POLITICAL REGIME CHANGE: STRUCTURE AND PROCESS-DRIVEN EXPLANATIONS?

HERBERT KITSCHELT  Duke University


Political regimes may be defined as the rules and basic political resource allocations according to which actors exercise authority by imposing and enforcing collective decisions on a bounded constituency. Over the past decades, profound political regime transformations in southern Europe, Latin American, East Asia, Eastern Europe, and perhaps now even Africa have revived political scientists’ concern with the breakdown and replacement of political governance structures. The main theoretical division within this field is drawn between those who seek more “structural” and “configurational” explanations, on the one side, and those who focus on the process of change itself—the sequence of events and the strategic moves of the actors.

The differences between the two camps encompass theory, methodology, and research design. Structure-oriented scholars typically assume that historical actors face extremely narrow choice sets or that their rational choices are clearly constrained by the distribution of resource endowments and their exogenous interest to maximize income and/or power, in light of which they calculate optimal strategies. Process-oriented scholars, in contrast, are primarily interested in the actors’ manipulation of their own and their adversaries’ cognitive and normative frames. Such change may eventually bring about political regime changes that were neither anticipated nor desired by any of the participants at the beginning of the process.

In other words, the main division in the field of studies on regime transformation is not one between historical and political institutionalists, on the one hand, and economic institutionalists with rational choice models, on the other. These two currents represent only strands within the structuralist camp. At most, the two differ on the nature of actors’ interests (self- or other-regarding) and the relationship between interests and structural constraints (exogenous or endogenous). What is at stake between structure- and process-oriented studies of political regime change is a more fundamental division concerning the concept of choice in political action itself. For structuralists, choices represent calculations in light of given preferences and institutional constraints. For process-oriented scholars, choices are caught up in a continuous redefinition of actors’ perceptions of preferences and constraints.

I shall focus the debate within the structuralist camp and between structuralists and process-oriented approaches on the question whether Barrington Moore’s seminal hypotheses about regime trajectories in The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (1966) can still be considered valid. In a nutshell, Moore argues that the deconcentration of political power and economic power before the advent of industrialization (precipitated by a commercialization of land, a rising bourgeoisie, and a fragmentation of state power) was beneficial to democratization. At least four of the five structuralist and process-oriented approaches I shall examine address these hypotheses directly or indirectly.

Structure- and process-oriented approaches also differ on methodological and design-related questions. Structuralists prefer systematic macroquantitative or conceptually disciplined qualitative comparison, with countries as units of analysis. As the books by Huntington, Luebbern, and Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens testify, followers of the comparative case study methodology have also ventured to increase the number of cases they compare and thus to lend more credibility to their main theoretical contentions. In contrast to structural approaches, the process-oriented literature revolves around descriptive diachronic reconstructions of individual cases of regime transition with very little systematic comparison across a wider universe of countries. Whatever comparison is brought in remains on the illustrative and impressionistic level. I know of no single process-oriented study that supplies a systematic comparative analysis of regime transitions for a large number of instances.

I wish to argue that structuralist and process-oriented analyses do not directly compete with each other but focus on different objects of explanation with different research methods and comparative designs. Taken as absolutes, structuralist approaches tend to explain “too much,” whereas process approaches explain “too little.” Structuralist approaches are good at accounting for the general causes of
regime breakdown and the consolidation of new regimes. Process approaches may explain the timing of breakdown and transition as well as the specific trial-and-error process of searching for a new viable regime. Structuralists have little to say about timing and transitions; nor have process-oriented studies succeeded in predicting regime consolidation. As far as the probability of democratic consolidations is concerned, a modified version of Moore’s arguments still appears to have considerable plausibility.

