Neo-Classical Realism and Russia-China Relations:

Explaining Russia’s Post-Soviet Foreign Policy

 

By Anna Radivilova

SFSU

IR 747 / Fall 2003

 

 

 

 

 TOC \o \h \z \u Introduction. PAGEREF _Toc71937125 \h 1

Theoretical Debate of Foreign Policy. PAGEREF _Toc71937126 \h 7

Realism.. PAGEREF _Toc71937127 \h 7

Liberalism.. PAGEREF _Toc71937128 \h 10

Constructivism.. PAGEREF _Toc71937129 \h 11

Case Study: Russia-China Relations. PAGEREF _Toc71937130 \h 12

Realism.. PAGEREF _Toc71937131 \h 12

Balance of Power Realism.. PAGEREF _Toc71937132 \h 12

Power Maximization Realism.. PAGEREF _Toc71937133 \h 14

Balance of Threat Realism.. PAGEREF _Toc71937134 \h 16

Neo-classical realism.. PAGEREF _Toc71937135 \h 19

Constructivism.. PAGEREF _Toc71937136 \h 27

Alternative explanations - Liberalism.. PAGEREF _Toc71937137 \h 30

Conclusion. PAGEREF _Toc71937138 \h 32

Bibliography. PAGEREF _Toc71937139 \h 35

 


 

Introduction

The end of the Cold War marked a turning point in international politics. The disintegration of the Soviet Union effectively eliminated the bipolar nature that had characterized the global arena and cleared the way for the United States to emerge as the sole superpower. Since 1991, three of the world’s major powers have undergone drastic shifts in status: Russia, plagued by the turmoil of economic and political transformations, lost much of its international power; the US became the undisputed global power after losing its Cold War foe; and China, aided by its unparalleled economic growth, emerged as a new force on the international arena. These drastic shifts in power also provided a unique opportunity for the scholarly community: by analyzing the dynamics between these three states, scholars could test the validity of various theories of international relations. Russia presented an especially interesting case: would this power move to balance the US hegemony, as predicted by realism, or would it accede to US power for the sake of absolute gains, as posited by liberalism? Using the case of Russia to confirm the predictions of either theory would represent a major advance for the understanding of major-power behavior.

In pursuit of this goal, this paper looks at Russia’s foreign policy towards China in an attempt to determine which model of IR theory applies best. Defining foreign policy as “the intentions, statements, and actions of an actor (state)… directed towards the external world,” it will analyze Russia’s policy towards its powerful neighbor to see whether certain behavior trends can fit within the different theoretical predictions.[1] Historically, the relationship between Russia and China has been quite tumultuous. The Mongol Golden Horde successfully invaded Russia in the thirteenth century, extorting tribute for the next two hundred years and leaving an imprint of the dreadful Mongol Yoke imprinted on the Russian collective memory.[2] Beginning with the seventeenth century, the two neighbors have often found their interests at odds with each other as each strove to gain greater power in the Eurasian region.[3] The advent of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia and the Maoist revolution in China changed the relationship between the two states: united by a common ideology, the two signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, committing to a military alliance in defense of each other’s interests.[4] The respite was short-lived, however, and the 1960s marked the beginning of rivalry and disputes, culminating in several border skirmishes.[5] Under Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet Union moved to reestablish ties with China in an attempt to create a “Eurasian Socialist redoubt,” but this effort was cut short by the conservative putsch attempt in August of 1991.[6] The disintegration of the Soviet Union turned Russia’s foreign policy squarely towards the West, with Yeltsin abrogating ties with the East and former Soviet Republics in favor of closer ties with Europe and the US.[7] But as Russian foreign policy makers became increasingly disillusioned with the West and its perceived failure to afford Russia the respect it deserved, Yeltsin moved to rekindle ties with China, defining the relationship as a “constructive partnership” in 1994 and upgrading it to the status of a “strategic partnership for the twenty first century” in 1996.[8] The Putin administration seemed to be continuing the course of reconciliation by signing the Sino-Russian Good Neighborly Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in July of 2001.[9] The progress from of the relationship from a “partnership” under Yeltsin to the signing of the treaty under Putin seems to show that Russia is in fact moving to establish close ties with its largest neighbor. The fact that the rhetoric of both countries is continuously marked with dissatisfaction with the unipolarity of the international system and calls for the establishment of a “multipolar world” begs the further conclusion that Russia is seeking these closer ties in order to balance the overwhelming power of the US.

A closer look at the Russian foreign policy, however, throws doubt at the above conclusion. Focusing on the policies of Yevgenii Primakov, the country’s Foreign Minister between April and September 1998 and Foreign Minister from September 1998 to May 1999, and those of Vladimir Putin, the country’s president since 2000, shows that Russia has shifted from an East-centered policy under Primakov to a more balanced, “equidistant” one under Putin. Primakov saw Russia as a “great power” whose foreign policy had to “correspond to that status.”[10] He saw the emerging unipolarity of the international system as potentially destabilizing and advocated a foreign policy line of establishing closer ties with smaller powers in order to balance the power of the US.[11] He perceived China as the one of the best candidates for that purpose: both states were dissatisfied with US hegemony, both had an interest in protecting the principles of sovereignty and international law which US actions in Kosovo and Iraq were undermining, and both were equally perturbed by the American abrogation of the ABM treaty.[12] Primakov’s perceptions were directly reflected in the policies he pursued. He openly criticized the actions of the US, advocated closer economic ties with China, and proposed the formation of a “strategic triangle” between Russia, China, and India.[13] An analysis of Putin’s policy shows a different policy direction. While still critical of the US unipolarity, Putin has nevertheless abandoned the open calls for a creation of an alternative pole.[14] He acceded to the abrogation of the ABM treaty, even going as far as to propose Europe and Russia enter into a “new non-strategic Anti-Ballistic system, excluding China,” a fact quite worrisome to Beijing.[15] He has also sought closer ties with other powers in Asia, recently putting on hold the construction of the Angarsk-Daquin pipeline to China in order to consider the alternative of the Angarsk-Nakhodka pipeline to Japan, an action showing that he does not perceive China as Russia’s most important trading partner in Asia.[16] And, in his most controversial decision, he moved to cooperate with the US in its war on terrorism and acquiesced to US military presence in Central Asia.[17] In looking at Putin’s policies, the intriguing conclusion is he has not only not pursued the Primakovian line of a balancing partnership with China but has actually moved to develop closer ties with the West.

