The Failure of U.S. Public Diplomacy: Structural and Institutional Elements

Bruce A. Heiman*
Senem E. Ozer**
San Francisco State University
College of Business
Department of International Business

Working Draft v10.4
Do Not Cite or Quote or Reproduce
Copyright 2006-7, B. Heiman, S. Ozer

*Corresponding author contact info:
heiman@sfsu.edu, ph: 650-575-8220, fax: 415-338-0596,
1600 Holloway Ave., San Francisco, CA 94132, U.S.A

**This work is based partly on the author’s Master’s Thesis at San Francisco State University; a very early version of the paper was presented at the 4th International Business and Economy Conference, January 2005, Honolulu Hawaii.
The Failure of U.S. Public Diplomacy: Structural and Institutional Elements

ABSTRACT

The Failure of U.S. Public Diplomacy:
Structural and Institutional Elements

Bruce Heiman*
Senem Evrim Ozer
San Francisco State University
College of Business, Department of International Business

This paper moves the debate about U.S. Department of State public diplomacy failures beyond debates such as “Is the message on target?” versus “Is the message content poor?” We examine structural and institutional determinants of public diplomacy performance by analyzing available data from federal departments, existing scholarly work, and a foreign public opinion poll. Using a median regression model, we consider the impact of institutional credibility, cultural values, income, bilateral trade, public diplomacy spending, old war alliances, and Women’s roles on U.S. public diplomacy (P.D.) success. The strongest factors positively affecting P.D. success are income and women’s roles in government, while factors predicting P.D. failure are government institutional credibility and public diplomacy spending. For 35 countries the findings suggest there is merit in pushing the discussion beyond the existing limited discourse to a consideration of local (foreign) structural and institutional factors that influence foreign citizens’ perceptions of the U.S.

*Corresponding Author; heiman@sfsu.edu.
Introduction

The path to success in the United States’ battle for hearts and minds of the world is characterized by various, often opposing assumptions and resultant recommendations. Disagreement exists over what is the correct problem to attack. A disturbing fact holds true for all the proposed solutions; despite increased efforts of the U.S. administration, world opinion shows declining support for the U.S. A Pew Research Center survey conducted in late 2002 shocked all parties interested in and expecting to see a stronger, more credible, and better understood U.S. since the September 11 tragedy in New York: “Osama Bin Laden is trusted to ‘do the right thing regarding world affairs’ by more than half the population in Indonesia, Pakistan, Morocco, and Jordan. In none of these countries do more than 8% of people express the same faith in President George W. Bush” (Quenqua 2003, p. 9). The poll results show a similarly low level of overall success; among the 44 countries, where 38,000 people were surveyed, approximately 60% support U.S.-led efforts to fight terrorism (Federal Document Clearing House, 2003). A recently released report of a 2005 Pew Research Center survey titled, “U.S. Image Up Slightly, But Still Negative,” shows that the negative attitudes against the U.S. remain a serious problem (Pew, 2005).

Two explanations are commonly used to explain public diplomacy (P.D.) failure in the United States. The first explanation advocates a misunderstanding between the U.S. and other countries, charging public diplomacy with the responsibility of failing to explain well U.S. foreign policy, essentially asserting that the U.S. message is poorly delivered by extant public diplomacy efforts. The second explanation suggests U.S. foreign policy is very well understood in the rest of the world, which is itself the problem: “Neither U.S. control over the flow of news,
nor the efforts of Pentagon and Madison Ave. spin doctors, can ease the resentment of U.S. polices and actions that have affected the lives, hearts, and minds of the people of the region” (Andoni 2002, p. 264). This second approach, rather than blaming poor delivery of the message, asserts poor message-content. The two approaches fail to take into consideration idiosyncratic attributes of foreign states, which may influence the success and failure of any public diplomacy undertaking. This study considers the extent to which institutional credibility, cultural values, prosperity, trade with the U.S., public diplomacy spending, past alliances, and women’s roles are associated with U.S. public diplomacy success or failure. Our work finds a strong relationship between U.S. public diplomacy success and several of the above-mentioned state-level attributes.

The policy mechanism of public diplomacy has seen little rigorous empirical academic research as to reasons for its efficacy or lack thereof, and P.D. remains a contemporary topic, often covered by newspapers, magazines, and popular journals. One scholar has called into question the practice of basing foreign policy on public opinion polls (Holsti, 1992). As far back as 1944, two scholars (Laves and Wilcox) observed that the U.S. government is not configured for handling the myriad duties of world affairs (including what we now call public diplomacy) with any degree of competence. An exchange of ideas, however, has flourished in subcommittees and committees in the U.S. Congress, as well as other governmental bodies. Private sector entities, particularly the advertising and media industries in the U.S., have similarly expressed an interest in volunteering solutions to U.S. public diplomacy needs. The following sections provide a brief review of the current literature. We present an alternative approach to the present dichotomous argument of poor delivery versus poor message. Our findings hint at important elements in the determination of P.D. success or failure, and offer a novel, useful approach to understanding the roots of the P.D. problem.
Other countries recognize issues with P.D., but like the U.S., the discussion is impaired by over-emphasizing a debate that adds little value to the discussion. For example, the UK has explored its public diplomacy outcomes in what is an ostensibly thorough manner, though their focus is on a “reactive” versus “proactive” policy debate. This approach, while providing utility for determining action items for public diplomacy in specific countries, nonetheless (like the U.S. approach) ignores the structural and institutional foundations of public diplomacy success (or failure). The emphasis of the UK report (Leonard, Stead, et al, 2002) is almost exclusively on how best to implement P.D. initiatives, tacitly assuming the content of policy is proper. This amounts to little more than a one-sided re-framing of the “poor delivery of good content” side of the debate.

Perhaps the closest existing work to this study is by Nisbet, et al (2004), who study the sources of opinions of the U.S. in the Arab world. The authors “…examine the relative contributions of macro-level socioeconomic and political influences, individual-level demographic factors, and TV news use to anti-American attitudes” (p. 11). They conclude that mass media sources, notably television, play a large role in determining the negative opinions of the U.S. among Arab peoples (p. 27). They attribute problems with perceptions of America as media-based and detect no role for institutional factors (for example, the credibility of local government institutions) in shaping opinion. We take issue with this approach: although the authors employ sound methods, their work is limited to the Arab world, which limits their generality of findings. Further, their model explains just over 11% of the variation in the dependent variable (opinion of the U.S.), suggesting other important factors remain unspecified. Our work covers a diverse group of many more countries and specifically focuses on institutional and structural factors, which Nisbet, et al treat more cursorily.
This paper proceeds as follows: first, in our discussion of the literature, we discuss the present approaches to the debate by describing the “poor delivery,” and “poor policy content,” views as well as a hybrid perspective that, declares the need for improved delivery of messages, and the need for increased truth and credibility in content. We offer an alternative approach to this debate, which considers how institutional and structural aspects of states shape perceptions of the U.S. A preliminary empirical exploration is then reported, which suggests that our new approach shows promise. In concluding, we discuss potential issues with our work as well as the implications of our findings for policy and future research directions.

**Current Approaches, and Literature in Brief**

In this paper, we define public diplomacy as U.S. government attempts to influence foreign citizens’ (residing outside the U.S.) opinions of the U.S. towards a positive view. In this section we identify three existing approaches to the challenge of public diplomacy: poor message delivery, poor message content, and a hybrid view which considers both message delivery and content as in need of remediation.