**STRUCTURALIST APPROACHES**

Gregory Luebbern concludes his study of regime change in the interwar period with an unabashed structuralist proclamation: “One of the cardinal lessons of the story I have told is that leadership and meaningful choice played no role in the outcomes” (p. 306). Drawing upon a wide range of cases essentially covering the entirety of Europe, including the Balkan states, Luebbert claims that it is class cleavages and class alliances articulated on the level of group and party mobilization that determined whether regimes became fascist, liberal democratic, or social democratic in the interwar period. In a nutshell, the strength of liberal democratic free-market-oriented parties before and after World War I is key. Such parties were furthered before World War I by the absence of religious, ethnic, or regional cross-class cleavages that could have divided nonsocialist voters. Dominant liberal parties were able to enter alliances with the emerging labor parties against entrenched conservative and antidemocratic elites and thus weakened and coopted the labor movement in a democratized capitalist order (Britain, France, Switzerland). Whereas strong liberalism with weak labor movements persevered during the interwar decades of economic crisis, divided bourgeois parties and strong labor mobilization before and after World War I led to fascist regimes where the peasantry threw in its lot with the reaction (esp. Germany, Italy, Austria, and, to a lesser extent, Spain) and to social democracy where the peasantry entered red-green coalitions (Scandinavia). In eastern and southern Europe, mass political mobilization, particularly that of the working class, had not proceeded far enough to yield anything beyond an authoritarian dictatorship, regardless of whether fascism, liberalism, or social democracy are considered (pp. 258–66).

Whereas Barrington Moore saw large landholders and labor-repressive agriculture as a key force promoting fascism in the twentieth century, Luebbert maintains that by the 1920s, the German Junkers no longer played a critical economic role and that the landed elite did not control the votes of rural laborers anyway (p. 309). Luebbert’s argument, however, fails to recognize that an application of Moore’s thesis to twentieth-century regimes must necessarily emphasize the imprints past class dominance had left on the political organization of the state and on the mobilization of the peasantry. In fact, where feudal and absolutist regimes based on large landowners had disappeared early, fascism had no basis for success because either the state organization (military, bureaucracy, judiciary) was inimical to a new authoritarianism or a class of family farmers had an independent political voice that usually favored democratization, or both.

The critical cases undermining Luebbert’s arguments are Belgium and the Netherlands, included among the countries he classifies as without hegemonic liberalism before World War I; yet contrary to his theoretical expectations, they did not produce fascism in the interwar period. Both countries are, however, characterized by the early demise of feudalism, the dominance of family farms, and a large market-based middle class.

Luebbert’s argument that late industrialization has nothing to do with the failure of liberalism (pp. 59–62) also rests on weak foundations. Timing may not be as important as the character of late industrialization in critical countries in order to account for regime outcomes. Late industrialization is often associated with an initially state-led process of industrialization yielding a highly “organized” capitalism with a bourgeoisie closely intertwined with an antidemocratic state apparatus. If there were no offsetting conditions, such as an independent liberal–democratic peasantry (Sweden), this pattern of industrialization favored authoritarianism (Germany, Japan). Again, this interpretation explains why Belgium and the Netherlands escaped authoritarianism in spite of cross cleavages dividing liberal parties. Both countries experienced a gradual and relatively spontaneous, decentralize process of industrialization.

Although Luebbert is a structuralist, he is forced to admit the contingency of political choice in at least one critical instance. He argues that whether or not farmers allied with the Left or with fascism essentially depended on the socialists’ choice to mobilize farm workers. If socialists engaged in that strategy, they tended to unite mid-sized farmers and large landholders against the Left and thus prepared the way for a fascist coalition, whereas in other instances red-green alliances were feasible (pp. 277–95). In the spirit of Luebbert’s structuralism, however, it must be noted that countries where peasants coalesced with fascism had a different legacy of agricultural property rights than countries where they did not. Conversely, if historical patterns of landholding and their political consequences did not matter, political choice on the part of socialist party leaders is clearly critical in accounting for interwar regime outcomes. Luebbert cannot have it both ways, that is, both deny the political consequences of rural political economy and provide a structuralist account of interwar regime outcomes.

