Putin and Chechnya: A Pre-Dispostion Towards A Diversionary Theory of War

 

By

 

Ryan Yambao

 

IR 747

 

FALL 2003

 

 

 

Abstract

 

            The paper addresses the question of Russia’s policy discourse and perception towards Chechnya in 1999.  The paper argues that the leading causal factor of Russia’s war in Chechnya was the result of Putin’s attempt to garner political support and create political cohesion.  Furthermore, the paper also argues that the nature of the Chechen resistance is based less on Islamic fundamentalism than survival.  Despite the apparent link to international terrorist networks, Chechen militancy embodies a variety of motivation.  In doing so, the paper will trace the change in perception of the Chechen quagmire both in Russia and Chechnya.  This author would provide a diversionary theory of war as a theoretical explanation in order to provide a factual basis for correlation of what is perceived to be an explanation founded on conspiracy.

 

 

I.  Introduction

 

            Military conflict escalated between Russian forces and Chechen militants in 1999 breaking the three year old ceasefire created by the 1996 Khasavariut Accord that formally left the status of Chechnya’s relationship to Russia undecided until December 31, 2001.  On August 1999, Russian forces responded against Chechen incursions in Dagestan led by Shamil Basayev and Khattab.  Two months later on October, Russian troops invaded Chechnya taking a third of the republic of what seemed to be a response to a series of terrorist bombings in Moscow and Volgodonsk a month earlier.  Yet the apparent justification for the invasion of Chechnya remains highly suspicious and contested.  The question remains as to whether the conflict in Chechnya is political in nature.

            This paper assumes that the incursion in Dagestan and the apartment buildings in Russia have little influence in the decision to renew the war in Chechnya.  I argue that despite the legitimacy of a military response against terrorism, the root cause of the war in Chechnya can be trace in the political machinations within the Russian political elite as an attempt to create political cohesion and to consolidate their own internal political positions.  The paper will attempt to draw a correlation between the war in Chechnya and public support for the newly appointed premier Vladimir Putin, which was at that time a relatively unknown former Russian secret service.

            In making my argument, I follow a realist interpretation of the causes of war.  More specifically I would apply a diversionary theory of war as a theoretical explanation for the decisive military action taken by the Russian administration towards Chechnya.  My theoretical approach diverges from traditional neo-realist assumption of system base cause of war.  Rather, it offers a societal-level approach in explaining the war.  Evidence should focus on society’s reaction and support for specific policy discourse as well as support for individual(s) responsible for such policy.

 

 II. Why the War?

 

            A variety of explanations have been offered regarding the nature of the Russo-Chechen war yet none has been treated without some kind of skepticism.  Thus the question remains as to what factor(s) precipitated the second war in 1999.  I argue that the war in Chechnya was a result of Putin’s attempt to improve his political image and position within the Russian state.  An integral part of such policy discourse is the framing of the Chechen conflict in a way that would garner positive support from the public.  Thus, this paper implies that the changing nature of perception regarding Chechnya and the decision to renew hostilities are equally related. 

To support my argument, I offer a diversionary theory of war as an explanation.  Attempt to trace the war to conditions internal to states is an old tradition in the study of international relations.[1]  A diversionary theory of war is the idea that political elites pursue aggressive foreign policy such as war in order to divert attention from internal social and economic problems and consolidate their own political position.  The concept is grounded on a sociological foundation.  Using Georg Simmel’s in group/out group hypothesis, diversionary theory of war attempts to make a link between domestic political factors and the conflict behavior of states.  Simmel argues that conflict with the out-group increases the cohesion and political centralization of the in-group.[2]  Elaborating further on Simmel’s conflict-cohesion hypothesis, Lewis Coser propose that an increase in cohesion is possible  if minimal level of internal cohesion is already in place within the in-group.[3]
             This paper adopts a simplistic version of a diversionary theory of war using the following three theoretical considerations and assumptions:[4]