 The purpose of this project is to attempt to explain this shift in behavior through the prism of various IR theories. I will begin by testing three versions of realism: offensive realism, which puts primary importance on the influence of systemic variables;[18] balance of threat realism, which incorporates the leaders’ perceptions of threats into its analysis;[19] and neo-classical realism, which postulates that the link between systemic variables and foreign policy behavior is mitigated by the leaders’ perception of the international system and their ability to garner support for their policies.[20] I will then look at the propositions of constructivism, a theory which focuses on the link between collective identity and behavior.[21] I will conclude by assessing the alternative explanations presented by liberalism, first by looking at the predictions of Innerpolitik theory, which postulates that foreign policy is determined exclusively by domestic politics,[22] and then addressing the theory of economic interdependence, which predicts that close economic ties between two nations will negate confrontation between them.

It is my contention that realism as a school of thought is most applicable to the case of Sino-Russian relations. The view of both Primakov and Putin that Russia must defend its major power status falls in line with the realist stress on systemic variables as primary influence on foreign policy. Within realism itself, the neo-classical school is the one that provides a more nuanced perspective on the shift in policy between the two leaders. It does so by highlighting the influence of two variables on foreign policy formation: leader’s perception and state power. Primakov and Putin differed in their perceptions of China and the West, which influenced their view of what course of action would best serve Russia’s national interest. In addition, the variance in their domestic support coalitions had a direct effect on the freedom both had in pursuing particular strategies. Thus, while systemic variables, or Russia’s position in the international system, did serve as the primary influence on foreign policy, the intervening variables of perception and state power resulted in two different approaches to its relations with China. However, while neo-classical realism captures these nuances, it is nevertheless limited in one respect, namely in explaining how the leader’s perceptions are formed. I propose to eliminate this shortfall by incorporating aspects of constructivism into the analysis. The constructivist proposal that “identity is the link between norms and interests that motivate behavior” widens the area of study to include the role of collective identity in foreign policy formation. [23] After all, foreign policy decisions are not made in a vacuum. This allows us to examine how the Russian foreign policy elite perceived Russia and its place vis-à-vis China and the US and how this perception varied from Primakov to Putin. This can in turn help explain the variance between Primakov’s and Putin’s individual perceptions, and shed light on why the former pursued close ties with China while the latter opted for greater cooperation with the West.

Theoretical Debate of Foreign Policy

Realism

The first task of this paper is to determine whether Russia’s behavior toward China can be explained by using the realist theories. Realism is a broad cluster of theories that deals with power, national capabilities, coalitions as balance of power strategies, and revisionist and status-quo states.[24] The four schools I refer to here are offensive realism, as espoused by Waltz, power maximization realism, represented by Mearsheimer, balance of threat realism, put forth by Walt, and neo-classical realism, a school of thought represented by Schweller. Although the four schools disagree on the motives behind foreign policy behavior, they all agree that the primary determinant lies within the system level and concentrate on the impact of the international system on the behavior of states.

            Waltz’s offensive realism, or balance of power realism, makes “a simple prediction about a major power’s behavior.”[25] It contends that a state will always seek to balance whichever power is attempting to establish a dominant position in the system.[26] The anarchy of the international system makes states feel insecure and unsure about the intentions of others. Because of this, they are concerned with the relative distribution of power in the system and are engaged in a continuous evaluation and reevaluation of their relative position.[27] If the power of another state begins to increase, states will seek to guard their security by forming loose coalitions to balance the rising hegemon, thus hoping to deter aggression.[28] Thus the prediction is that the balance of power, once disrupted, will always be restored.[29]

            Power maximization realism differs slightly from offensive realism. It also assumes that the anarchical nature of the international system makes states insecure about their position. But it contends that states will seek to maximize their relative power in order to guard against external aggression.[30] Since the probability of an attack is dependent on the state’s ability to deter it, this probability decreases as its relative capabilities improve.[31] To Mearsheimer, all states are revisionist states who will seek to improve their position whenever the opportunity presents itself and when the opportunity costs of doing so are low.[32] Thus, a major power will always seek to improve its position: by improving its relative capabilities, it will prevent others from doing the same and guard against the possibility of aggression.[33]

            Walt’s balance of threat realism posits another take on the motivations of state behavior. To Walt, power is “not the only” part of the equation but rather, along with “geography, offensive capabilities, and intentions,” it is part of the “more general concept of threat.”[34] He builds on the balance-of-power theory’s assertion that “states will ally against the strongest state in the system” by stating that states will “tend to ally against the most threatening” [emphasis in the original].[35] Thus, he can foresee a possibility of states’ changing their strategies and alliances in response to a shifting perception of threat.

            The final realist school to consider is neo-classical realism. Neo-classical realism postulates that states do not seek security but rather seek to shape and control their external environment.[36] This school of thought seeks to combine Waltz’s insights on the international structure with sub-systemic variables to explain why certain states will deviate from simple balance of power logic.[37] Neo-classical realists explore the internal processes to determine how states decide on actions in response to “pressures and opportunities in their external environment.”[38] In their view, the impact of relative power distribution on foreign policy is an “indirect and problematic” process, with numerous factors mitigating the nature of the state’s response.[39] One of these factors is the decision-makers perceptions of the international situation and their assessment of the international balance of power.[40] Another is the strength of state apparatus and its relation to society.[41] As scholars like Zakaria and Christensen point out, “the ability of state leaders to mobilize their nation’s human and material resources behind security policy initiatives” will determine their responses to relative power shifts by either limiting or expanding their power to react.[42] For this school, structural factors are still dominant in the foreign policy decision-making process, but how a state will respond to a shift in the balance of power will be affected by the leader’s ability to garner resources and their perception of the situation.    