Overall, Luebbert’s account convincingly demonstrates that structures matter, but he may push this point too far. For example, the timing of the anti-democratic relapse in Germany, Italy, or Spain could hardly be accounted for by his model. Moreover, structuralism yields no deterministic, but a probabi-
listic, prediction. Even if all the structural constraints were right, would there have been a rise of the German Nazi party to power in 1933 had it not been for the Depression and the unique form of elite politics ushered in by the provisions of the Weimar constitution?

Luebbert’s historical account yields rather pessimistic conclusions for the future of democratization in the late twentieth century. Liberalism and democracy were compatible only before the working class acquired the capacity to mobilize and disrupt the operation of free markets early in this century. Liberal–Labor alliances, modeled on pre–World War I Britain or France, between the urban middle class and the working class are thus extremely unlikely (p. 315). At the same time, a rural middle class was critical in the past and does not appear to be present in most countries still facing the possibility of democratization. Luebbert also does not hold out much hope for a “tutelary,” restrained democratization under elite control because it will only compound the problems of democratic stabilization (p. 313). Under these circumstances, he envisions instability as the only “stable” outcome, “a cycle of establishment of democracy and its collapse, military intervention, and withdrawal” (p. 315).

Luebbert’s book is an impressive achievement in its comparative scope and its unrelenting, tenacious defense of a clear analytical thesis; yet it ultimately leaves too many empirical anomalies unaddressed, maybe because Luebbert did not take Barrington Moore seriously enough. In contrast, Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens’s Capitalist Development and Democracy, though analytically more complex and less tightly knit, incorporates more aspects of Moore’s thinking and arrives at more plausible and valid explanations of an even wider range of cases than Luebbert considered. The authors’ objective is to synthesize two hitherto antagonistic traditions in research on regime change and apply the synthesis to regime change in today’s advanced industrial countries (Western Europe and British settler democracies), Latin America, and the Caribbean. Macroquantitative studies have consistently found that economic development furthers democracy. Comparative historical analyses in the political economy tradition from Weber to Moore, however, have emphasized class relations and political institutions. Rueschemeyer and his coauthors argue that comparative historical political economy provides the mechanisms that explain why, when, and how economic development translates into democracy. Moreover, political economy can explain the cases that remain “outliers” in macroquantitative analysis.

Greater explanatory specificity in accounts of regime transformation requires examination of three sets of variables. First, class interests and class alliances matter, but in ways that modify Barrington Moore’s master thesis. Consistent with Moore, Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens show that labor-intensive and labor-repressive agriculture under the direction of large landowners is inimical to democracy. They also demonstrate that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century the political effects of long-term political hegemony of landowners on state structures (military, bureaucracy, judiciary) may be as important for political regime forms as the direct impact of agricultural property rights.

Contrary to Moore’s thesis, Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens argue that the bourgeoisie is generally inimical to democracy. The true source of persistent democratic drives is working-class mobilization, which, in combination with middle-class support, can bring about a political constellation favorable to democracy. The authors qualify their emphasis on the working class in several respects. When turning to Latin America, they note that the middle class is critical in bringing about full democratization (pp. 167, 181, 216–7). Even for advanced industrial societies, however, the subordinate role of the middle classes may be questioned. If the working class is mostly for democracy, it is really the middle class—a concept the authors define as “urban professionals, state employees and employees in the private sector, artisans and craftsmen, and small entrepreneurs, sometimes joined by small and medium farmers” (p. 185)—whose variable position determines regime outcomes. A good part of Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens’s middle class may be covered by Moore’s concept of bourgeoisie, thus reducing the gap between the two accounts. Going beyond simple structural accounts of stratification, Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens emphasize that class formation is an organizational process, rather than a political–economic configuration of property rights. But they might have further developed this insight in systematic comparisons of working-class, “middle”–class, and bourgeoisie-class formation to highlight their position vis-à-vis Moore.