1.      the perception of an external enemy by a state’s populace increases internal cohesion, reduces domestic conflict and increase support for ruling elite

2.      political leaders value public support and will take actions designed to bolster this support when they believe it is waning

3.      political leaders believe foreign hostile acts they undertake will create the perception of an external enemy on the part of their public

 

In addition, there is a correlation between regime types and the success/likelihood of a diversionary cause of war.  Diversionary conflict depends on the degree of the governments contact with the public and public’s independent access to information.  Thus, there is a great deal of importance given to governmental structure for this relationship.[5]  One can make a distinction between the likelihood of a diversionary war in democracies where population is most conscious as oppose to an authoritarian regime where information is restricted.

            In order to test this hypothesis and apply it to the war in Chechnya, I would employ the use of public opinion polls to assess government approval ratings as well as support for Putin’s decision both among the public and ruling elite.  Polls showing the changing perception of Chechen militancy will also be appropriate in analyzing the correlation between domestic political factors and the conflict behavior of Russia.

 

III. Putin, Public Opinion and the War

 

            An analysis of Russia’ public support for the war and the increasing support for Putin’s conduct of the war are hardly circumstantial.  A correlation can be made between the initial Russian response to the Dagestan incursion in August 1999 to the significant increase in public support for Putin.  As Figure 1 show prior to the invasion of Chechnya in October 1999, Putin’s overall performance in August of that year sits at 3%.[6]  Following the series of apartment buildings in Moscow and Volgodansk in September 1999 that what seemed to be the Russian government’s pre-text to invasion, support for Putin rose dramatically to 79%--a significant increase for a relatively unknown politician.

    

 

Furthermore, a more diplomatic solution seemed to have an adverse effect to Putin’s popularity ratings among the Russian public.  As was the case with U.S. Presidents during the Cold War, where the president suffers a 2 percent decrease in popularity ratings when engaged in peace with the Soviet Union and gains 4-5 percent popularity ratings in public opinion surveys when engaged in a more conflictual behavior against it,[7] the war in Chechnya has similar implications to Putin’s popularity ratings.  A survey conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation shows that 22 percent of the population would have their attitude towards Putin improve if peace talks with the Chechens begin compared to 30 percent who says that their will attitude will worsen if negotiations are to be initiated.[8]  The same survey yielded a positive support for Putin’s actions in Chechnya vis-à-vis his approval ratings.  When asked about the situation in Chechnya, 39 percent responded that the situation in Chechnya would increase the popularity of Putin compared to only 15 percent who thinks that the war would have an adverse effect in his popularity. 

Another relevant data is the favorable voting preferences of the Russian public for Vladimir Putin amidst the war in Chechnya.  In a poll conducted by the All Russia Center for Public Opinion Research (VCIOM), presidential voting preference for Putin is at 2 percent (Figure 2) in his first month in office compared to other leading presidential candidate, Communist Party leader Zyuganov.  By the end of 1999, two months into the war in Chechnya voting preference for Putin among the Russian public is up 39 percent and significantly increase to 50 percent by January of the following year, three months away from the presidential elections.[9]  Such dramatic support for an up and coming politician is unusual given the fact that in three months of office, Putin’s only significant policy accomplishment is the war in Chechnya.

In addition, Putin’s ruling coalition also benefited from the war in Chechnya. The result of the December 1999 State Duma elections posted significant victory for Unity, a coalition of pro-Kremlin.  Coming up second behind the Communist Party, Unity garnered 16.2 percent of the national vote and occupying a total of 81 seats in the State Duma.[10]  With nearly as many members as the Communist Party and a level of voting discipline that rivals those of the Communist, Unity has taken the pivotal faction formerly held by the Communists with the ability to dictate terms and form a cohesive majority for Putin regarding policy agenda.[11] Thus, applying the first theoretical assumption of the diversionary theory of war, a perception of a Chechen threat increases internal cohesion and increase support for the ruling elite. 

