of the Cold War period, since the ideologies of Soviet and US elites caused them to put heavy normative and conformist demands to their Third World allies—demands which could only be met by challenging powerful domestic groups (Goldstone et al., 1991, p. 40).

China in the late 1940s is but one example of how the Cold War system decreased the practical value of international legitimacy for the existing regimes, and opened up new avenues for alternative alliances for revolutionary parties. Vietnam during the 1950s is another case in point. For Ho Chi Minh it would have been virtually impossible to defeat the colonialist regime and challenge its successors without the availability of alliances with Moscow and Beijing. For Ho, as for other leaders of Third World insurgencies, these alliances did not only mean access to limited amounts of material aid, but—more importantly—they meant an opportunity to achieve international recognition and a chance to gain a deterrent against the intensification of the war by his opponents.22

Reversely, during the 1980s Babrak Karmal’s Afghan regime could never, in spite of its efforts, make a deal with the United States which would stop US support for the Islamist revolutionaries. The Islamist groups—which ideology was if anything more radical than that of their fellow believers across the border in Iran—found a foreign ally which would assist them with supplies and secure their relevance and legitimacy inside and outside their country. As this most unlikely alliance demonstrates, the Cold War international system did not only prove helpful to left-wing revolutionaries, it also provided opportunities for radical Islamists to criss-cross the patterns of ideological conflict and find the support they needed to fight the regime (Roy, 1989, pp. 619–626; Westad, 1989).

Still, it was the Soviet Union which most often entered into alliances with Third World revolutionary movements, and it was Marxist political groups which most often formed the core of the leadership of these movements. It was the combination of these two facts which by the late 1970s made many Western analysts conclude that Moscow was gaining ground in the global Cold War conflict.23 As we—in the wake of the Soviet collapse—learn more about the origins and nature of these alliances, it is possible to suggest that Moscow’s Third World policy was more ad hoc than strategic, and that some of its alliances were weak and conflict-
ridden from the outset. It is an irony that the Soviet leaders in most cases seem to have preferred working with the existing regimes, but that Moscow almost always lost out to the competition from the United States and therefore became a focus for the insurgents’ search for alternative alliances.24

The Cold War, as political paradigm, was always stronger in the center than in the periphery. Concepts such as ‘balance of power’ were meaningful in Washington and Moscow, but rarely in Managua, Luanda, or Zhangjiakou. As seen by Third World leaders – both those in power and their revolutionary opponents – there was never any ‘balance of power’ during the Cold War era; the world economic system was capitalist and the United States was the world’s most powerful nation, militarily and economically. Still, as long as the Soviet Union kept up its pretensions of being a world power, both the images and the reality of the Cold War conflict were to the advantage of those in the Third World who sought political change. As Soviet interests in interventions abroad started to decline in the early 1980s – very soon after the start of their direct involvement in the Afghan civil war – the international system also became more hostile to revolutionary victories (see Belikov, 1991, pp. 23–39; Valkenier, 1986, pp. 415–434). The breaking up of the Cold War pattern of conflict led to the temporary survival of besieged regimes, like the one in Kabul, and made other movements opt for a political settlement with the governments, like in Nicaragua and in Angola.25

I have argued here that the globalization of the Cold War improved the potential for revolutionary successes by making it impossible for the regimes to monopolize great power support. In this way the Cold War international system differs from the previous multi-polar systems – from 1870 to 1914 and in the years between the wars – during which it was always possible for a regime to combine support from several powers, and difficult for its opponents to find alternative alliances.26 Whether this is a unique characteristic of the late 20th-century system – or a part of all bipolar conflicts – is one of many issues for further research; as are indeed most of the tentative and exploratory conclusions I have presented here.

The starting-point for such research will have to be the Cold War periphery, not only because of previous scholarly neglect of Third World aspects of the conflict, but also because of the fruitful interplay of disciplines which research on these areas so readily lends itself to. It is then to be hoped that the gains which are being made in studies on Africa, Asia, and Latin America may reinvigorate the debate on the traditional issues for Cold War research, and put the Soviet–US conflict itself into a broader perspective of late 20th-century political change.

NOTES

1. Recent surveys indicating the scope of these omissions are the essays by Immerman, McMahon, Paterson, Rosenberg & Thorne which appear in a symposium in Diplomatic History (vol. 14, no. 4, Fall, 1990) edited by Robert J. McMahon, and also in Sorensen (1991).


3. Good examples on this most recent trend are Chen (1986) and Kamrava (1990).

4. On Mao, see Westad (1993, pp. 147–151); on Ho, see Ton (1994, pp. 207–210); or Ton That Thien (1989, pp. 66–88); and on Castro, see Domínguez (1989, pp. 8–15).

5. On the wider picture of revolutionary strategies, see Tilly (1978).


7. The use of anti-foreign sentiments to mobilize against outside intervention is of course only one aspect of the connection between nationalism and revolution. For a broad survey see Smith (1986, pp. 129–173).

8. These three motivations may be exemplified by the Vietminh in the late 1950s, the African National Congress in the 1960s, and the Afghan Islamists in the late 1970s. See Joyaux (1985, pp. 301–304); Ellis (1991, pp. 439–447); Roy (1990, pp. 76–83).


10. On Khomeini's views on foreign policy, see also Behrooz (1990, pp. 13–35).

11. For the Chinese Communist Party, see the evidence in Wu Xiuquan (1984).
12. The only major Third World revolutionary leader I know of who did not have foreign experience is Mao Zedong. Others, from Ho Chi Minh to Ruhollah Khomeini, had spent important periods of their lives abroad.


14. Richard Lowenthal, Model or Ally? The Communist Powers and the Developing Countries (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 232). Lowenthal points out that by the late 1970s such cooperation between Communist states is no longer a given, but he is not willing to widen that doubt to include revolutionary parties.

15. See also Michael Hunt's pathbreaking (1987) study, especially pp. 1–18.

16. This would contradict Theda Skocpol's observation that revolutionary movements often initiate external wars; see Skocpol (1988, pp. 151–157).


19. For an inlook into how these concepts may enrich the study of international affairs, see Sewell (1985, pp. 57–85), and Skocpol's reply (Skocpol 1985). See also Shwedler (1991, pp. 97–110 and 225–229). A fascinating example of how to approach foreign affairs through cultural anthropology is Fischer and Abedi's analysis of Iranian revolutionary posters (Fischer & Abedi, 1990, pp. 335–382).


21. In addition to the works mentioned above, Schama (1989) has recently given a magnificent example of such an approach.

22. Turley (1986, pp. 18–31). It is possible that Ho’s alliance with the Chinese Communists was, in terms of actual cooperation, more important than his links with Moscow even as early as the mid-1940s (see Tønnessen, 1991, pp. 335–336). Cooperation with Beijing had become vital to Ho’s strategy by the early 1950s, when Chinese commanders assisted the Vietminh forces in their battles with the French (see Chen Jian, 1991).

23. Some analysts believed Moscow to be ascendant in these areas even in the late 1980s; see Rubenstein (1988, pp. 551–556).

24. These preliminary conclusions are mostly drawn from my conversations with Soviet historians and social scientists during a visit to Moscow in May 1991. Soviet researchers are now (slowly) getting access to the evidence concerning their country’s foreign policy, at least to the materials covering events up to the 1960s.

25. This rush toward political settlements indicates that the post-Cold War era permits the ending of those stalemates which Gates (1986, pp. 543–544) discusses.


REFERENCES