Before proceeding to discuss these views, we note that the existence of a problem with public diplomacy has been noted with some frequency and eloquence. For instance, van Ham (2003) identifies the battle for “hearts and minds” (p. 427) of the population of the Arab world as crucial to public diplomacy success. Van Ham concludes by observing that U.S. P.D. is underdeveloped and undervalued to a large extent, but his focus is on fixing the U.S. system rather than on understanding the situation based on factors operating in various countries. This is typical of the extant literature. Our work, while recognizing value in promoting “good messages”
and “good delivery of messages,” focuses explicitly on how success varies with the structural and institutional conditions on the ground in a particular country.

Another approach (again used strictly to analyze opinion in the Arab world) reclassifies the debate into a paradox between sensitive and tactful public diplomacy, incurring the risks of an effort that may be too passive and ineffectual to meet needs, versus the risk of appearing combative and arrogant if an aggressive path to P.D. is taken (Wolf and Rosen, 2004). This laudable work has positive implications for P.D. policy implementation, but only subsequent to an analysis of factors affecting P.D. success within various countries.

U.S. Foreign Policy is Misunderstood—Poor Message Delivery. Three of the most notable works focused on the subject are by Christopher Ross, “Pillars of Public Diplomacy” published in the Harvard International Review, a report by the U.S. Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy (Ross, 2003b), created by Congress and appointed by the President, titled “Changing Minds and Winning Peace,” and a work by the General Accounting Office, titled “U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts, but Faces Significant Challenges,” presented to the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives (GAO, 2003). Each advocates a wide variety of ideas and promises an improvement over current dismal public diplomacy success levels. Four general themes emerge from their writings, as well as other important publications on public diplomacy. The absence of a clear strategy and direction is a common criticism among these publications: “The American public-information campaign is a confused mess,” lamented former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Richard Holbrooke (Waller 2003, p. 26). Similarly, a strategy which takes into account the role of the media in advancing opinions about the U.S. was recognized as an action item: “At a time when many
large and diverse publics are informed and energized about foreign affairs, it is no longer sufficient to explain our policies to 200 opinion leaders; the United States must also find ways to repeat key messages for audiences of two million or 20 million, through national and transnational media, which make up the fifth pillar” (Ross, 2003b, p. 8).

Mixed messages abound. For example, Francois Heisbourg, Chairman of the International Institute of Strategic Studies, noted the failure of public articulation of President Bush’s National Security Strategy (NSS) in 2002: “The 2002 Nuclear Posture Review generated controversy throughout domestic and foreign media, however, because of Bush’s emphasis on preventive action – not because of the actual content of the publicly available parts of the document” (Heisbourg, 2002, p. 76). This seems a clear case of poor message delivery. Educational and cultural exchange programs have recently been marked for improvement, reflecting increased focus on message delivery using a high-context, interpersonal strategy: “In the past, one common mistake was thinking of government educational and cultural exchanges as a kind of frill, a nice undertaking if the resources were available. Today, viewing exchanges as a long term investment in the national security of the United States is vital” (Ross, 2003a, p. 257). Finally, the overall lack of public diplomacy funding is identified as in need of adjustment owing to the current rise in anti-Americanism around the world. Improving message delivery modalities is costly compared to revising message content—attention to the funding deficit would likely result in increased resources for message delivery improvement, and not for creating more cogent policy. Funding for public diplomacy programs was $600 million in 2002, which Djerejian (2003) suggests indicates serious under-funding issues. To give the present (as of this writing) administration in the U.S. some credit, using the sparse and contradictory indicators available (since part of the budget is classified), we estimate that present (2006-7) P.D. levels are
funded to at least a range of $1 – $1.4 billion per annum. This may reflect an actual increase in resources for message delivery.

Hoffman (2002) notes that losing the propaganda war and subsequent poor message delivery stems from lack of free speech in target countries. This particular “poor delivery” argument is different than the others mentioned, as the fault of the matter is ascribed to foreign institutions rather than weak or improper U.S. P.D. efforts. The problem is particularly vexing as foreign state-run media broadcasters enjoy high credibility and reach many in the intended audience more effectively than U.S. public diplomacy efforts. Cogently, Hoffman’s advice is to increase efforts targeted at bringing freedom of the press to target countries. Hoffman’s work, which recommends coupling foreign policy tightly to public diplomacy by understanding the implications of conditions in countries of interest.

U.S. Policy Content is Understood (Well-Delivered)--The Content is Poor. Contrary to advocates who consider better strategizing, coordination, and implementation of public diplomacy to be the problem, others argue for a reconsideration of U.S. foreign policy which takes into account the path to current policies and their implications. This view avers that while foreign opinions should not determine the course of U.S. foreign policy, the formulation of foreign policy ought to be more sensitive to public diplomacy consequences (Bloomgarden et al, 2003). Others take a more hard-line approach to this view, suggesting that current U.S. foreign policy is hypocritical, indefensible, and call for an immediate change of direction in U.S. unilateral foreign policies.

While U.S. foreign policy cannot be made on the behest of a foreign audience, a flexibility and visible willingness to work collaboratively with other nations on global problems
including terrorism may result in increased goodwill generally and specifically towards the U.S. This perspective states that the U.S. depends on participation and cooperation from other countries whose opinions and concerns must be taken into account in policy formulation. Policies which do not adapt will be counter-productive, rendering public diplomacy an ineffective tool. For example, Spain arrested eight alleged members of Al Qaeda for complicity in the September 11 attacks, but refused to turn them over to U.S. authorities because the Bush administration said that they might face secret trials before military tribunals (Blinken, 2002). Public diplomacy disaster ensued, resulting in loss of respect for the U.S. throughout Europe. In the book, The Battle of Hearts and Minds (Lennon, 2003) Blinken, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, asserts similar skepticism and mistrust against the U.S. generated by the U.S.’ opposition to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and to an enforcement mechanism for the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The U.S., the sole hegemonic power of the post-Cold war era, cannot afford to advance foreign policy without (1) engaged partners, and (2) exercising appropriate leadership to reach agreements that advocate or at least fairly compromise regarding its own foreign policy goals. Regarding the consequences of U.S. hypocrisy: “If the United States rejects the restraint these agreements impose, or declines to negotiate improvements, how can it ask others to embrace them” (Blinken 2002, p. 103).

U.S. treatment of foreign nations during and after the Cold War stirs up a series of distrustful attitudes particularly in developing nations. Anti-Americanism is not a product of misunderstanding, it is the result of a legacy of poor policies: “The collapse of the twin towers symbolized the collapse of U.S. foreign policy in the Arab and Muslim worlds… The United States is realizing that huge dark spots tarnish its world image, especially in the Middle East, but
the United States has not addressed this monumental problem by reexamining the basic assumption of its policies” (Andoni, 2002, p. 262).