            Support for both Putin and his ruling coalition is not surprising given the unprecedented high public support for the second war, which both parties rode their campaigns with.  Compared to the first Chechen war of 1994-1996, the military operation against Chechnya drew a 67 percent support from the public compared to only 30 percent in 1994.[12]  By March 2000, the support has increased to 70 percent with only 22 percent advocating both Russia and Chechnya to enter negotiations (see Figure 3). 

 

 

Dec 99’

Mar 00’

 

Dec 94’

Jan 95’

Continue Operation

67%

70%

Continue Operation

30%

16%

Enter Negotiations

22%

22%

Oppose Bombardment

36%

71%

Don’t know

11%

8%

Immediate Withdrawal

23%

 

Source:  VCIOM Survey 1999-2000; 1994-1996

 

The favorable public opinion towards the conflict in Chechnya and the aggressive military policy by the Russian administration draws attention as to how Putin has framed the war differently as to win significant public support. 

            The apartment bombings throughout Russia as well as the incursion in Dagestan have deep psychological impact on the public perception of terrorist threats.  Among Russians polled in September 2001, more than two years after the war began, 70 percent are still fearful of falling victims to terrorist attacks.[13]  A critical aspect of the diversionary theory of war is the ability of political leaders to create the perception of an external enemy in the part of the public.  By creating the perception of Chechnya as a threat to Russia’s own domestic security, Putin provided sufficient fear factor in order to rally the Russian public behind state actions against Chechnya. 

 

 

 

IV. Media and the War

            Another critical aspect for the diversionary explanation of the second Chechen conflict is the restricted or “managed” coverage of the war.  Another correlation can be made using comparative media coverage of the first and second Chechen war.  During the first war the Russian media has greater access to information and was less restricted to areas within Chechnya to conduct their coverage.  Such dramatic turnaround in freedom of the press allows the Russian public to have the opportunity to take a good look of the facts of the war besides information provided by the state.  The result is a significant opposition to the war that fueled general disapproval of Yeltsin’s presidency in 1994.[14] Thus, as Anatol Lieven writes, “forthright, even gruesome, coverage of war is in fact a force of peace.”[15] 

            That is not the case during the second war in 1999.  Public support for the war has tamed enthusiasms for journalistic coverage of the war.  Evidence shows that most Russian journalists share the public perception of the Chechen conflict as an anti-terrorist campaign in the part of Russia.[16]  Nevertheless restrictions were imposed on border crossing, specifically journalists from other media outlet other than the state’s press services.[17]  Journalists such as Andrei Babitskii from Radio Liberty and Anna Politskovskaya suffered continued harassment from Russian secret service and were suspected of working directly with Chechen militants.  Such harsh treatment of the media and media journalists shows Russia’s commitment to silencing any domestic criticisms of the war.  The decision of Russian state officials not to broadcast interviews with Shamil Basayev both on television and in print media exemplified such commitment and is justified as a preventive measure against terrorist propaganda.  Only NTV provided critical coverage of the second war amidst the growing support for the military operation but not without any consequences.  It provided the Kremlin the opportunity to criticize NTV as pro-Chechen and anti-Russian, labeling it as “un-patriotic.”[18]  The most significant policy initiative yet against the media is the passing of the Doctrine of Information Security issued on September 2000.  The doctrine emphasizes the imperativeness of state-owned media networks to dominate the information market by “strengthening governmental mass media, broaden its possibilities regarding timely providing Russian and foreign citizens with trustworthy information.”[19]

            The critical role played by the media during the 1994-1996 war is virtually non-existent in the second war.  Government control of the Russian media for the most part has aided in transforming the perception of the conflict in favor of the Russian military.  Instead of Chechnya dominating the news coverage in Russia, it is Putin who had the opportunity to use the media to bring attention to his policies and initiatives.  Radio Free Europe reported that Putin received nearly a third of all television coverage of presidential candidates with figures for his share of the air time lacking reports devoted to the war in Chechnya, which was at that time a leading news story and central to his political agenda.[20]

V.  Alternative Causes

 

            A variety of explanations can be made assessing the root cause of the conflict in Chechnya.  I would address and respond to two significant and common justifications for the renewal of war in Chechnya.  First is the perceived threat to the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation; the second is the apparent link of Chechen militancy to international terrorism.