The other two sets of variables explicitly theorized in Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens’s explanatory framework are state structures and transnational power structures. In general, the more resources state elites control independently of socioeconomic classes and the more they represent a hierarchically integrated and ideologically united state apparatus, the more likely it is that authoritarian regimes will take hold. The precise nature of state influence depends on the countervailing force of independent voluntary associations (“civil society”) and the nature of the dominant class from which the state is autonomous. Also, transnational power structures have highly contingent effects. In general, dependency in the periphery of the world system involves mechanisms unfavorable to democracy (foreign direct investment, capital-intensive and sectorally constrained industrialization, or labor-repressive and labor-intensive agriculture). But the authors also show that British colonialism and its legacies in state structures also had indirect effects that kept the “British” Caribbean, with few exceptions, democratic in the post–World War II era, whereas the “Hispanic” Caribbean under U.S. influence experienced some of the most repressive and exploitative dictatorships of
that era. In addition, other international factors, such as war, the Cold War, and alliance systems, have significant but varied effects on regime change.

Whereas these three sets of variables (particularly class structures and alliances) tend to account for democratization in advanced industrial countries very well and also cover the four cases of authoritarian breakdown (Italy, Germany, Austria, and Spain [pp. 99–121]), the discussion of Latin America and of the Caribbean requires a further set of variables, namely, the institutionalization of political parties. The authors discover that only where parties are institutionalized as lasting competitive organizational alternatives (whether based on clientelistic linkages or programmatic differences) do democracies survive for any length of time. It is somewhat unfortunate that the systemic role played by parties is not emphasized also for Western democratization. Characteristically, in Germany, Italy, and Spain the nonsocialist parties did not solidify around firm party organizations in the interwar period and were easily swept away by fascism. Austria is the exception, but here a full-fledged fascism was imposed only through Germany’s annexation of the country. The importance of parties in twentieth-century political regime change would have allowed the authors to marry Moore’s and Luebber’s central insights in a more encompassing framework.

The authors touch upon the role of ideology in regime change briefly but postulate that it is “linked to structural and organizational realities” (p. 50). In particular, this applies to religion. While the authors maintain that religious organization is more important than church doctrines (p. 275), the two elements are usually so highly intertwined that it is not clear in which direction the causal arrow runs. Moreover, lacking a close analysis of countries beyond the reach of Christian doctrines and church organizations, it is hard to determine how important either aspect of religion is for political regimes.6

Given the complexity of the variables Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens take into account, what is the analytical bite of their study? What events and trajectories of regime change does it rule out? The discussion of the Latin American cases (preceded by a 12-page summary of the main argument), in particular, is so complex that it is not entirely clear in the end what has been achieved in terms of explanatory parsimony. Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens do wish to argue against a facile modernization theory associating industrialization with democracy; yet at the same time, they embrace it as a partial explanation. They emphasize the role of the working class but do not get around the role of the middle class. The discussion of state structures and transnational relations leaves so many options and contingencies open that just about anything appears to be possible. One wishes the authors would have explored some less complex structural explanations, such as Ronald Rogowski’s elegant and provocative account of political cleavages and regime alternatives in Commerce and Coalitions (1989) to show that a complex approach still combines the virtues of greater empirical verisimilitude and of discrimination between predicted, possible, and impossible pathways of regime transition.

At times, one has the impression that Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens try to convert every contingency into a structural historical determinacy in order to excorize the role of a process-oriented account of regime change. Particularly in Latin America, where it is often hard to say whether regimes ever “consolidated,” this standard may be driving the structuralist approach too far. Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens argue against the “presentism” of process-oriented explanations of democratic regime transitions (p. 35); but they do not confront these explanations with their own findings. The complexity of their account is rooted in the ambition to explain regime trajectories exhaustively and represent complex configurations and sequences of causation. In light of the result documented in their book, however, more than a few readers may conclude that the isolation of individual mechanisms affecting political regimes and the selective consideration of contingencies to account for outliers promises to provide a more manageable structuralist research strategy than explanatory holism. Nevertheless, Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens have produced a splendid book that will definitely further theorizing on political regime change.