If a misunderstanding is to be blamed for anti-Americanism in the world, perhaps it is Americans who need a deeper understanding of foreigners, and not vice-versa. Only about 20% of Americans hold passports, and of that group, over 80% have only traveled to Canada or Mexico (U.S.BTS, 2006). The failure of an international ad campaign, “Shared Values,” launched by Charlotte Beers, the former CEO of Ogilvy & Mather, and an attack on a McDonald’s restaurant in Paris demonstrate that anti-Americanism is not an attack on the civilized world, or a philosophical resistance to the values and way of life of Americans. Rather it is a response by people on the receiving end of perceived unrelenting, rapacious U.S. economic dominance (Quenqua, 2003). These perceptions of the U.S. were not mitigated in the least by public diplomacy efforts. As evidence of the need to advocate a change of course in foreign policy that invites less ill-will around the world, critics suggest a return to a diligent practice of American values. Putting to work the ideals upon which the U.S. is based is one important way to improve credibility and calm the rising trend of anti-Americanism around the world. “The epitome of U.S. hypocrisy was its intervention with Qatar to censor Al Jazeera, accompanied by a disparaging and slanderous media campaign to discredit a forum for free statement in the Arab world. The eventual bombing and destruction of the station’s office in Kabul on November 20, 2001, which could not have been a ‘mistake,’ symbolized for the region the true U.S. position on freedom of speech and the press. The United States has no tolerance for any narrative other than the one disseminated by U.S. media, which has come to echo the official line” (Andoni, 2002, p 279).
Is public diplomacy a poorly disguised code word for propaganda? U.S. P.D., in its present form, is often associated with lies advanced by the government to influence its audience in a particular desired direction. In the visionary thinking demanded by many experts who care deeply about U.S. public diplomacy success, a redefinition must be undertaken to prevent skeptics from tuning out pro-American coverage. Blatantly manipulative content is one source of foreign derision of U.S. policy. Guidelines developed by experts in the field of public diplomacy are not lies; yet, selective truth telling does not make the image of the U.S. any more credible than lying. The U.S.-controlled Middle East Television Network (METN), and others like it, must practice what the U.S. preaches to the world: freedom of press. Single-sided optimistic “truth-telling” only foments the bias of news networks such as Al Jazeera. METN must present the ugly and the good together to fill the void left by anti-U.S. reporting, e.g., by Al Jazeera.

The “poor content” argument seems compelling, partly because it has implications for foreign policy formulation, beyond public diplomacy. Based on our discussion above, however, there seems to be a preference for blaming the messenger: the “poor message delivery” argument gets the most attention and resources. This may be a political effect of expending resources to fix non-controversial problems at the expense of attacking core issues, e.g., the content of foreign policy and its connection to P.D.

Hybrid View: Fix Poor Content & Delivery Via Reorganization Of U.S. P.D.. A hybrid approach to the problem suggests that the delivery mechanisms of P.D. need to be re-thought and advocates substantial reorganization and reprioritization of public diplomacy efforts to coordinate between different departments of the government to achieve a more consistent, truthful, and credible message, while recommending a greater voice to the Undersecretary for
Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs of the U.S. Department of State. “The State Department would remain the lead agency for enacting policy, and along with other parts of government that participate in public diplomacy—including the Defense Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development and government-sponsored international broadcasting – it would be brought under the new strategic umbrella” (Djerejian, 2003, p. 8). Testimony from the report by David M. Abshire, President of the Center for the Study of the Presidency, and a member of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim World, formed in June 2003 at the request of Congress, commented that “two of the Advisory Group’s recommendations are: [1] the formation of a new strategic architecture in the White House for global communications; and [2] the creation of a new organization, whether it be a corporation, endowment, or foundation that can marshal the resources and creativity of the private sector to export the ‘best of America.’” The advisory group calls for a Cabinet-level Special Counselor to the President, supported by a Board of Experts drawn from the private sector. A Board of Experts, chaired by the Special Counselor, would conduct regular assessments of our global communications, with an eye toward eliminating compartmentalization and promoting synergies” (Abshire, 2004, p. 3).

Calls for a new cabinet level position find support in both Republican and Democratic circles: “Pete Peterson, a former Nixon administration cabinet member who is now Chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations, recommends creation of a public diplomacy coordinating structure within the White House along the lines of the National Security Council (NSC), as well as a nonprofit Corporation for Public Diplomacy to bridge government and private sector efforts. He wants the government to ratchet up the paltry $5 million a year it spends on public opinion polling abroad” (Harwood, 2003, p. A2). The suggestions for a cabinet level position in the NSC may stem from Congress’ and the White House’s historic lack of trust for the U.S. Department of
State. Moreover, since the creation of the NSC in 1947, U.S. Department of State’s involvement in the policy process has diminished (Hook, 2003, p. 24):


One critical aspect of reorganizing P.D. efforts is identified by the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim World, in a report released to Congress on October 1, 2003: The report noted a need for a culture of measurement in organizations such as the State Department. A lack of performance measures was similarly discussed in a U.S. GAO report on public diplomacy (Djerejian, 2003). The general consensus on the types of measures which can be used to better assess P.D. efforts and programs includes foreign public opinion polling: “The federal government spends little on polling or focus groups abroad. Marketing & public relations experts the GAO interviewed said the $3.5 million the State Department spends on overseas opinion research is about a tenth of what it needs to spend” (Weiser, 2003).¹ Similarly, Ariel Cohen of the Heritage Foundation suggests acquiring a better understanding of the target audience and their wedge issues prior to the discussion of development and delivery of a public diplomacy message (Cohen, 2003, p. 215).

¹ Note that the difficulties in ascertaining the amount actually spent on public diplomacy are underscored by the substantial disparity between Weiser’s (2003) and Harwood’s (2003) estimates of the amounts the State Department spends on overseas public opinion polling, $3.5 million and $5 million, respectively.
P.D. Efforts Should Empower Communication Channels. Broadcasting, including TV, radio, and other communication mediums such as the Internet play a large role in efforts to reduce anti-Americanism in the world. In winning the war of ideas, the U.S. Department of State has a crucial role to play by actively listening to and participating in debates, because the relative absence of U.S. views in foreign media until now has created a void where U.S. foreign policy is routinely and grossly misinterpreted. “In the Middle East particularly, American broadcasting is not even a whisper. An Arab-language radio service is operated by the Voice of America, but its budget is tiny and its audience tinier – only about 1/2 % of Arabs ever listens to it. Among those under the age of 30, 60% of the population in the region, virtually no one listens” (Waller 2003, p. 27).

In response to anti-American broadcasting, the U.S. Department of State has made numerous attempts to communicate its own message. A large part of the burden is placed on the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), created in 1994 after the United States Information Agency’s merger with the U.S. Department of State. Successful attempts such as the pamphlet produced by the U.S.I.A. shortly after September 11, 2001, and BBG’s Radio Sawa, a successful U.S.-backed Arabic-language radio station that mixes American and Arabic pop music with U.S.-sponsored messages give hope to some who are concerned about U.S. public diplomacy message delivery problems. Middle East Television Network, is a relatively new entity, born from policy makers interested in empowering communication channels. METN recently sought substantial funding from the U.S. House of Representatives. A similar notable venture is Radio Farda, which began broadcasting in Persian in December, 2002.
The real success of these organizations in swaying foreign public opinion remains to be seen (Djerejian, 2003, p. 2): “The report also asked for an independent review of the planned government-sponsored Middle East Television Network, and it urged the Broadcasting Board of Governors to adopt “a clearer objective than building a large audience” with its new, music-oriented radio network in Arab countries, Radio Sawa.” In fact deeper skepticism has been expressed by advertising executives: “I don’t think we should be advertising,” said DDB Worldwide chairman Keith Reinhard, who is leading a private-sector taskforce to counter anti-American sentiment abroad: “I think we should be listening and, based on what we hear, modifying behavior where possible” (Melillo, 2003, p. 9). Public diplomacy successes observed during the Cold War may be harder to attain now with the merger of U.S.I.A. into the U.S. Department of State. We speculate that the so called “peace dividend” following Soviet Union’s collapse (Cohen, 2003, p. 217) may have provided government officials an excuse to cut public diplomacy spending.