            Among the number of possible objections to my argument is what has been considered the “domino effect.”  This assumes the precarious state of the Russian Federation particularly in the period immediately following the breakup of the Soviet Union.  It is widely believed that Chechnya’s independence would create a “brushfire,” providing the same opportunity for other republics to break away from the federation.  Thus, similar to the first Chechen war, Putin’s decision to invade Chechnya in October 1999 is a response to further threats of secession and to prevent the “Yugoslavization” of Russia.  Such an assumption is valid considering the heterogeneity of Russia’s ethnic composition.  But such claim fails to assess the actual risks of regions seceding from the federation.  Using a comparative analysis of perceived regions at risk, Matthew Evangelista made the argument that the most serious threat to the territorial integrity of Russia is not Chechen independence but rather Russian military reaction.[21]  The fact that none of the republics followed suit after the 1994-1996 conflict lends credit to other explanation.

            There were various and distinct reaction from the republic regarding Chechnya.  The most significant divergence is the case of Dagestan, which resembles Chechnya ethnically, economically and shares the same religious orientation.  Both share adherence to Islamic Sufi movement and influences; social structures are loosely organize around extended clans and groupings of villages; and both are economically the poorest of the eighty nine subjects of the federation being ranked 88th and 89th respectively.[22]  Yet despite the obvious similarities Dagestan chose not to pursue the Chechen path.  Such failure is attributed to both historical and sociological factors.  Dagestan lacks the historical experience of Chechnya in relation to Russia.  Dagestan did not suffer the same mass deportation as Chechens did, thus lacking Chechnya’s traditional strong opposition to Moscow.  In addition, Dagestan is not ethnically homogenous as Chechnya.  Its population is fragmented to 700 villages with 34 ethnic groups making it both linguistically and ethnically diverse.[23]  Furthermore, the social organization of both Chechnya and Dagestan significantly differs from one another.  Chechnya’s teip membership, which base itself on loyalty and clan allegiance, is a more cohesive social and political unit than Dagestan’s djamaat, which transcends blood relations and functions more or less like an ancient city states.[24] Dagestan’s djamaat were retained and functioned well within the Soviet political system.  Thus, Dagestan, which lacks the hostile opposition to Russian rule, possess more loyalty to Russia compared to Chechnya.  Such different social attitude toward Russia would explain the more pro-Russian reaction of Dagestan in the wake of the incursion precipitated by Chechen leader Shamil Basayev and Khattab in August of 1999.  The success of the Russian military in responding to the attacks was due in part to the opposition from local Dagestani villagers who welcomed Russian military support. 

            Tatarstan, provides yet another divergence from the “domino effect.”  It is argued that the “Tatarstan model” could be possible solution for peace in Chechnya.[25] Yet despite the sizable Muslim population, Tatarstan pursued a different strategy than that of Chechnya pursuing a voluntary power sharing with Moscow rather than declaring full independence from Moscow.  One reason for Tatarstan’s path after empire is its leadership’s moderate appetite for formal ties with Moscow as well as Mintimir Shaimiev’s ability to compromise.[26]  Superficially, Tatarstan possess similar qualities that Chechnya has namely oil, notorious gangsters, and a population of Islamic orientation.  But further analysis of Tatarstan’s internal dynamics shows little evidence that would point to a possible secession.  Religion, which has been greatly exaggerated in the case of Chechnya, has little influence in the politics of Tatarstan.  Among Tatars in the early 1990’s, 30 percent considered themselves atheist, while 30 percent believed in but did not practiced Islam, leaving roughly 25 percent believing and practicing Islam.[27]  Both the case of Dagestan and Tatarstan show difficulty of assessing the tendency of these republics to follow Chechnya.  The similarities use to justify protecting the territorial integrity of Russia is only presented along superficial lines and fails to make any relationship with the internal dynamics of each republic.