In the spirit of Moore, there is one very important hard-and-fast message that consistently comes across in Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens’s study: countries with labor-intensive and labor-repressive agricultures will not become stable democracies. This message also influences their concluding speculations about the future of democracy. In Taiwan and South Korea, the absence of a landlord class and rapid industrialization combined with the strength of autonomous states yields moderately favorable prospects for democracy. The decline of agriculture has also brightened hopes in Latin America; but the weakness of working-class organization, state and military autonomy, dependence on foreign capital, and the lack of strong parties cast dark shadows over the future of democracy on that continent. In Eastern Europe, finally, the nomenklatura may constitute the functional equivalent of a landlord class and the large autonomous state apparatuses within weak civil societies also do not bode well for democracy. Even in the early 1990s, structuralists like Luebber or Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens arrive at muted-to-pessimistic conclusions about the future spread of democratization.

PROCESS-ORIENTED APPROACHES

Whereas structuralists hold actors’ preferences constant and focus on changing institutional constraints, process-oriented studies of regime transformation emphasize the contingency of all parameters of choice. In this regard, Paul Brooker’s The Faces of
Fraternityism represents an analysis at the crossroads between the two perspectives. It is emphatically rooted in Durkheimian sociology in its emphasis on the changing role of a comprehensive collective conscience/consciousness for societal integration and regime stability. Yet Brooker is careful to explain in the first three chapters of his study that efforts to revive a communitarian spirit by "fraternal" political regimes in Germany, Italy, and Japan in the first half of the twentieth century cannot be explained in social-structural terms. Fraternal appeals did not initially inspire a mass following; nor did it necessarily come to the fore before, or even soon after, national socialism, fascism, and its Japanese military variant came to power. Thus, contrary to Durkheim, fraternalism does not grow out of a segmental division of labor with mechanical solidarity but somehow emerges in advanced, functionally differentiated societies with organic solidarity, something that would appear to be an anachronism to Durkheim. For this reason, Brooker offers a quasi-rational explanation of fraternalism in twentieth-century politics. In order to consolidate domestic regime entrenchment and to mobilize psychological resources for their external imperialist plans, totalitarian regimes decided to engage in fraternalist appeals and mass organizations (p. 74). Over more than two hundred pages, Brooker then provides a detailed account of the organizations and mechanisms each of the three regimes employed to instill fraternalism in the population. The concluding assessment argues that fraternalism was carried furthest in Japan yet remained more or less unsuccessful in Germany and Italy. In the most successful case, however, structural conditions for fraternalism were most conducive.

Brooker warns his readers on the first page of the preface that "most political scientists and sociologists will view the book as conceptually lightweight" (v); and this, indeed, is the book's major problem. Its conceptual apparatus and explanatory thrust could have been strengthened by engaging in a variety of related or competing theoretical approaches to fascism and to the rise of segmental or "pillarized" mass parties and reactionary social movements in order to explore why these, but few other, countries were vulnerable to the lures of a totalitarian order appealing to a new spirit of particularist (racist, nationalist) community. In terms of comparative design, Brooker samples on the dependent variable. Fraternalist regimes would appear in a much starker light if they were contrasted to regimes that failed to become fraternalist when faced with similar decision problems and political crises. Why is it that fraternalist appeals struck a resonant cord within elites primarily in Germany, Italy, and Japan but not in most other industrial countries? Brooker does not answer this question. In the end, Brooker provides an instructive description of the internal institutions of totalitarian rule in the three countries but little more. The book's greatest weakness, in fact, may be that it does not discuss alternative structuralist comparative accounts of regime change, such as the strand of analysis to which Barrington Moore had contributed.