Dick O’Brian of the Washington office of the American Association of Advertising Agencies notes, “….because the nature of the anger toward America is so deep … it requires a solution that is more complex than advertising alone” (Melillo 2003, p. 9). An abandonment of advertising and news and information-related programming may not be an answer to reversing the tide of anti-Americanism: “Public policymakers must think hard before appearing on Arab television networks and proceeding with plans for U.S. government–funded Middle East television and radio networks to promote U.S. policies and human rights. The targeted audience will be evaluating the words not in terms of the eloquence or proficiency of the speaker’s Arabic but in terms present and past U.S. actions” (Andoni, 2002, p. 268).
While the establishment of new channels of unbiased and fair news and information coverage sponsored by the U.S. government, such as METN signal worthy intentions, they may be the wrong answer to organizations such as Al Jazeera: “If the goal is to ensure satellite access for Middle Easterners to professional news that gives America a fair hearing, it would be much cheaper to offer tax incentives to U.S. broadcasters to perform the public service of dubbing and then duplicating their news in Arabic. CNN, CNBC and Fox are nongovernmental enterprises, which possess far greater credibility than METN” (Satloff, 2003. p. A21).

**Funding Issues in P.D.** U.S. public diplomacy is starved of adequate funding, and as a result, is unable to achieve a satisfying decline in anti-Americanism around the world. The inadequacy is particularly glaring when comparing other spending with public diplomacy spending. The South China Morning Post, in 2003, stated “The U.S. spends only about $1 billion on public diplomacy, 4% of the country’s international affairs budget. This contrasts with about $25 billion spent on traditional diplomacy and more than $30 billion on intelligence and counter-intelligence” (South China Morning Post, 2003, p. 15). The hybrid approach is thought-provoking in that it suggests aggressive funding of the re-working of both (1) message delivery modalities and (to a lesser but nonetheless noteworthy extent), (2) message content (by focusing on truth and credibility of the messenger). This thrust, however, still lacks attention to a fundamental issue: attributes of states targeted by P.D. efforts, notably institutional and structural characteristics of targeted states and their impact on perceptions of the U.S. The next section proceeds to offer a preliminary exploration of the opportunity for expanding the inquiry into this realm.
Regarding the Structural and Institutional Determinants of U.S. Public Diplomacy
Success/Failure

Knowing the Score: Public Opinion Polling in P.D., The Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy and the GAO, as well as members of the current White House administration, suggest U.S. foreign policy must acknowledge the importance of including foreign public opinion polling among measures used in the assessment of public diplomacy programs: “Dan Barlett, the White House director of communications, said in an interview that while he believed that the administration was making progress in the hearts and minds campaign, ‘...we also face many challenges. Many of the Middle Eastern people have been fed a steady diet of anti-American propaganda,’ he said, which helps explain why ‘not everyone shares our assessment’ that the war is necessary and will lead to the liberation of the Iraqi people” (Becker 2003, p. 2). Some members of Congress, journalists, and scholars in the field call for an immediate reconsideration of the foreign policy itself, taking into account the variant economic, political, social, and cultural concerns prior to an aggressive ad campaign and propaganda war: “The Arabs or Muslims are not 4-year old kids who don’t know what’s happening around them,” said Khaled Abdelkarim, a correspondent for the Middle East News Agency, who regularly attends briefing by the State Department. “I appreciate their efforts, but I’m afraid it’s not working. This feed and kill policy throwing bombs in Baghdad and throwing food at the people is not winning hearts and minds” (Becker 2003, p. 2). These remarks underscore the gap between foreign policy and public diplomacy. PD frequently lags substantially behind the realities of foreign policy action

The literature on the topic of public diplomacy fails to offer much insight into how to solve PD performance problems. Extant approaches fail to rigorously utilize dependent variables comprised of concrete public opinion research. This discussion introduces consideration of the
impact of institutional credibility, cultural values, income, bilateral trade with the U.S., public diplomacy spending, past allies’, and women’s roles on U.S. public diplomacy success, measured by a dependent variable constructed using survey data from an existing foreign public opinion poll, released on June 3, 2003.

Putting into practice the suggestions advocated by those who suggest either or both of (1) informing the foreign public via better mechanisms, or (2) revising message content, may help reduce anti-Americanism in the world. Given limited public funds, however, a targeted approach should consider optimizing the degree of success, given state-level factors among different types of audiences. These audiences are distinguished by varying dimensions of institutional credibility, cultural values, income, globalism, and history. Below, we discuss how these institutional and structural differences in various countries affect U.S. public diplomacy success.

<define institutional and structural factors>  ###

**Institutional credibility.** U.S.-style freedoms and culture rely on the extent of independence of each of the branches of the government from the influence of the others (commonly referred to as separation of powers), and the ability of state agencies to act to enforce laws. Government credibility allows western-style trade, and hence U.S. culture to exist (North, 1990). We use a proven measure of the credibility of a government’s policies: Henisz’s (2000) Political Constraint Database rates the strength of government credibility, roughly the existence of checks and balances in a given government (he labels his key measure POLCON). We interpret Henisz’ measure to also reflect citizens’ freedom to engage in civil discourse and self-interested activities (including trade) that reflect one’s own beliefs. President G.W. Bush’s address to a joint session of Congress and the nation delivered nine days after September 11,
2001, outlined a course of foreign policy which has arguably caused a decline in U.S. public diplomacy success, and suggests a link between those who oppose democracy, and those who are anti-American: “Americans are asking ‘Why do they hate us?’…They hate what they see right here in this chamber: a democratically elected government. Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our freedoms: our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other” (Bush, 2001). Populations in countries possessing a relatively high degree of institutional credibility are expected to show a greater degree of understanding and support for the U.S. than governments with a low degree of credibility. That is, people in high-credibility countries are expected to positively identify with the U.S. and its values.

Hypothesis 1: As the degree of institutional credibility increases for a given country, public diplomacy success increases.²

Cultural Values. Hofstede’s (1991) study of cultural dimensions provides a method of measuring the relative differences between national cultures, and how those differences may influence the receptiveness or positive interpretations of U.S. policies in a given society. Two of Hofstede’s most relevant cultural dimensions are particularly useful for us: individualism versus collectivism, and degree of uncertainty avoidance.

Individualism “pertains to societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after himself or herself and his or her immediate family. Collectivism as its opposite pertains to societies in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which throughout people's lifetime continue to protect

² All hypotheses include an implicit “ceteris paribus.”
them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty” (Hofstede, 1991, p. 51). Societies which place a high value on individualism may be more comfortable with recent revised directions of U.S. foreign policy which place secondary value on partnerships and cooperation thru pre-emption and unilateralism.

Hypothesis 2: As individualism increases for a given country, public diplomacy success increases.