            The most immediate justification for the second war and probably the one with the most serious implication is Chechen links to international terrorism.  Evidence of Chechen links to international terrorist networks such as Al-Qaeda is beyond doubt.  In fact, evidence show that Chechnya has been receiving money in the amount of $500,000 to $1 million a month from Al-Qaeda and 40 other organizations in the Middle East, Europe and elsewhere.[28]  Russian military action is seen as an anti-terrorist response to the incursion in Dagestan and the series of apartment buildings in Russia.  Yet little evidence points to Chechen involvement.  Besides Shamil Basayev, who is a native Chechen, the attackers during the Dagestan incursion are in fact Dagestanis, devoted to the practice of Wahhabism.[29]  Furthermore, investigation on the apartment buildings in Moscow turned in five suspects—none of them Chechen, which fuels speculation of various government agencies’ involvement in the bombing.[30]  Such allegation is not an entirely new political maneuver in the part of Russia.  Russian allegations of Chechen link to Al-Qaeda and other terrorist networks is reminiscent of earlier Russian effort to link Albanian insurgents in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia to international terrorism.[31]  Thus, the possibility of using terrorism as a justification for war may prove to be part of an even bigger motivation—the positive political implications the war in Chechnya may have on Putin’s political agenda.

            The argument for territorial integrity and international terrorist link as a pre-text to war present a valid argument yet it is over-exaggerated.  The lack of evidence pointing to high level of risk among other regions points to the uniqueness of the Chechen conflict.  The same can be said to the relationship between Chechen militancy and international terrorism based on Islamic fundamentalism—that despite the apparent contact the conflict in Chechnya is far more than any kind of terrorist act.  Its root is by far still political in nature.

 

VI. Chechnya and September 11: Policy Implication

 

            The attacks on September 11 have significant impact in the conduct of the war in Chechnya.  Not only did it bred new life in what was initially a limited engagement in the region, but it has also forced the international community to recognized the legitimacy of Russian policy discourse towards Chechnya.  German Chancellor Schroeder and Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi have stressed the need to “evaluate things differently in relation to Chechnya,”[32] while France’s Jacques Chirac shows an understanding of Russia’s problem with Chechnya and advocates tougher measures against terrorism.[33]  Such change in perception of the Chechen conflict in the west is attributed to Russia’s reframing of the whole conflict under the international terrorist campaign.  Such policy discourse may be pragmatic in the short run but may prove to be problematic and counter-productive in the long run. 

            Indeed, Russia has benefited from an alliance with the West in the broader anti-terrorist campaign.  Muted criticism has been the result and at some level even support for Russian policy toward Chechnya from the West.  Yet such benefits are only short lived.  Already, support for the war has gone down, which brings into question the validity of further involvement in the region.  The toll on Russian and Chechen casualties has not seen any dramatic decrease—particularly on civilian casualties.  A public opinion poll on done on March 2002 and November 2003 shows Russian public support has gone down to 32 percent and 21 percent respectively from 67 percent and 70 percent in 2000 and 2001 (see Figure 4).  Support for peace negotiations, on the other had, has been gaining significant support from the public posting a 68 percent support in November 2003.

A major reason for such dramatic decline in popular support for the war is that Russia growing lack of strategic goals in the region.  Russia has moved far beyond the limited objectives of pursuing terrorists within Chechnya. The invasion of Chechnya entails greater consequences towards building an atmosphere for cooperation and possibility for peace.  Furthermore, the framing of the whole conflict under a broader anti-terrorist campaign has significantly marginalized moderate Chechens, which is crucial if peace negotiations are to be made.  Anna Politkovskaya has argued for the existence of at least three distinct cleavages in Chechen society.  One group is made up of relatively pro-Western and moderate Chechens related to Alan Maskhadov.  Another represents the radical wing associated with Basayev and the third consists of various armed groups competing amongst each other with numerous distinct goals.[34]  Russian portrayal of Chechens is undifferentiated thus generalizing the whole of Chechnya as basically “bandits” and “terrorists”.  The struggle for Chechen independence is not of perpetual conflict.  Yet Russian actions, as well as those radical Chechens are undermining those who are not committed to violent conflicts.