Liberalism

            In an attempt to explain major power behavior, it is important to look not only at realism but to also consider the predictions of liberalism. The two schools of liberalism addressed here are the Innerpolitik theory and the Economic Interdependence theory. According to Innerpolitik thinking, the state’s domestic environment is what shapes foreign policy. Internal factors such as political and economic ideology, national character, partisan politics, and the social structure will influence the external behavior of a state.[43] Factors like public opinion, free press, and competitive politics limit the freedom of the decision-makers to pursue certain policies.[44] Since these factors are represented the most in democratic systems, Innerpolitik theorists posit that as a state democratizes, its external behavior will become less and less confrontational.[45] The basic prediction here is that democracies will not go to war against other democracies, regardless of the distribution of power in the international system. Along with the theory of democratic peace promoted by Innerpolitik theorists, another important branch of liberalism is the Economic Interdependence school. This theory’s basic assumption is that “economic interdependence in an increasingly integrated world economy reduces the expected utility for relying on military force to resolve international disputes.”[46] Put otherwise, increased economic interdependence between two states decreases the chance of confrontation between them since the possibility of damaging important economic ties raises the opportunity costs of war too high.[47] In addition, interdependence theorists posit that states are concerned with absolute rather than relative gains and that they will pursue tactics to increase their absolute economic welfare regardless of whether their actions would bring greater benefits to others.[48] The prediction of both of these schools is that as a state becomes more democratic and integrate more fully into the global economy, its foreign policy will become less confrontational and will be marked by greater cooperation with other states.

Constructivism

            Having defined the scopes of realism and liberalism, it is also important to consider the contribution of constructivism to the debate. Constructivism is a school of IR theory that seeks to add to the realist and liberal explanations the role of “cultural and institutional context” in foreign policy formation.[49] This context shapes the way leaders understand the international system, the nation interests, and the implications of their policies.[50] Scholars in this field look at identity as “the link between norms and interests that motivate behavior.”[51] From their perspective, realism and liberalism do make an important contribution by capturing some of the causes and processes that affect behavior, but they fall short of explaining why a certain courses of action are chosen over others.[52] Constructivists attempt to rectify this shortfall by turning to the concept of collective identity norms.[53] As Robert Herman points out, how leaders react to a particular situation “depends at least in part on how the decision makers understand the world and how they interpret the frequently ambiguous lessons of history.”[54] A shift in collective identity brings with it a reassessment of national priorities and goals and a redefinition of the national Self.[55] Thus, in attempting to explain major power behavior, one must look not only at constraints imposed by the structure of the system or by the country’s political economy, but also assess how these constraints are perceived by the decision-making elite. Incorporating the constructivist concept of national identity can help explain why different leaders, when faced with similar internal and external circumstances, will take dissimilar courses of action.

Case Study: Russia-China Relations

            Having established the theoretical framework, I will now move to test the different theories against the case of Sino-Russian relations. I will do so by identifying the key independent variable for each theory, determine whether a change in its value had occurred, and see whether there is a relationship to a change in the dependent variable.  My main objective is to see which theory best explains the shift in policy between Primakov and Putin.

Realism

Balance of Power Realism

For balance of power realism, also known as structural realism, the independent variable is a shift in the international balance of power. As such a shift is difficult to measure in quantitive terms, Alastair Johnston proposes that we look at relative shares of world military expenditures as a measure of power.[56] As Chart 1 shows below, the US far outpaces Russia and China in military expenditure, making it an undisputed hegemon.

Text Box: Source: SIPRI, 2004
 

 

 

 

The first prediction of structural realism is that major powers will seek loose coalitions to balance the rising hegemon.[57] Moving from this perspective, Russia should then strive to find potential partners to balance the power of the US. It should seek stronger ties with others equally as dissatisfied with the balance of power, namely countries like China. This prediction does hold true for the policies of Primakov. In December of 1998, he did propose that Russia form a “strategic triangle” with China and India in order to balance the power of the US.[58] However, it does not hold true for Putin. While he did sign in July of 2001 the Sino-Russian Good Neighborly Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, causing some analysts to warn against the “formation of a full-fledged anti-US alliance,”[59] he has pursued policies much more accommodating to US interests than those of his predecessor. He has abandoned the calls for the formation of an alternative pole, has acquiesced to the abrogation of the ABM treaty,[60] and has allowed the stationing of US military in Central Asia, traditionally Russia’s zone of influence.[61] These actions contradict the predictions of structural realism. Since the power of the US has remained virtually unchanged, Russia’s wish to balance should have remained the same. Thus, while the theory explains Primakov’s behavior, it fails to explain the shift to a less confrontational and more cooperative behavior of Putin.

Power Maximization Realism

            Like balance of power realism, the power maximization theory would also use the balance of power as its independent variable. It differs from structural realism in the fact that it sees all states as essentially revisionist and predicts that they will move to maximize their power when the opportunity is presented.[62] Such a window of opportunity could occur when the costs of maximizing power are low and when other powers are scaling down their military expenditure.[63] In his definition of state capabilities, Mearsheimer includes military power as well as the state’s “latent power,” or wealth and population as the “socio-economic ingredients that go into building military power.”[64] It could be derived from this that a state will move to maximize its power not only when the external costs are low but also when its latent power, or internal capabilities, increase. This would suggest that Russia should be expected to exhibit aggressive and confrontational behavior if the external costs for doing so are low or if its internal capabilities increase. Applying this theory to the behavior of Primakov and Putin shows that Russia’s policies do not match the pattern predicted. As Chart 1 above shows, the external environment has remained virtually unchanged, with the US maintaining its dominance. What has changed, however, is Russia’s internal capability. According to Chart 2, Russia’s GDP, what Mearsheimer identifies as an important component of latent power, experienced a drastic drop in 1998.

Text Box: Source: SIPRI, 2004
 

 

[CF1] 

 

 

Such a drop in latent power should have been reflected in its foreign policy behavior: it should have become less confrontational towards the hegemon and abandoned calls for forming balancing coalitions. However, 1998 is precisely when Primakov had proposed the formation of the “strategic triangle.” This search for balancing allies at a time of an economic downturn does not fit with the prediction of power maximization theory. In addition, since 1999, Russia’s GDP has shown a steady increase (Chart 2). This increase in latent power should have been matched by an intensified effort to oppose the power of the US and seek stronger ties with China. Putin should have continued or intensified the Primakovian line. But, as the discussion above showed, his behavior has not shown an increase in confrontation and has actually been more accommodating to US interests. He has maintained the ties with China established by his predecessors, but has also sought closer ties with the US through such actions as cooperating in its war on terror.[65] This goes against Mearsheimer’s prediction that a major power will use every opportunity to maximize its power. Thus, power maximization realism also falls short of explaining Russia’s behavior.