Uncertainty avoidance. Uncertainty avoidance is “the extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened by uncertain or unknown situations” (Hofstede, 1991, p. 113). The post 9-11 pre-emption doctrine and subsequent U.S. decision for military action in Iraq suggest relatively higher rates of uncertainty avoidance in the United States in comparison to Morocco, Jordan, Turkey, Pakistan, and Indonesia, where particularly sharp decreases in citizens’ attitudes towards the U.S. have been observed among those with previously favorable opinions of the United States. The uncertainty of Iraq’s nuclear, biological and chemical weapons capabilities may have been tolerated by neighbors Jordan and Turkey, but distant nations which show significantly higher levels of uncertainty avoidance, have taken military action against the Saddam Hussein administration in Iraq. As a country’s populace increasingly experiences high levels of uncertainty avoidance (similar to the U.S.), public diplomacy success is expected to increase.

Hypothesis 3: As the degree of uncertainty avoidance increases for a given country, public diplomacy success increases.
Income and Prosperity. In winning a war of ideas, one should not overlook the possible resentment which may have been arisen in the world against U.S. hegemonic power: “One billion people live in poverty, 110 million children go without schooling, seven million children die from neglect every year. In the poorest countries, people have incomes of $100-200 a year, whereas U.S. incomes average more than $30,000 a year. Thanks to technology, the have-nots are more aware of this gap today than they ever were before” (Blinken, 2002, p. 112). For our empirical measure, we use gross domestic product per capita (adjusted for purchasing power parity). Differing levels of prosperity could negatively influence a (lower GDP per capita) foreign citizen’s opinion of the U.S. Citizens of countries with comparatively higher GDP per Capita are expected to think highly of the U.S. and be receptive to public diplomacy messages. This measure might also be roughly interpreted as one that reflects increasing individual identification with emergent similarities in modern western civil society. Non-U.S. high GDP societies are expected to have attitudes and beliefs in common with the U.S.—this may manifest in the form of physical and cognitive infrastructure commonalities. In particular, similar forms of complex organization arise as similarity in channels of communication between and shared communication codes increases (see Simon, 1962; Heiman and Nickerson 2004). As income and prosperity increase, people can afford higher bandwidth, farther-reaching, higher efficacy communication channels. Economic incentives increase to develop and share common communication codes beyond local, contiguous communities. As these phenomena increasingly impact a population, the convergence of tools and conventions surrounding modes of communication increases identification with cultures employing similar trappings of modernity (e.g., the internet). Income and prosperity facilitate increased positive identification with modern, industrialized countries, notably, the U.S.
Hypothesis 4: As income and prosperity (measured by GDP per Capita) increases for a given country, public diplomacy success increases.

Bilateral Trade with the U.S. A high level of bilateral trade between nations may signal mutual dependency, and an effective U.S. trade policy towards a particular nation. Foreign public opinion is influenced by trade policy and volume, and the U.S. share of world wealth makes it a leader in improving international trade and promoting the global economy: “Senator Chuck Hagel has laid out five priorities he sees for an American foreign policy and strategic world vision that includes: redesigning and strengthening global alliances, redefining the strategy for the global war on terrorism, strengthening public diplomacy, enhancing energy security, and improving international trade and the global economy” (U.S. State Department, 2003, p. 1).

Hypothesis 5: As bilateral trade with the U.S. increases for a given country, public diplomacy success increases.

Public Diplomacy Spending. This study includes the level of funds the U.S. spends by country on U.S. public diplomacy as an important factor for consideration. A report, entitled “Changing Minds, Winning Peace,” produced by The Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World states that “despite the new campaign, the United States was spending only 25 million dollars per year for outreach in Arab and Muslim nations, and called for a dramatic increase in funding” (Lee, 2003, p. 2). Data scarcity and even contradictions in data regarding the total U.S. Department of State spending on specific countries resulted in our use of Educational & Cultural Exchange spending data, a subset of total P.D. spending, and an area comprising approximately 41% of total public diplomacy spending (see Figure 1). We assume that P.D. spending in other areas is proportional to P.D. spending for Education &
Cultural Exchange. Our view is that comparatively higher P.D. spending reflects high degree of awareness and attention to the issue for a given country. P.D. success should follow the application of attention and resources by the U.S.

Hypothesis 6: As public diplomacy spending increases for a given country, public diplomacy success increases.

Past Alliances. Do old partnerships persist? Is it purely a coincidence that the United Kingdom is one of the strongest “natural” supporters of U.S. foreign policy? Are World War II alliances associated with support of the U.S. sixty years later? The inclusion of past alliance data accounts for this effect.

Hypothesis 7: Countries associated with the U.S. as allies during WWII experience increased public diplomacy success.

Women’s Roles. Historically, the study of women’s roles in government has been neglected to a large extent (Sapiro, 1981). Recently, in a Foreign Affairs article titled: “The Payoff from Women’s Rights,” author Isobel Coleman promotes United Nation Millennium Development Goals, gender equality and empowering women, as the means to economic development and democratization. According to Coleman (2004, p. 86):

Washington has also compromised on women’s issues in Iraq. On the one hand, it has placed women’s rights high on its reconstruction agenda: U.S. officials meet frequently with female Iraqi leaders, emphasize the importance of women’s rights, and have channeled several million dollars to local women’s groups. In March,
Secretary of State Colin Powell announced the Iraqi Women’s Democracy Initiative, which earmarks $10 million for leadership, political advocacy, and media training for women. On the other hand, Washington has bowed to pressure from Shia leaders, backing down from appointing several female judges and designating only three women to the Iraqi Governing Council and none to the 24-member Constitutional Committee.

Acceptance of the ideals promoted by the United States will vary with the observed roles of women in other nations. We measure this by looking at the percentage of the number of seats in national parliaments held by women as a percentage of total parliamentary seats (counting both upper and lower houses where applicable).

In countries where a low percentage of seats in parliament are held by women, foreign public opinion may veer towards anti-Americanism. By contrast, in countries where a relatively high percentage of seats in parliament are held by women, foreign public opinions may be more supportive of ideals advocated by the United States. Note that the percentage of women in government may serve to proxy the extent that other traditionally under-represented groups have a voice in government.

Hypothesis 8: As the number of women in Parliament increases for a given country, public diplomacy success increases.

**Data and Method**

Our sample consists of a convenience sample of countries with a reasonably high degree of geographic diversity. Table 1 shows the list of countries which were included in the analysis.
The small sample size (n=35) is owing to limitations in data availability for multiple measures, notably Hofstede’s cultural measures.

We examine the relationship of U.S. public diplomacy success with institutional credibility, individualism, uncertainty avoidance, income (wealth), trade, public diplomacy spending, past alliances, and women’s roles. Our dependent variable, public diplomacy success (PubDiplSuccess) is constructed using the findings of two global attitude project reports, “What the World Thinks in 2002” (Pew, 2002), and “Views of a Changing World” (Pew, 2003), which were produced by The Pew Research Center for People and the Press. “What the World Thinks in 2002” contains results from 38,263 surveys conducted in 44 nations. “Views of a Changing World” contains results from 66,788 surveys conducted in 44 nations. Though the database is useable (subsequent to cleaning), it nevertheless has at least two important limitations. Some survey responses are impossible to classify as reflecting favorable or unfavorable views of the U.S., for example, “….tell me whether you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree, or completely disagree with the statement... Women should have the right to decide if they wear a veil” (Pew, 2003, p. T-91). In some countries which struggle between a balance of modernity and traditionalism, the question may be interpreted as a question of ideology on whether or not the respondent believes women should, or should not wear a veil. The item does not necessarily embody a reflection of an opinion of the U.S. This and similar-type response items were removed from consideration for inclusion in the construction of the dependent variable. The second disadvantage of the data is the difficulty in classifying moderate responses as reflecting a favorable or unfavorable opinion of the U.S.: “In the long run, do you think a war with Iraq to end Saddam Hussein's rule is likely to increase the chances of terrorist attacks in Europe, lessen the chances, or will it make no difference?” (Pew, p. T-70). To be conservative in our method,
we have elected to treat neutral responses as negative, in order to be confident when declaring a response as representing a favorable view of the U.S.