            Chechen perception of Russia is dramatically changing as well.  No longer confined to the pursuit of full independence or historical animosity between the two nations as a motivating factor towards militancy, Chechen hostile behavior towards Russia are becoming more personal in nature (see Figure 5).

 

Why do Chechens Kill Russians?

Reason

Why Chechen become suicide bombers?

Why Chechens continue arm resistance to Russia

Revenge on the federal forces for their brutality

69%

56%

Struggle for Chechen Independence

8%

24%

Jihad

8%

6%

Source: Validata, August 2003[35]

 

As such, Chechen militancy has become less about gaining independence or creating a pan-Islamic state but more about survival.  Terrorism has been transformed into a method of warfare and not an end to itself. 

 

 

VI. Prospects for Peace

            The possibility of peace depends on the political will to end the conflict.  Although, it is not the aim of this paper to provide a solution for the conflict, it is important to recognize that the difficulty of providing a peaceful solution to the conflict has much to be attributed the argument of this paper—that the war in Chechnya serves a political purpose.  There are positive gains that can be made in a continuous military operation in Chechnya.  Dmitri Trenin was quick to point out that the war has quickly raised the profile of the Russian military and Secret Service allowing it freedom from usual restrictions from Moscow and maintaining its influence against any radical military reform.[36]  Russian bureaucrats are also profiting from the conflict in Chechnya.  Federal subsidies appropriated to aiding the rebuilding of Chechnya and other social programs are being embezzled within Chechnya by both Russian administration and Chechen guerilla groups.[37]

            Most importantly, Chechnya takes the responsibility for the Russian government’s shortfalls, whether it is the military, security service, oligarchs and Putin for that matter.  As Pavel Baev writes, “…this war is not about winning or losing—but about having.”[38]  Regime consolidation, which Putin sought to accomplish at the expense of Chechnya, serves the immediate political goals of Putin but managing a war in order to maintain such cohesion may prove costly for Putin in the long run.  As such, the prospect of peace remains to be seen.  As long as Chechnya is seen as having positive political and economic incentives, there would always be the need to continue the war.

 

VII. Conclusion

 

            An analysis of Russian public opinion shows a correlation between Putin’s rise to power and the start of the second Chechen war in 1999.  Evidence shows that the war made a positive impact on Putin’s candidacy for president and support for his ruling coalition.  Such relationship is hardly coincidental given the fact that Putin’s only significant policy is the war against Chechnya.  Furthermore, public perception of the conflict shows evidence of political manipulation thus increasing the likelihood of diversionary motives for war.

            Given the positive political implications of the war, continued Russian military operation will persist despite increasing pressures from the Russian public.  Chechnya will remain a political tool both for Putin and the rest of the Russian political elite.  Thus, as Baev writes, “Chechnya, is not an anomaly in the otherwise positive direction of Russia’s general development—but a core element of Putin’s regime.”[39]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

 

Dunlop, John. Russia Confronts Chechnya. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

 

Evangelista, Matthew. The Chechen Wars:  Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union. Washington D.C: Brookings Institutions Press, 2002.

 

Levy, Jack S. “The Causes of War: A Review of Theories.” Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War, Volume 1, eds. Philip Tetlock, Jo Husbands, Robert Jervis, Paul Stern, and Charles Tilly. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.

 

Levy, Jack S. “The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique.” Handbook of War Studies. Edited by Manus Midlarsky.  Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989.

 

Lieven, Anatol. Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998.

 

Politkovskaya, Anna. A Dirty War: A Russian Reporter in Chechnya. London: The Harvill Press, 2001.