Guiseppe Di Palma's To Craft Democracies has rather different ambitions and is firmly rooted in the "proceduralist" view of democratic regime change. Not structural conditions but human actions achieve democratic consolidation. At the center of Di Palma's concerns is the process of "democratic crafting" involving "negotiated agreements" between challengers of the old order and incumbent elites that move common perceptions of self-interest toward accepting democracy as the best possible regime form under given conditions. The establishment of democracy, unlike that of other systems, does not legislate a particular distribution of resources among social groups, but institutes uncertainties over outcomes as Adam Przeworski (1991) argued in Democracy and the Market. For this reason, Di Palma believes that the game between authoritarian elites and challengers can be more easily converted into a positive sum game, provided that the right steps in the process of regime transition are undertaken. Authoritarian elites must be assured of "coexistence" and fair play. For this reason, the transition should be engineered through negotiated agreements (pacts) that focus on rules of decision making, rather than outcomes. Demonstration effects and the diffusion of successful examples from abroad may be important in precipitating such steps. Careful crafting can exploit the elites' internal divisions on strategy and their sense of uncertainty about their own interests. Di Palma demonstrates these strategies of garantisimo with an analytical reconstruction of the Italian and Spanish experience and contrasts it to the Portuguese case, where democratization almost failed.

Di Palma then discusses a number of tactical devices that facilitate the transition process. In addition to pacts, a speedy timetable of electoral reform and balanced concessions among all participating forces pave the road to democracy. Over time, the rules that are instituted generate their own support, once actors devise their strategies around the new opportunity structures. For this reason, "legitimacy," as a normative belief in the correctness of the system of rules, is certainly not a precondition of democracy. Institutional habituation of actors' strategies to democratic procedures is the overriding goal of democratic crafting.

While not denying that tactical moves on the part of democratic challengers and skilled techniques of converting games into positive-sum payoff structures facilitate a transition to democracy, we must ask how far such processes carry us in explaining democratic consolidation? Much of his attack on structuralism targets a vague modernization-theoretic version that stresses democratic values and elite attitudes yet not the more hard-nosed comparative studies in the tradition of Moore and others that focus on property rights, class relations, and state institutions. After Di Palma raises some rather strong claims for procedural analysis in the opening chapters of his book, he takes much of them back in chapter 8 where he begins to
compare, in a rather impressionistic and unsystematic manner, the structural conduciveness of different regions and countries to democratic crafting. Such crafting, taken by itself, is insufficient to explain democratic prospects in particular cases: "Even when we favored explanations that focus on the transition and its strategies, these in turn have begged for their own explanations—often of a deeper historical and structural nature" (p. 156). The final chapter of the book also raises the importance of international system configurations and concedes that hegemonic powers play a critical role in regime change.

In the end, Di Palma's book provides several interesting insights into transition techniques that may make a difference in countries characterized by roughly similar structural conduciveness to democratization. These observations, however, could be analytically sharpened. For example, Di Palma's study puts a great deal of emphasis on pacts and agreements between incumbent and challenging elites yet never engages in a specific analysis of the different scope, bindingness, timing, and longevity of pacts in the transition process. More importantly, the book does not deliver a specification of the structural circumstances that may give significance to different techniques of crafting for the ultimate outcome. Di Palma delivers a timely reminder that economic, political, and cultural determinants are not everything when we try to understand regime change but does not present a sufficiently crisp and precise analysis, corroborated through systematic comparison, to advance the emerging field of "transitology" in significant respects. Whereas structural approaches explain too much, Di Palma's "transitology" explains too little. For this reason, Di Palma's optimism requires a more robust theoretical base.