Balance of Threat Realism

            According to Walt’s balance of threat theory, states will balance against the one they perceive as most threatening.[66] The key independent variable for this theory, then, is not the balance of power but rather the balance of threat, with “threat” defined as a combination of geography, offensive capabilities, and intentions.[67] One hypothesis that could be drawn from this is that a state’s perception of threat should be reflected in official rhetoric.[68] An analysis of rhetoric under Primakov and Putin shows that the unipolar power of the US is considered a threat to Russia’s interests. To Primakov, the main threat emanated from “those interested in destabilizing the world geopolitical equilibrium.”[69] Although he advocated for “an equitable and mutually beneficial partnership” with the US, he believed it was not interested in engaging Russia on equal terms, something that was confirmed by the “a humiliating geopolitical defeat” of NATO expansion.[70] Russia’s 1997 National Security Concept reflected these views. The top two  threats outlined in the document were “attempts by others to diminish the role of Russia as a powerful center,” and the stationing of foreign powers’ troops in the neighboring regions,[71] showing the degree of Russia’s mistrust of Western intentions.[72]  This perception of the West as a threat to Russia’s interests can be related to Primakov’s policy towards China. In order to balance the threat, he advocated the establishment of a multipolar world and promoted closer ties with China as a way to protect Russia’s interests.[73]

            Putin’s election to presidency did not drastically change the country’s official discourse. The National Security and Military Doctrines, signed within the first few months of his presidency, both stated that Russia’s position in international politics has become less influential and that certain powers are attempting to weaken it in the “political, economic, military, and other spheres.”[74] The National Security Concept identified these attempts to be “the strengthening of regional blocs and alliances” (NATO expansion), the establishment of foreign bases in proximity to Russian borders, and the weakening of the CIS integration processes.[75] What these documents show is that Russia’s perception of US policies as a threat to its national interests did not change under Putin. What is surprising then is that Primakov actively sought to balance the Western threat by engaging China while Putin has attempted to engage the West and has diminished his cooperation with China. If the American measure of global power has not decreased, Russia’s perception of it as a threat should not have diminished, and Putin should have continued the policies of Primakov. One counterargument balance-of-threat theorists could present is that Putin could perceive China as more threatening than the US and is thus cooperating with the US to balance China. This could definitely be true, but it goes beyond Walt’s predictions when specifically to this case. If Russia’s perception of “threat” is determined by geography, military capabilities, and intentions,[76] one of these aspects had to change for China in order for Putin to perceive it as a greater threat. Leaving geography aside, an analysis of China’s military capabilities and intentions shows that no significant change has occurred. China has been modernizing its military, partially through large arms purchases from Russia, but this is a process that started under Primakov, and, by the admissions of Russian officials themselves, the arms sold to China lag behind Russian technology by as much as fifteen years and do not pose a direct threat.[77] Chinese intentions towards Russia have also not become more hostile, as confirmed by the strong diplomatic relations between the two states and the signing of the Friendship Treaty. Based on this, it could be said that what accounts for the difference between Primakov and Putin are the two leaders’ personal perceptions of China, something not expressly included in Walt’s theory. Primakov’s personal perception of China as a good ally led him to push for closer cooperation, while Putin’s ambivalence towards Russia’s neighbor prompted him to balance the relationship with other ties. Thus, while the balance of power theory does bring in the concept of perceptions, it does not give enough attention to the causal link between the leaders’ personal perceptions and the difference in foreign policy outcomes.

Neo-classical realism

The one realist school of thought that does attempt to factor in leader’s perceptions is neo-classical realism. This school attempts to incorporate both external and internal variables in its analysis of state behavior. It admits that the scope and ambition of foreign policy is driven primarily by the state’s “place in the international system and specifically by relative material power capabilities,” an assumption that leaves it squarely in the realism camp.[78] However, it sees the impact of power capabilities on foreign policy is an “indirect and complex” process: systemic pressures can affect the broad contours of foreign policy by limiting policy choices for the decision-makers but they may not be strong enough to force a single choice.[79] In order to explain why particular courses of action are taken, one must look to internal factors, such as the leader’s perceptions of the international context and their ability to garner domestic support for certain policies.[80] The attention neo-classical realists pay to internal factors in shaping foreign policy makes them stand apart within the realist school. Applying these ideas to the case of Russia-China relations shows that the school is able to provide a much more nuanced explanation of the shift in policy between Primakov and Putin.

As part of the realist tradition, neo-classical scholars maintain that structural factors are the primary influence on foreign policy. Thus, the independent variable should continue to be the country’s place in the international system. The prediction that stems from this is that Russia should worry about its position relative to other powers. This prediction is confirmed by the statements made by both Primakov and Putin. Primakov viewed Russia as a “great power.” In his first press conference, he stated that Russia “remain[ed] a great power” and that its foreign policy had to protect and advance the “country’s status.”[81] This language shows that Russia’s position in the international arena was one of his main concerns. The same concern can be seen in Putin’s language. In his 2000 Presidential address, he stressed that he viewed Russia as “the strongest Eurasian power” whose influence was undermined by the efforts of others to create a unipolar world.[82] These statements show that both Primakov and Putin believed that Russia’s national interests can only be protected by maintaining great power status. This link between relative power and national interests upholds the neo-classical proposition that structural variables are the primary influence on foreign policy.

If the independent variable, or Russia’s relative power, has remained the same, then what can explain the difference in Primakov’s and Putin’s policies towards China? Neo-classical realists point to various factors that mitigate the impact of structural factors on external behavior. One such factor is the leader’s perception of the external environment. Foreign policy is made by actual people, and this human factor is the deciding factor in why foreign policy trends may not closely track “objective power trends.”[83] As Randall Schweller points out, the leader’s perceptions and assessment may move quicker than the change in capabilities, which can explain the rapid shift in foreign policy behavior that typical measures of capability may not account for.[84] Thus, an assessment of Primakov’s and Putin’s perceptions can highlight the mitigating factor between systemic factors and resultant policies.