 

Remington, Thomas. “Putin, the Duma, and Political Parties.” Putin’s Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain, ed. Dale R. Herspring. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003.

 

Robertson, Ann. “Yeltsin, Shaimiev, and Dudaev: Negotiating Autonomy for Tatarstan and Chechnya,” Unity or Separation: Center-Periphery Relations in the Former Soviet Union, eds. Daniel Kempton and Terry D. Clark. Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 2002. pp. 99-142.

 

Simmel,Georg. Conflict. Trans. Kurt Wolff. Glencoe: Free Press, 1956.

 

 

Academic Journals

 

Lapidus, Gail. “Putin’s War on Terrorism: Lessons from Chechnya.” Post-Soviet Affairs 2002, v18 n1, 41-48.

 

 

Electronic Sources

 

All Russia Center for Public Opinion Research VCIOM Surveys 1999-2003, [online] available at http://www.russiavotes.org. Internet.

 

Baev, Pavel. “A Useful War?” Russia and Eurasia Review, 17 December 2002 v1 n14 [online] available at http://russia.jamestown.org/pubs/view/rer_001_001.htm. Internet.

 

“European Monitors Find Fault with Media Coverage,” RFE/RL Russian Election Report 2000 [online] (accessed 2 February 2003); available at http://www.rferl.org/elections/russia00report/. Internet.

 

LaFraniere, Sharon. “How Jihad Made Its Way to Chechnya.” Washington Post Foreign Service. 26 April 2003.

 

“Chechen-based Islamist may be aiming to set up new stronghold in Dagestan.” Monitor, 4 August 1999, v5 n150, Jamestown Foundation [online] (accessed 30 November 2003) available at http://www.jamestown.org/pubs/view/mon_005_150_000.htm#006. Internet.

 

Morgan and Anderson. “Domestic Support and Diversionary External Conflict in Great Britain, 1950-1992.” Journal of Politics, Aug 99, v61 n3 [online] (accessed 24 November 2003); Academic Search Elite available at http://0-search.epnet.com.opac.sfsu.edu:80/direct.asp?an=2321088&db=afh. Internet

 

“Russia: Deadly Bombing Fuel Political Intrigue.” Fortnight in Review, 24 September 1999 v5 n18, Jamestown Foundation [online] (accessed 30 November 2003) available at http://www.jamestown.org/pubs/view/for_005_018_001.htm. Internet.

 

“Western Leaders Reevaluate Stance on Chechen Wa.,” Jamestown Foundation Monitor, 27 September 2001 [online] CDI Russia Weekly #173 available at http://www.cdi.org/russia/173.html##6.

 

 “France Softens Its Stand on Chechnya in its Relation with Russia.” Strana Ru,13 September 2001, [online] CDI Russia Weekly #171 available at http://www.cdi.org/russia/171.html##9.

 

Trenin, Dmitri. “The Forgotten War: Chechnya and Russia’s Future,” Policy Brief, 28 November 2003 [online] (accessed 2 December 2003); Carnegie Endowment for International Peace available at http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/Policybrief28.pdf. Internet.

 

“Is Moscow subsidizing rebels?” Chechnya Weekly, 6 February 2003 v4 n3 [online] (accessed 3 December 2003); Jamestown Foundation available at http://www.jamestown.org/pubs/view/chw_004_003_004.htm. Internet.

 

Validata, August 2003 [online] (accessed 3 December 2003); available at http://www.validata.ru/e_e/chechnya. Internet.

 


 

[1] Jack S. Levy, “The Causes of War: A Review of Theories,” Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War, Volume 1, eds. Philip Tetlock, Jo Husbands, Robert Jervis, Paul Stern, and Charles Tilly, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) 262.

[2] Georg Simmel, Conflict, trans. Kurt Wolff, (Glencoe: Free Press, 1956) 93.

[3] See Jack Levy, “The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique,” Handbook of War Studies, ed. Manus Midlarsky, (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989) 261.