COMBINING STRUCTURAL AND PROCEDURAL ACCOUNTS OF DEMOCRATIZATION

Samuel Huntington, in The Third Wave, lays out a broad, eclectic canvass that encompasses structural and procedural arguments. He also considers the most comprehensive universe of cases and treats them in a more rigorous comparative analysis than does Di Palma; but he is less systematic than Luebbert or Ruechmeyer, Stephens and Stephens in tracing the impact of different sets of variables on regime patterns. Huntington resists efforts to pigeonhole his account as "nomothetic" or "ideographic" from the very beginning (P. xiii). Democracies are complex phenomena, and they are caused by many forces' contributing to historical "waves" of democratization. In contrast to the first two waves following on the heels of the two world wars in the twentieth century, the third wave of democratization beginning with the 1974 Portuguese revolution appears not to be triggered by international political events but by a variety of domestic forces. It is important to note that that 23 of the 39 countries democratizing since 1974 had at least one previous democratic experience, whereas most countries that had never been democratic stayed authoritarian until 1990 (p. 44). This association reestablishes a linkage to externally induced democratization in previous waves.

Overall, Huntington sees five causes of the third wave—at least three of them structural but one unambiguously procedural. First, authoritarian regimes are unable to dissociate the regime's economic effectiveness from the legitimacy of rulers or the legitimacy of rulers from legitimacy of rules of governance. Hence, the oil shocks and the economic dislocations and structural transformation of the world economy in the 1970s and 1980s precipitated the downfall of many dictatorships. With the decline of communism, "outside of Africa and a few countries elsewhere, democracy had come to be seen as the only legitimate and viable alternative to authoritarian regimes of any type" (p. 58). Second, Huntington stresses the importance of economic development but sees it as neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition. Going beyond older modernization approaches, he argues that the source and distribution of wealth are important. Hence, the oil-rich, state-centered regimes did not become democratic; but countries that generate a broad-based urban middle class through a wide diversification of a growing industrial economy did. Huntington's analysis is here quite close to Ruechmeyer, Stephens and Stephens's main hypothesis and certainly consistent with the overall gist of Moore's earlier analysis. Third, however, Huntington emphasizes the independent effect of religious doctrine and religious change. Reversing Weber's causal chain, he notes the rise of Christianity—particularly an individualist and socially activist Christianity—in democratizing countries that has forced Catholicism to withdraw support from the political status quo. Fourth, beyond these structural changes, new transnational politics effected by the United States, the Soviet Union, the European Community, and the Vatican improved the atmosphere for democratic change in the 1980s. Finally, the democratic wave began to feed on itself. Demonstration effects and snowballing reinforced opposition efforts to bring about democracy in countries where structural conditions were even mildly conducive to regime change.

Huntington shows that the mode of transition interacts with the nature of incumbent political regimes (p. 133); thus, he goes significantly beyond the structuralism/proceduralism divide. Elite-initiated or elite-negotiated transitions are most typical in bureaucratic one-party or military regimes, whereas personal "sultanistic" dictatorships hold out less promise for change and often require the wholesale replacement of the ruling elite. For each of the patterns of transition, Huntington provides detailed descriptions of actors' moves and tops off each analysis with a set of lessons actors might draw. For example, reformers should always participate in elections, because even rigged elections, monitored by
foreign observers, weaken an authoritarian regime. In any case, rulers usually miscalculate their chances in open elections, except in cases where there is only a small urban middle class (p. 179).

Huntington finally discusses various aspects of democratic stabilization, such as how to decide on the prosecution of authoritarian elites and how to deal with the military. The most interesting segment deals with the prospects of democratization of countries that have made initial steps in the third wave of democratization (pp. 270–79). Based on their previous democratic experiences, economic development, location in the international system, and duration of democratization effort in the third wave, Huntington is least optimistic about Mongolia, Sudan, Pakistan, Nicaragua, Romania, Bulgaria, Nigeria, and El Salvador. He remains especially pessimistic about democratic prospects in regions of the world that have not entered democratization, especially homegrown Marxist–Leninist regimes linked to nationalist appeals, sub-Saharan Africa, Islamic countries, and certain areas of East Asia. Huntington makes a special point to highlight the antidemocratic implications of Confucian and Islamic religious doctrines, a factor not considered by any of the other studies.