The first point that warrants attention is the difference between Primakov and Putin in their perception of China. The existence of such a difference can explain why they two differed in their policies towards this powerful neighbor. Between the two, Primakov held a much more favorable view of China. He saw it as the perfect partner for Russia in its endeavors to regain influence in the international arena. Disillusioned by the failures of the pro-Western foreign policy of his predecessors, Primakov turned his attention to the Asia-Pacific region, elevating it from sixth to third place on the list of Russia’s international priorities.[85] From his perspective, China was the country’s most important ally in the region. Stressing Russia’s Eurasian character, Primakov constantly highlighted the two countries’ shared interests and reiterated China’s importance as Russia’s trading partner. His office discounted the idea of China’s growing strength as a potential threat, as can be seen from the comment of his Deputy Foreign Minister Gregorii Karasin that “prosperity kills the urge to fight.”[86] To Primakov, China was an ideal partner for Russia in challenging the US global dominance.

Putin, on the other hand, has a much more ambivalent stance towards China. Although he has maintained the ties with the large neighbor, he is much more sensitive to its potential threat. One important issue is the demographic crisis in the Far East and the fear of a growing Chinese presence in the region.[87] In June 2000, Putin had stated that “if [Russia] does not make every real effort [to integrate the region], even the indigenous Russian population will soon speak mostly … Chinese.”[88] This statement shows that he does not view growing ties with China as purely beneficial. Another stumbling block is the issue of Taiwan. Although Russia officially follows a one-China policy, some analysts have pointed out Putin’s apprehension of closely aligning with China and potentially getting Russia embroiled in a conflict with the US.[89] Thus, although Putin shares Primakov’s appreciation of maintaining close ties with China, he is nevertheless much more cautious about the dangers such ties could bring.

This variance in perception of China can be directly translated to the two leaders’ foreign policies. Primakov urged China, along with India, to form a “strategic triangle” to balance the power of the US and create a new multi-polar world. Putin’s ambivalence, on the other hand, can be seen in the fact that although he has continuously reiterated that Russia and China stand for a “multipolar, just and democratic order,” he has not been actively pursuing the idea of a strategic triangle floated by Primakov. Instead, he has sought to balance the relationship with ties to other regional powers, most notably Japan. Russia’s recent decision to halt the progress on the Angarsk-Daquin pipeline to China to reconsider the Angarsk-Nakhodka pipeline to Japan is illustrative of the fact that China is no longer viewed as Russia’s primary partner in the East.[90] The fact that the two leaders’ images of China can be linked to a difference in foreign policy confirms the neo-classical prediction that perceptions can play an important mitigating role between structural factors and external behavior.

Along with differing perceptions on China, another important difference between Putin and Primakov is their perceptions of the US. Primakov viewed US dominance as detrimental to Russia’s national interests. To him, the main threat emanated from “those interested in destabilizing the world geopolitical equilibrium,” with the unilateralism of the United States serving as the primary example.[91] American-led bombing of Kosovo, the expansion of NATO against Russia’s objections, and the undermining of the role of the UN Security Council were perceived by Primakov as examples of the US unwillingness to treat Russia as an equal partner and afford it appropriate respect. The foreign policy encouraged by this line of thinking is one of pursuing closer ties with others equally as dissatisfied. In China, Primakov saw a powerful partner that shared his concern over the dangers of US unilateralism. He thus advocated closer cooperation between the two states in creating a new multi-polar world.

            While Primakov saw the US primarily as a threat, Putin perceives it as both a threat and an opportunity. He is similar to his predecessor in that he too views unipolarity and US unilateralism as threatening to Russia’s interests.[92] The main difference between the two is that Putin also views contact with the West as potentially beneficial for Russia. To him, Russia’s ability to regain its great power status is hinged on its economic recovery, and the West plays an important role as a potential investor in the country’s economy. In addition, the US is an important partner in fighting against Islamic fundamentalism, and cooperation between the two deflects the criticism Russia has been receiving over its conduct in Chechnya.[93] Thus, while Putin has maintained the ties with China to balance against the Western threat, he has also cultivated closer ties with the Western community to take advantage of its opportunity. His difference from Primakov in his view of the West is therefore directly related to the difference in his foreign policy.

            The fact that Primakov’s and Putin’s respective images of China and the West play an important role in shaping their policy choices coincides with the neo-classical stress on the role of perceptions as intervening variables. Faced with similar external circumstances, Primakov and Putin nevertheless made different choices. This shows that their personal assessments of what would be most beneficial for Russia’s interests played a formative role in their decision-making. However, their actions cannot be simply explained by a difference in perceptions. Another important mitigating factor is the freedom afforded to them to pursue their strategies. Neo-classical realists propose that along with the leader’s personal perceptions, state power, or the ease with which leaders can achieve their ends, can influence how they respond to the pressures of the international system by either limiting or expanding their power to react.[94] In this respect, Primakov’s and Putin’s political capital played an important role. Primakov main support base came from Russia’s military-industrial complex. This part of the Russian economy had suffered enormous set backs from the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.[95] With domestic orders falling, China emerged as the ideal source of reliable income.[96] In Primakov, the military-industrial complex found an influential advocate for their cause. According to a 1998 article in Moscow Times, many political analysts linked his advocacy for closer ties with China and India to the fact that these two nations were the primary buyers of Russian arms.[97] With Putin, on the other hand, pro-Western interests groups gained greater influence. In his study of the subject, Tor Bukkvoll points out three domestic reasons for Russia’s new foreign policy. One is the rise of greater political influence “by the pro-Western oil, gas, and metallurgical lobbies.”[98] The second is “the change in a more pro-Western direction among sectors of the Russian security forces.”[99] And the third is the loss of political influence by the military-industrial complex.[100] By reorganizing the export branch of the industry and by appointing a former security officer Andrei Belianov as its head, Putin effectively brought the military-industrial complex closer under his control and lessened its ability to lobby its interests.[101] The lessening of power of the military-industrial complex and the strengthening of pro-Western big business and security forces has had a direct influence on Russia’s foreign policy. The people with greatest influence in the Putin cabinet do not perceive the US as the primary threat, [102]  thus the need for the formation of a balancing coalition with China is lessened. The result is a foreign policy aimed at balanced ties between Russia and China and Russia and the US. This difference in political capital can be related to the neo-classical definition of state power. It could be said that the power of the military-industrial complex allowed Primakov to pursue his pro-China policy while the support of the pro-Western business and security services gave Putin the freedom to pursue a more Western-oriented policy.