[4] Morgan and Anderson, “Domestic Support and Diversionary External Conflict in Great Britain, 1950-1992,” Journal of Politics, Aug 99, v61 n3 [online] (accessed 24 November 2003); Academic Search Elite available at http://0-search.epnet.com.opac.sfsu.edu:80/direct.asp?an=2321088&db=afh. internet

[5] Levy (1989) in Midlarsky,262.

[6] All Russia Center for Public Opinion Research VCIOM Surveys 1999-2003, [online] available at http://www.russiavotes.org. Internet.

[7] Levy, Behavior, Society and Nuclear War, 271.

[8] Public Opinion Foundation

[9] All Russia Center for Public Opinion, VCIOM Surveys 1999-2003.

[10] Central Electoral Commission, 2000.

[11] Thomas Remington, “Putin, the Duma, and Political Parties,” Putin’s Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain, ed. Dale R. Herspring, (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003) 42-43.

[12] VCIOM Survey 1999-2000; 1994-1996; [online] (accessed 28 September 2003) available at http://www.russiavotes.org. Interntet.

[13] Public Opinion Foundation, 22 September 2001; [online] (accessed 4 December 2003); available at http//english.fom.ru/reports/frames/eof032701.html. Internet.

[14] Masha Lipman and Michael McFaul, “Putin and the Media,” Putin’s Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain, ed. Dale Herspring, (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003) 68.

[15] Anatol Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998) 205-206.

[16] Nabi Abdullaev, “Moscow Tightly Controls Information on the Chechen Conflict,” Prism, 17 December 1999 v5 n20; Jamestown Foundation [online] (accessed 29 November 2003); available at http://russia.jamestown.org/pubs/view/pri_005_020_001.htm. Internet.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Masha Lipman and Michael McFaul, (Herspring) 70.

[19] Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation, 9 September 2000, 5.

[20] “European Monitors Find Fault with Media Coverage,”  RFE/RL Rusian Election Report 2000 [online] (accessed 2 February 2003); available at http://www.rferl.org/elections/russia00report/. Internet.

[21] Matthew Evangelista, The Chechen Wars:  Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union, (Washington D.C: Brookings Institutions Press, 2002) 87.

[22] Evangelista, 91.

[23] Evangelista, 92-93.

[24] Evangelista, 93.

[25] Evangelista, 98.

[26] Ann Robertson, “Yeltsin, Shaimiev, and Dudaev: Negotiating Autonomy for Tatarstan and Chechnya,” Unity or Separation: Center-Periphery Relations in the Former Soviet Union, eds. Daniel Kempton and Terry D. Clark, (Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 2002) 101.

[27] Evangelista, 98.

[28] Sharon LaFraniere, “How Jihad Made Its Way to Chechnya,” Washington Post Foreign Service, 26 April 2003.

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[32] “Western Leaders Reevaluate Stance on Chechen War,” Jamestown Foundation Monitor, 27 September 2001 [online] CDI Russia Weekly #173 available at http://www.cdi.org/russia/173.html##6.

[33] “France Softens Its Stand on Chechnya in its Relation with Russia,” Strana Ru,13 September 2001, [online] CDI Russia Weekly #171 available at http://www.cdi.org/russia/171.html##9.

[34] Anna Politkovskaya, A Dirty War: A Russian Reporter in Chechnya, (London: The Harvill Press, 2001)

[35] Validata, August 2003 [online] (accessed 3 December 2003); available at http://www.validata.ru/e_e/chechnya. Internet.

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[37] “Is Moscow subsidizing rebels?” Chechnya Weekly, 6 February 2003 v4 n3 [online] (accessed 3 December 2003); Jamestown Foundation available at http://www.jamestown.org/pubs/view/chw_004_003_004.htm. Internet.

[38] Pavel Baev, “A Useful War?” Russia and Eurasia Review, 17 December 2002 v1 n14 [online] available at http://russia.jamestown.org/pubs/view/rer_001_001.htm. Internet.

[39] Baev, Russia and Eurasia Review, 17 December 2003.