Many of our measures are most appropriately treated as ordinal and not continuous or interval data, which renders conventional OLS regression problematic. Non-parametric inferential tests are more robust than corresponding parametric tests when the assumptions underlying the parametric test are not satisfied, as is the case with our data. We use (non-parametric) median regression partly to address the above issue with data-types, and partly to minimize the impact of outlier data on parameter estimation. Also, median regression makes no assumptions about the frequency distributions of the variables being assessed, a plus for models that rely on convenience samples. In this model, instead of minimizing the sum of squared residuals (as in ordinary least squares regression), the sum of absolute residuals is minimized. The aim of using a quantile regression model is to estimate the median of the dependent variable conditional on the values of the independent variable.

**Empirical Analysis**

Construction of the Dependent Variable. Public diplomacy success, our dependent variable (labeled PubDiplSuccess), is constructed using survey data from the survey projects, “What the World Thinks in 2002” (Pew, 2002), and “Views of a Changing World” (Pew, 2003). First, countries’ survey responses were classified potentially reflecting as favorable or unfavorable views of the United States. For example, in France 62% said a war with Iraq to end Saddam Hussein’s rule is likely to increase the chances of terrorist attacks in Europe, 8% believed chances would lessen, 28% said it will make no difference. Survey responses to this question for France were classified as 8% favorable and 90% unfavorable. The remaining 2% who refused, or did not have an answer to the question were treated as missing data. Recalculated percentages of
favorable and unfavorable views in France based on the question were scored at 8.2% and 91.8%, respectively. Roughly 26 survey questions from each of the 35 countries were classified and the percentages recalculated as above, resulting in a total of 830 raw data points. Second, questions were categorized across six topics, post-war (Gulf-war) opinions, Islam & governance, judging democracy, globalization, nationalism, and values and modernity (Pew, 2003). For each country, the sums of the lowest favorable category-responses for each country were added to arrive at the final measure used in our analysis. Owing to severe lack of classifiable data in the categories of Islam & governance, and nationalism, only four topics were used in the statistical analysis: post-war opinions, judging democracy, globalization, and values and modernity. Choice of summing the minimum percentage favorable responses for each category rather than the mean or the maximum favorable response reflects our desire to explain the determinants of the worst opinions of the U.S.—that is, what factors are responsible for people’s least positive feelings towards the U.S.? As PubDiplSuccess increases across our data, public diplomacy success increases—the number of people in a country who have affinity for U.S. policy increases. Our results should shed light on which factors improve people’s least positive opinions of the U.S. If PubDiplSuccess = 4, a country has a possible maximum of a 100% favorable view of the U.S. in the four summed categories. For PubDiplSuccess = 0, a country has a possible minimum of a 0% favorable view of the U.S. Actual data values for this measure vary between 0.322 and 1.645, a range that is sufficient for our analysis to proceed.

**Construction of the Independent Variables.** The natural log of most variables was taken to magnify differences in the data while preserving ordinal ranking, which is the critical information needed for median (non-parametric) regression, the technique we use to identify significant associations between our independent variables and the dependent variable. This was
done because a fraction of the data for many of the measures was clustered tightly, and rounding routines in Microsoft Excel (used to hold data prior to transfer to STATA, our analytical software) create a risk that distinct data would be improperly truncated and/or rounded and subsequently treated as identical by STATA, thus triggering STATA routines to deal with “ties” in the data when in fact a false “tie” was detected. Although this is not the case for all data, several important measures suffered from this problem, so as noted, we used the natural log of all the independent variables (except for WWIIally, a dummy variable, individualism and uncertainty avoidance).

Institutional credibility (LnPolitcred). We use Henisz’s (2000) Institutional credibility Index POLCON (which we re-label PolitCred). PolitCred—institutional credibility, was originally coded with zeros as values for a few cases. For this variable, in order to use as much data as possible given an already small sample, prior to calculating the natural logarithm, we added 0.01 to all values of the institutional credibility measure (PolitCred). This preserves the ordinality of the data (there are no negative raw data) while allowing us to take the natural log of the few values that were previously coded as 0. This minor change does not affect coefficient estimates and is acceptable for a median regression model. The natural log of the PolitCred values for 2002 was calculated used to magnify differences in data, and 0.01 was added to all values, as discussed above. Lower values of LnPolitcred suggest less credible governments.

Cultural Values (Indiv & Uncert). For individualism vs. collectivism and uncertainty avoidance values, Geert Hofstede’s (1991) cultural dimensions scores for individualism and uncertainty avoidance were used. Eight countries included in our analysis were not included in the Hofstede’s IBM survey, including, Angola, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Ghana, Jordan, Senegal,
Slovak Republic, and Uganda. Regional estimated values offered by Hofstede were used for the missing values (Hofstede 1991). Low values of Indiv indicate less value is placed on individualism, and collectivism is the prevalent cultural value. Low values of Uncert indicate more tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity within the society.

**Income and Prosperity (LnGDPperCapita).** Per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) values based on purchasing power parity for 2002, obtained from the 2003 CIA World Fact Book (2004) were used in comparing countries for different levels of income and prosperity. Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) reflects the assertion that purchasing power remains constant through exchange rate fluctuations (Ross et. al., 2003), providing an internationally comparable measure of a country’s residents’ relative ability to afford identical or similar goods and services. Low values for LnGDPperCapita roughly indicate residents of the country cannot afford many goods and services available in their country.

**Bilateral Trade with the U.S. (LnTotlTrade).** Total trade volume of the U.S. (regardless of direction of trade) with countries for 2001 and 2002 from the U.S. Census Bureau's FT-900 report, “U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services,” from March 18, 2003 was used in assessing general trade levels between the U.S. and the countries used in the analysis (U.S. Census Bureau, 2003). Low values of LnTotlTrade indicate little trade has occurred between the two countries.

**Public Diplomacy Spending (LnPubDiplSpend).** Data scarcity in the area of total U.S. Department of State spending on specific countries resulted in the use of Educational & Cultural Exchange spending, an area where approximately 41% of total public diplomacy spending occurs (GAO, 2003, p. 5). According to Michael J. Courts, Assistant Director of International
Affairs and Trade of the U.S. General Accounting Office, Educational and Cultural Exchanges represent the single largest public diplomacy program budget item (Courts, 2004). We assume that spending on unknown parts of the public diplomacy budget is proportional to the amounts spent on the known parts of the budget. The U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Annual Report (2003) provides a country breakdown of exchanges expenditures in thousands of dollars. Low values for LnPubDiplSpend indicate low exchange expenditures for a country, and a correspondingly low amount of P.D. spending by the U.S.

Past Alliances (WWIIally). The information on countries originally in the Allies and the Axis during WWII was captured by “Post-Cold War Allies,” an article authored by William R. Hawkins, at the National Review (Hawkins, 2003). We have coded this measure as a dummy variable where 0 indicates that the country was not an ally of the U.S. during World War II and 1 indicates a WWII ally.