            By incorporating domestic variables in its analysis of foreign policy, the neo-classical perspective presents a more nuanced theoretical model for explaining Sino-Russian relations. The concept of state strength allows the inclusion domestic politics in the analysis and helps to explain the role of political capital in foreign policy formation. The fact that Primakov was supported by the pro-China military-industrial lobby gave him the freedom to advocate closer ties with China at a time when Russia’s internal strength was weak, something that power maximization realists would predict should have lessened its aggressive behavior. Putin’s pro-Western supporting coalition, on the other hand, gave him the room to reestablish ties with the West. The fact that this occurred at a time that Russia’s economy was recovering disproves the prediction of power maximizationists that internal strength is directly translated into aggressive behavior. The existence of the other mitigating factor presented by neo-classical realism, that of the leaders’ perceptions, is also supported by the Russia-China case. The fact that Primakov viewed China as an advantageous partner and the West as a threat, while Putin has a more ambivalent approach to China and views the US as both a threat and an opportunity, can help explain why the latter has not continued the balancing attempts of the former and has instead pursued a more cooperative policy, a fact that balance of power realism would find difficult to explain. Neo-classical realism also goes one step further down the causal chain than balance of threat theories by pointing to the role of the leaders’ personal perceptions in how a state assesses the international system. Thus, this particular branch of realism comes the closest to explaining the reasons behind the shift in foreign policy between Primakov and Putin. The theory does have one weak point, however. Although it does incorporate personal perceptions, it does not give enough attention to how these perceptions are formed. Without fully exploring this, the connection between perception and foreign policy becomes a sort of a wild card. If a leader’s behavior deviates from the realist predictions, simply attributing it to perceptions without assessing how those perceptions are formed leaves the analysts with no tools to explore how a leader is likely to react to particular situations, making any course of action equally possible. Without exploring how Putin and Primakov’s perceptions were formed, both a balancing and an accommodating behavior could be predicted. This lessens neo-classical realism’s ability to project future behavior. From this standpoint, the constructivist approach to Russia’s behavior could offer some insight.

Constructivism

Constructivism takes on the subject on perceptions by stressing the importance of collective identity and the “cultural and institutional context” in which foreign policy is formed. [103]According to Robert Herman, the key to understanding leaders’ behavior lies in their understanding of the world and in “how they interpret the frequently ambiguous lessons of history.”[104] What is crucial to consider is the country’s national identity: the core identity of the foreign policy elite, how it perceives the national Self, and what makes up its Other.[105] A constructivist approach to the case of Russian-Chinese relations would take as its independent variable the foreign policy elite’s self identity. A shift in the collective identity of the decision-makers should bring with it a reassessment of national goals and priorities, a process that should be reflected in foreign policy behavior.[106] An analysis of the foreign policy elite under Primakov and Putin highlights the difference in their approaches to the international system. Primakov and his cabinet were people who built their careers in the CPSU in the 1970s and 1980s, at a time when the Cold War was still in full swing.[107] Primakov’s own career marks him as someone who is more familiar with the non-Western world. He was a Pravda correspondent in the Middle East, and served as a director of the Institute for Oriental Studies, his former alma mater.[108] He is fluent in Arabic, but speaks only “passable English.”[109] And his close personal ties with Saddam Hussein made him one of the main diplomats involved in the negotiations before the first Gulf War.[110] This background of working closer with non-Western countries can be related to the general mistrust Primakov felt towards the West. In 1993, while Primakov was serving as the head of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, that office released a report warning about the threat of NATO, a notable occurrence considering that the official foreign policy line at the time was one of cooperating with the West.[111] And at his first press conference as Russia’s Foreign Minister, he stated that Russia’s relationship with the US proceeded from an “equitable, mutually beneficial partnership,” but went on to say that the US plans to expand NATO were not his idea of “equitable.”[112] What this says about Primakov’s perceptions is that he perceived the West, particularly the US, as threatening, saw Russia-US relations as adversarial and contentious, and believed that Russia had to guard its interests by forming coalitions with other dissatisfied states, such as China. This sentiment was expressed by Yeltsin in 1996 when he stated “we can rest on the Chinese shoulder in our relations with the West. In that case, the West will treat Russia more respectfully.”[113]

In contrast to Primakov, Putin and his cabinet have much more Western-oriented backgrounds. The new foreign policy leadership has been classified as Westernizers both because of their education and ideology.[114] Most are young, speak at least one European language, have experience in working or studying in Europe or the US.[115] Putin himself is a former KGB operative who spent an extensive amount of time in Germany.[116] What this familiarity with the Western world amounts to is that Putin and his cabinet identify closer with the West than the Primakov cabinet. This is confirmed by the statement made by Putin in June of 2000 that “Russia should lean on two wings: European and Asian…We do justice to both European pragmatism and oriental wisdom. Therefore Russia’s policy should be balanced.”[117] Thus, while the institutional and cultural context of the foreign policy decision-making process under Primakov was marked by an idea of Russia as opposed to the West, the context under Putin is one of Russia that has more in common with Western powers. This context in turn shaped the personal perceptions of the leaders themselves, which helps to explain why Primakov saw it as necessary to align with China to balance the American hegemony while Putin has pursued a more balanced foreign policy. Thus, the constructivist stress on the role of collective identity strengthens the case neo-classical realists make about the relationship between personal perceptions and foreign policy behavior.