Huntington’s analysis is impressive in scope; but at times he is compelled to trade sophistication in conceptualizing critical variables for breadth of comparison. Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens’s account of economic development, class structure, and democratization tends to go in the opposite direction. Clearly, Huntington’s book does not provide as detailed an analysis of political institutions and regime structures preceding democratization (pp. 110–21). Huntington’s global reach, however, has its own virtues; it encompasses structure and process and, due to its global reach, is able to say more on such contentious issues as the role of religion for political regime transformation.

Overall, the two studies from which most can be learned for the further analysis of regime change are Huntington’s and Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens’s. Luebbert’s study is a close runner-up. All of these analyses in one way or another feature the importance of Barrington Moore’s insights and of the tradition on which Moore built. All of them also refrain from extreme optimism or pessimism about the future avenue of global democratization. Huntington and Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens lead us to hypothesize that in the Middle East or sub-Saharan Africa, but also in some of the postcommunist successor regimes, chances for democratic consolidation are poor. Conversely, there are a number of countries and regions of the world that give reason for hope to those who welcome democracy.

Against the backdrop of these studies, what future avenues may be open for analyzing political regime change? Luebbert and Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens have probably pushed the case-oriented systematic historical–comparative approach as far as it can productively go. Conversely, Huntington offers a broad, variable-oriented comparison, which still remains bivariate in its consideration of causal elements. In the future, multivariate analysis or Boolean algebra, as proposed by Charles Ragin (The Comparative Method 1987) may help us to develop a more formal representation of causal complexity in pathways of regime transition. At the same time, it is desirable to spell out more clearly the precise mechanisms that make each causal force relevant if we are to see sharper analysis of regime transitions.

Notes

1. For example, Ronald Rogowski’s Commerce and Coalitions (1989) is an avowedly rational-choice-based account; yet it considers itself to provide a generalization of Gerschenkron’s and Moore’s comparative-historical class-based structuralism. Conversely, Theda Skocpol’s States and Reforms (1979) is explicitly based on structuralist premises yet implicitly assumes rational actors who maximize wealth or power and are not driven by more illusive ideas.

2. Sometimes contributors to studies of regime transformation misunderstand their own accomplishments. In this sense, Adam Przeworski in Democracy and the Market (1991) wishes to offer a rational-choice-based explanation of regime change yet really falls back onto a historical institutionalism plus a process-oriented reconstruction of actors’ changing cognitive frames.

3. Rogowski’s book (see n. 1) is the other major examples of this more comprehensive comparative approach.

4. Probably closest to the systematic and encompassing comparison of transition processes I am looking for are Terry Karl’s articles, especially “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America” (Comparative Politics [1990]) and (with Philippe Schmitter) “Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe” (International Social Science Journal, May 1991). In these and other examples, however, the conceptualization of the main independent variable, modes of regime transition, is not sufficiently refined.

5. I am setting aside here the question whether it is still adequate in light of recent historical research to refer to the rise of Scandinavian social democracy as a “red-green” coalition of workers and farmers against the bourgeoisie. As Swenson’s research makes clear, there emerged, if anything, a sectoral coalition in which parts of Labor and business cooperated with agriculture against Labor and business in other sectors. See Peter Swenson’s “Bringing Capital Back In” (World Politics 43 [1991]).

6. To explore the influence of religion, see especially the broad comparative neo-Weberian account in John Hall’s Powers and Liberties (1985).

7. I have added up rankings of the countries on each of Huntington’s four criteria and singled out countries with the four lowest rankings. At the top of democratic promise are Spain, Greece, Portugal, Turkey, Uruguay, Chile, Ecuador, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bolivia, Brazil, Peru, Philippines, and South Korea.

8. According to Huntington, even formal democracies in predominantly Confucian countries are characterized by the absence of government turnover (p. 304).