Women’s roles (LnWomenGov). The United Nations Human Development Report’s data on the number of seats in parliament held by women as a percent of total number of seats was used in the analysis of women’s roles and empowerment in a country’s society (UNHDR, 2003). Low values of LnWomenGov indicate few the seats in a country’s parliament are held by women.

Table 2 summarizes the construction of the dependent and the independent variables. Tables 3-A and 3-B present the summary statistics for our cleaned data. For clarity, Table 3-A gives the summary information for variables prior to logging, while Table 3-B gives the summary statistics for the logged values of the data where appropriate. We find no hints in the summary statistics that would preclude moving forward with an inferential analysis.
Findings

Table 4 presents maximum-likelihood estimates of parameters for our model. The data is analyzed using the quantile regression (median regression) routines in the software package STATA. The Pseudo R-squared information suggests our model explains about 25% of the variation in the dependent variable, a substantial fraction.

At first glance, seven of eight variables are significant at a standard of $p \leq 0.05$. We suspect, however, that some of these results may be spurious. In particular, we suspect Indiv and Uncert are, in fact, not truly significant factors—their coefficient magnitudes are comparatively low and several additional tests hinted strongly at their likely lack of significance. To be conservative, we elect to treat Indiv and Uncert as not significant.\(^3\) Given our strict standard for significance for Uncert and Indiv, for simplicity we elect to subject all estimated parameter values to a stringent standard for significance ($p \leq 0.001$). Note the three factors that were found to be significant predictors of public diplomacy success under this standard: LnGDPperCapita (average individual wealth), LnPubDiplSpend (spending on public diplomacy), and LnWomenGov (the percentage of women in national legislative bodies).

In addition to Indiv and Uncert, the variables LnPolitCred (institutional credibility) and, LnTotlTrade (total bilateral trade) are significant at a level of $p \leq 0.01$, and LnPolitCred has a sign opposite that predicted. We discuss PolitCred and LnTotlTrade briefly below. WWIIally is not a significant predictor of public diplomacy success.

\(^3\) We ran several variations of our main analysis, in some instances with slightly different coding schemes for independent variables, using OLS regression, and with various combinations of independent variables. Results were generally consistent with the findings in Table 4, but Indiv and Uncert were only sporadically significant, and always had very low (often near-zero) magnitude coefficients.
Though we have identified several significant predictors ($p \leq 0.001$) of P.D. success, the sign of one coefficient is not as predicted. LnPubDiplSpend’s negative sign may be explained by the possibility that comparatively more funds are spent on remediating public opinion in countries where P.D. is already a disaster. That the U.S. tends to spend the most money where problems with public opinion are at their worst is, in fact a somewhat comforting finding. It would, however, clearly be better to be able to report that public opinion improves most where the most money is allocated rather than merely noting that the money goes to where the least favorable opinions are found. “Opinion polls show that despite tens of millions of dollars spent on advertising campaigns the reputation of the United States has deteriorated sharply in the past year, mainly because of the invasion of Iraq, U.S. Middle East policy and the Bush administration’s treatment of old European allies” (Reuters News, 2003, p. 1).

The findings regarding LnGDPperCapita and LnWomenGov are signed as predicted by our Hypotheses, and merit further attention. LnGDPperCapita and LnWomenGov have the highest absolute magnitude coefficients in the model, 0.17 and 0.10, respectively, suggesting that these factors have a substantial impact on public diplomacy success.\(^4\) The general level of income and prosperity in a society as well as women’s involvement in government are strong predictors of U.S. public diplomacy success. Conversely, a lack of income and/or women’s involvement in government for a given country predict P.D. failure.

**Discussion**

\(^4\) The next largest absolute magnitude coefficient is only 40% of the magnitude of the coefficient for LnWomenGov, and is only 25% of the magnitude of LnGDPperCapita.
Our findings suggest that the relationships between U.S. public diplomacy success and two of our independent variables are real and worthy of further study. There are positive relationships between public diplomacy success and average prosperity and income, and women’s roles in society. Of these factors the largest coefficient belongs to income and prosperity, suggesting that a comparatively high degree of average wealth in a society predicts strong support for U.S. policies. The positive relationship observed between U.S. public diplomacy success and women’s roles suggests that as women increasingly assume responsible roles in society and in particular elected government, U.S. P.D. success will increase.

Other effects. We now turn to a brief discussion of LnPolitCred’s (lesser) significance and sign, which is opposite to our prediction. One possible explanation for this finding is that in countries experiencing low government credibility, citizens admire and aspire to the U.S.’ comparatively greater freedoms and the associated benefits to individuals, while in countries with more democratic, credible governments, enlightened disagreement with U.S. policies is not only permitted, but growing. That is, an informed citizenry with good access to multiple media sources limits possible successes from short-term public diplomacy advertising campaigns—“propaganda” is recognized and resented for being an attempt to influence a country’s citizens (Quenqua, 2003, p. 9). Resentment of the U.S. becomes “reasonable” under a societies’ norms. We further note that the small magnitude of PolitCred’s coefficient and its lower significance level of p≤.01 (recall our standard for significance is p≤.001) call into question whether the value of the coefficient is other than zero.\footnote{For completeness, we added values from the Transparency International (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index to the model (Transparency International, 2006). One important difference between Heinz’ POLCON measure (our PolitCred) and the Transparency International index is that corruption is not precisely the same as institutional credibility—we see the former as a subset of the latter, where POLCON also incorporates the important element of the relative protection of freedom of speech—a crucial difference for measuring public diplomacy success. In}

5
bilateral trade volume with the U.S.), though it is significant at $p \leq 0.05$, for consistency with our standard for significance, we concede that this is likely a spurious effect, especially given the very small comparative magnitude of the estimated coefficient.

**Caveats, Contributions and Directions.** The reader is cautioned that our model may have limited generality owing to the small sample size, despite the sample’s diversity. We use median regression in lieu of ordinary least squares regression (OLS). Median regression is a conservative, non-parametric statistical method. We use it owing to our small sample size and its freedom from assumptions regarding the nature of the data’s underlying distribution. Median regression also boasts a decreased impact on parameter significance of outlier and skewed data. Given our construction and cleaning of the data as well as our conservative statistical technique, we believe that the model is sound and offers insight into the phenomenon of P.D. success/failure. Further study seems warranted, notably using a larger sample, and more explanatory institutional and structural factors.

This paper has attempted to shift the focus of the debate around the failure of U.S. public diplomacy from the “poor delivery versus poor message” approach to consideration of underlying institutional and structural factors that predict P.D. success or failure using empirical evidence. Our results suggest that this view has merit. Possible policy implications suggest foreign policy and public diplomacy efforts that (1) raise a country’s standard of living (average income and prosperity), and (2) enhance potential for increasing women’s roles in governing society would likely lead to increased levels of public diplomacy success. Regarding women’s roles in government, this measure may reflect the effects of policy towards under-represented models incorporating both measures or solely the TI index, the TI index is never significant. When both factors were present in the model, only LnPolitCred was significant—this replicates the findings of our main model (Table 4).
groups in general, e.g., religious or ethnic minorities. The nature of our findings suggests that an appropriate path to P.D. success may be politically sensitive to implement. Revised foreign policy content linked tightly to P.D. activities involves substantial policy remediation and recognition of past failures in approaching public diplomacy.