Alternative explanations - Liberalism

            An alternative explanation that could be applied to Russian-Chinese relations is one presented by liberalism. Specifically, the propositions of two schools, Innerpolitik and Economic Interdependence, are worthy of examining. Innerpolitik theory proposes that there exists an inverse relationship between the country’s democratization and aggressive or confrontational external behavior. Theorists in this school predict that as a country becomes more democratized, its policy-makers become more constrained by public opinion, free press, and partisan politics, with the result of a more accommodating approach to other democracies.[118] In applying this approach to Russian-Chinese relations, the key independent variable should then be the level of Russia’s democratization. In line with the predictions of the theory, a strengthening of Russian democracy should be reflected in a more accommodating stance towards the US and a less cooperative stance towards China, and visa versa. An analysis of the state of Russia’s democracy under Primakov and Putin does not show this prediction to be true. As Chart 3 shows, Russia’s Freedom House rating (with score of 1 as most free and score of 7 as least free) has increased from 3.5 under Primakov to 5.5 under Putin, showing that its level of democratization has actually decreased. And yet Primakov was much more confrontational towards the US than Putin. The same could be said for Russia’s relationship with China: if greater democratization should mean less cooperation with non-democracies, then Primakov’s calls for a strategic triangle with China and India does not fit with the models predictions. Thus, the Innerpolitik theory has a difficult time explaining the shift from a search for closer ties with China under Primakov and the more balanced policy of Putin.

Text Box: Source: Freedom House, 2004
 
 

 

[p2] 

 

           

Along with the Innerpolitik school, another liberal idea that could be applied to this case is that of economic interdependence. The interdependence scholars posit that the increasing integration of the global economy lessens the states’ confrontational behavior by making the economic costs of using military means against a valued economic partner far too high.[119] The underlying assumption here is that states become more concerned with the absolute gains of economic cooperation and become less worried about relative gains, or the question of power. Applying this to Russia, a strong case can in fact be made that Putin is not seeking a close alliance with China to balance the US power because he knows that Russia needs Western investment to recover its fledging economy. In his State of the Nation address in May of 2000, Putin did point to the country’s dropping population and weak economic standing as being of a potential detriment.[120] However, the question to ask here is why he sees it as a detriment. Further in the address, Putin clarified that the reason Russia’s economic weakness presents a problem is because it threatens the country’s “sovereignty and territorial integrity, originating from external forces attempting to impose a geopolitical reconstruction on the world.”[121] What this shows is that Putin is concerned about other powers taking advantage of Russia’s weak position and diminishing its role in the international community, a clear sign that his ultimate focus is Russia’s relative power. Thus, while Putin may pursue a more accommodating policy towards the US in order to secure Russia’s economic well-being, he is doing so not for the sake of economic recovery per se, as liberals would pose, but rather to assure that Russia returns to its great power status, securing his policy squarely in the realist camp.

Conclusion

            In analyzing the case of Russian-Chinese relations under Primakov and Putin shows, the model provided by neo-classical realism presents the most nuanced approach out of all the presented theories. The balance of power realism does not explain why Putin has not continued the balancing behavior initiated by Primakov. The power maximization school also fails to explain why Putin has not taken advantage of Russia’s strengthened economy to pursue the more aggressive balancing policy. Balance of threat comes close to explaining Putin’s behavior by alluding to the role of the possible perception of China as a threat, but it does not go deep enough to explain where this perception of threat stems from. The liberal theories, with their stress on democratization and economic interdependence, fail to explain the fact that Primakov and Putin behaved in a way contrary to the models’ predictions. Neo-classical realism, by incorporating the possible influence of the leader’s personal perceptions and the role of state power, comes the closest to explaining the shift in Russia’s foreign policy behavior. The idea of perceptions can be directly applied to Russia-China relations in that Primakov’s and Putin’s perceptions of China and their views of the West caused them to pursue different policies despite the fact that the actual relative power distribution in the international system had remained the same. At the same time, the idea of state power alludes to the role of political capital each leader had in shaping the freedom with which they could pursue their policies. The support Primakov received from the Pro-China military industrial complex and the Western-oriented coalition of Putin demarked the ease with which each could pursue his strategy. The one shortfall of neo-classical realism is that it also does not fully explore the origins of leader’s perceptions, a factor that limits its ability to project future policy decisions. This shortfall can be rectified by turning to the constructivist concept of national identity. As the discussion above showed, the personal experiences of Primakov and Putin and their respective cabinets shaped the image each had of Russia and its role vis-à-vis the West. This image in turn shaped the policy choices each made. Thus, the analytical tools of neo-classical realism can be strengthened by incorporating the concept of national identity. One possibility is looking specifically to statements made by leaders to discern what images shape their personal perceptions. A projection could then be made about how those image will influence future policy choices. Such an approach would increase the theories explanatory power and broaden its reach to more cases.

            This paper has shown that both Primakov and Putin have viewed Russia’s relationship with China through the prism of Russia’s relative position in the international system. Both have seen the development of closer ties with the powerful neighbor as intrinsically tied to Russia’s relationship with the United States. The difference between the two is that Putin and his cabinet perceive the United States, and the West in general, in a more favorable light and deem cooperation as an important opportunity for Russia to regain its strength. The policy direction that stems from this is the abandoning of open calls for a balancing coalition with China and a closer collaboration with the West. The question then is whether this policy will continue. In my view, Putin will continue the accommodationist policy for the near future, at least until Russia’s economy makes a recovery. At the moment, Russia lacks the economic clout and is far too dependent on Western investment to openly challenge US dominance. While this did not stop Primakov from advocating for the Russia-China-India alliance, Putin is a much more cautious leader, and is also not averse to compromising on certain issues for the sake of his long-term goals. This is confirmed by the fact that he chose not to challenge the US on the abrogation of the ABM treaty, classifying it simply as a mistake. As long as the US does not make any moves so detrimental to Russia’s interests that Putin would be forced to take a stand or loose face, Russia will continue to pursue a balanced policy towards the East and West. However, this willingness to concede to US will only continue until Russia regains the great power status Putin has as his goal. Once Russia regains some of its economic strength, we can expect that it will begin to take a stronger stance and reaffirm its presence as a major player on the international arena.


 

Bibliography

 

Aron, Leon. “Russia’s New Foreign Policy.” Russian Outlook (Spring 1998. [Database

online]. Available: <http://0-www.ciaonet.org.opac.sfsu/wps/arl02/arl02.html>, (accessed 20 April 2004).