As our primary contribution to the conversation regarding public diplomacy failure and success, this study finds that U.S. foreign policy should encourage and promote (1) increased average individual wealth and prosperity and (2) an increased role for under-represented groups (notably women) in national elected government legislative bodies. In order for public diplomacy efforts to effectively support these initiatives, U.S. foreign policy might usefully orient on these goals more explicitly. Tight coupling of P.D. and foreign policy seems warranted. Continuing P.D. failure to promote these elements may result in worsening public opinion of the U.S. The nature of our findings suggests that implementing an appropriate path to P.D. success is likely to be a politically matter. Revised foreign policy content linked tightly to P.D. activities involves substantial policy remediation and recognition of past failures in approaching public diplomacy.
References


Heiman, B. A. and J. A. Nickerson (2004). "Empirical evidence regarding the tension between knowledge sharing and knowledge expropriation in collaborations." Managerial and Decision Economics 25(6-7 Special Issue: Deploying, Leveraging, and Accessing Resources Within and Across Firm Boundaries).


Table 1: List of countries in the sample (n=35)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANGOLA</td>
<td>INDIA</td>
<td>PHILIPPINES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARGENTINA</td>
<td>INDONESIA</td>
<td>POLAND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BANGLADESH</td>
<td>ITALY</td>
<td>SENEegal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRAZIL</td>
<td>JAPAN</td>
<td>SLOVAK REP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BULGARIA</td>
<td>JORDAN</td>
<td>SO AFRICA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CANADA</td>
<td>KENYA</td>
<td>TANZANIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZECH REP</td>
<td>KOREA REP</td>
<td>TURKEY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EGYPT</td>
<td>MALI</td>
<td>UGANDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRANCE</td>
<td>MEXICO</td>
<td>UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GERMANY</td>
<td>NIGERIA</td>
<td>VENEZUELA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHANA</td>
<td>PAKISTAN</td>
<td>VIETNAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUATEMALA</td>
<td>PERU</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Broken down by region*:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>South Asia</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>North America</th>
<th>Middle East</th>
<th>South America</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Eastern Europe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country count</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Total</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* We count Philippines as in Asia, and Bangladesh as in South Asia; the Czech Rep. and Slovakia are both counted as Eastern Europe.
### Table 2: Construction of variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PublcDiplSuccess--U.S. Public Diplomacy Success</td>
<td>Sum of lowest (most negative) responses (percentages of respondents) of the four survey question categories: Post-War Opinions, Judging Democracy, Globalism, Values &amp; Modernity.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LnPolitcred--Natural log of Institutional credibility.</td>
<td>LnPolitcred indicates level of credibility of government institutions—it reflects degree of independence and oversight between different branches and institutions of government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiv--Individualism vs. Collectivism.</td>
<td>Indiv indicates degree of individualism versus collectivism, a cultural attribute; higher values suggest greater individualism. We did not take the logarithm of this measure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncert--Uncertainty Avoidance.</td>
<td>Uncert indicates degree of tolerance for uncertainty within the society or unstructured situations. Higher values indicate more uncertainty avoidance. We did not take the logarithm of this measure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LnGDPperCapita--Log of Gross Domestic Product per Capita.</td>
<td>LnGDPperCapita indicates the degree of income and prosperity in a country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LnTotlTrade--Log of Total Bilateral Trade.</td>
<td>LnTotlTrade—represents the intensity of trade that occurs between the two countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWIIally--Dummy coding for WWII Ally.</td>
<td>U.S. Allies in World War II =1 if country was an ally of the U.S. in World War II, otherwise = 0. We did not take the logarithm of this measure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LnWomenGov--Log of Number of Women in Parliamentary body.</td>
<td>LnWomenGov: Lower values indicate fewer seats in a country’s parliament are held by women.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 3-A: Summary Statistics—not logged *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Possible Min</th>
<th>Possible Max</th>
<th>Actual Min</th>
<th>Actual Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politcred</td>
<td>0.496</td>
<td>0.298</td>
<td>.502</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiv</td>
<td>39.571</td>
<td>22.514</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncert</td>
<td>65.057</td>
<td>18.558</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDPperCapita ($)</td>
<td>9,071.43</td>
<td>9269.259</td>
<td>4600</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>29,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TotlTrade ($ million)</td>
<td>71,255.40</td>
<td>155553.500</td>
<td>8982.5</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>751,112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PubDiplSpend ($ thou.)</td>
<td>1,941.60</td>
<td>1870.444</td>
<td>1269</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWIIally</td>
<td>0.171</td>
<td>0.382</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WomenGov (%)</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PubDiplSuccess</td>
<td>0.961</td>
<td>0.312</td>
<td>1.025</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.322</td>
<td>1.645</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*For clarity, we do not use the logged values of variables in this table. All variables except Indiv, Uncert and WWIIally are logged for the regression.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Possible Min</th>
<th>Possible Max</th>
<th>Actual Min</th>
<th>Actual Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LnPolitcred</td>
<td>1.686</td>
<td>2.452</td>
<td>-0.689</td>
<td>-16.118</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-6.908</td>
<td>-0.150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiv</td>
<td>39.571</td>
<td>22.514</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncert</td>
<td>65.057</td>
<td>18.558</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LnGDPperCapita ($)</td>
<td>8.547</td>
<td>1.143</td>
<td>8.434</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>6.397</td>
<td>10.285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LnTotlTrade ($ million)</td>
<td>9.128</td>
<td>2.413</td>
<td>9.102</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>3.970</td>
<td>13.530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LnPubDiplSpend ($ thou.)</td>
<td>6.837</td>
<td>1.159</td>
<td>7.212</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8.965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWIIally</td>
<td>0.171</td>
<td>0.382</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LnWomenGov (%)</td>
<td>-2.170</td>
<td>0.845</td>
<td>-2.120</td>
<td>-13.816</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-4.605</td>
<td>-1.140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PubDiplSuccess</td>
<td>0.961</td>
<td>0.312</td>
<td>1.025</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.322</td>
<td>1.645</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* We use the logged values of variables in this table. All variables except Indiv, Uncert and WWIIally are logged for the regression.
Table 4: Results of Median Regression Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Coefficient (std. Error)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LnPolitcred</td>
<td>-0.0244 **</td>
<td>(0.0081)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiv</td>
<td>-0.0028 **</td>
<td>(0.0013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncert</td>
<td>-0.0026 *</td>
<td>(0.0013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LnGDPperCapita</td>
<td>0.1659 ***</td>
<td>(0.0293)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LnTotlTrade</td>
<td>0.0232 *</td>
<td>(0.0105)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LnPubDiplSpend</td>
<td>-0.0407 ***</td>
<td>(0.0106)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWIIally</td>
<td>-0.0229</td>
<td>(0.0588)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LnWomenGov</td>
<td>0.1015 ***</td>
<td>(0.0230)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.0641</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.2625</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p ≤ 0.05 **p ≤ 0.01 ***p ≤ 0.001
Figure 1: Key Uses of U.S. Dept. of State’s Public Diplomacy Budget Resources, Fiscal Year 2003

- $245M Educational and cultural exchanges (9%)
- $226M Regional bureaus (38%)
- $226M Regional bureaus (38%)
- $226M Regional bureaus (38%)
- $51M Related appropriations
- $71M International information and other programs

Source: GAO (2003, p. 5).