 

Basu, Baidya Bikash. “Russian National Security Thinking.” Strategic Analysis: A

Monthly Journal of the IDSA 24, no. 7 (Oct00).

 

Bukkvoll, Tor. “Putin’s Strategic Partnership with the West: the Domestic Politics of

Russian Foreign Policy.” Comparative Strategy 22 (2003), 223-242.

 

Dannreuther, Roland. “Russia’s Eurasian Security Policy.” Geneva Centre for Security

Policy: Joint Workshop on Europe and Transatlantic Security. Held in Kandersteg, Switzerland, Aug. 25-27, 2000.

 

Donaldson, Robert H. and John A. Donaldson. “The Arms Trade in Russian-Chinese

Relations: Identity, Domestic Politics, and Geopolitical Positioning.” International Studies Quarterly 47 (2003), 709-732.

 

Dittmer, Lowell. “The Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership.” Journal of Contemporary

China 10:28 (2001), 399-413.

 

Freedom House. “Freedom in the World: Russia.” Country and Territory Reports.

[online]. Available: http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/countryratings/russia.htm, (4/18/2004).

 

Garnett, Sherman. “Challenges of the Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership.” Washington

Quarterly 24:4 (2001), 41-54.

 

Garnett, Sherman. “The Russian Far East as a Factor in Russian-Chinese Relations.”

SAIS Review 16:2 (1996), 1-19.

 

Goldstein, Avery. “Great Expectations: Interpreting China’s Arrival.” Occasional Paper.

University of Pennsylvania: Brown Center for International Politics, September 1996.

 

Herman, Robert. “Identity, Norms, and National Security: The Soviet Foreign Policy

Revolution and the End of the Cold War,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, Peter J. Katzenstein, ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.

 

Johnston, Alastair Iain. “Realism(s) and Chinese Security Policy in the Post-Cold War

Period,” in Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War, Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, eds. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999.

 

Kuchins, Andrew. “Russian Foreign Policy Towards the East.” 205 Days of Putin:

Geopolitics and Nuclear Security. Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, 2000. [online]. Available: <http://www.ceip.org/files/daysofputin/205days_transcipt.htm>, (3 April 2004).

 

Leighton, Marian. “From KGB to MFA: Primakov Becomes Russian Foreign Minister.”

Post-Soviet Prospects 4, no. 2 (Feb96). [online], available: <http://www.csis.org/ruseura/psp/pspiv2.html>, (28 September 2003).

 

Lukin, Alexander. “Russia’s Image of China and Russian-Chinese Relations.” Working

Paper. [Database online]. Available: CIAO Database: search terms Lukin, Russia, foreign policy, (Accessed 7 February 2004).

 

Lukin, Alexander. The Bear Watches the Dragon: Russia’s Perception of China and the

Evolution of Russian-Chinese Relations since the Eighteenth Century. Armonk: ME Sharpe, 2003.

 

Mandelbaum, Michael, ed. The New Russian Foreign Policy. New York: Brookings

Institutions Press, 1998.

 

Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W. Norton &

            Company, 2001.

 

Neack, Laura. The New Foreign Policy: U.S. and Comparative Foreign Policy in the 21st

Century. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003.

 

Powell, Robert. “Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory,” in

Neorealism and Neoliberalism: the Contemporary Debate. David Baldwin, ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, 209-233.

 

Rose, Gideon. “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics 5:1

            (1998), 144-172.

 

Saunders, Paul J. “The Real Vladimir Putin,” Washington Times, January 6, 2000.

[online]. Available: <http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/articles/1_6_00Putin.htm>, (9 May 2004).

 

Schweller, Randall L. “The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism.” Progress in

International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field, Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, eds. Cambridge: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2003, 334-347.

 

Shlapentokh, Vladimir. “Is the ‘Greatness Syndrome’ Eroding?” Washington Quarterly

            25:1 (Winter 2002), 131-146.

 

SIPRI. “Military Expenditure in Constant US Dollars: Russia, China, USA.” The SIPRI

            Military Expenditure Database. [online]. Available:<http://first.sipri.org/index.php?page=step3&compact=true>, (Accessed 7 May 2004).

 

SIPRI. “Development and Trade Statistics: Russia.” Facts on International Relations and Security Trends Database. [online]. Available: <http://first.sipri.org/index.php?page=step3&compact=true>, (Accessed 7 May 2004).

 

Staar, Richard F. “Russia Reenters World Politics.” Mediterranean Quarterly (Fall

            2000), 23-39.

 

Timofeyey, Alexei, and Alexei Bausin. “Primakov Forging Military Partnership,”

Moscow News, 12/24/1998. [Database online]. Available from LexisNexis, (4/16/2004).

 

Trenin, Dmitri. “Pirouettes and Priorities: Distilling the Putin Doctrine.” The National

Interest(Winter2003). [online]. Available: <http://www.findarticlescom/cf_dls/m2751/74/112411721/print.jhtml>, (Accessed 3 April 2004).

 

Tsygankov, Andrei. “The Final Triumph of Pax Americana? Western Intervention in

Yugoslavia and Russia’s Debate on the Post-Cold War Order.” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 34 (2001), 133-156.

 

“Vladimir Putin Creating Anti-USA Axis?” Pravda On-line, 12/09/2002. [online].

Available: <http://English.pravda.ru/main/2002/12/09/40548.html>, (Accessed 3 April 2004).

 

Volk, Evgueni. “Who’s Who In Primakov’s New Russian Government.” Executive

Summary #1232 (6 November 1998). [online]. Available: <http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/BG1232es.cfm>, (9 May 2004).

 

Walt, Stephen M. “The Progressive Power of Realism.” American Political Science

Review 91, no. 4 (December 1997), 931-935.

 

 

 


 

[1] Laura Neack, The New Foreign Policy: U.S. and Comparative Foreign Policy in the 21st Century, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), 26.

[2] Lowell Dittmer, “The Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership,” Journal of Contemporary China 10:28 (2001), 399.

[3] Ibid

[4] Ibid 400

[5] Sherman Garnett, “The Russian Far East as a Factor in Russian-Chinese Relations,” SAIS Review 16:2 (1996), 1.

[6] Dittmer, “Strategic Partnership,” 402.

[7] Ibid

[8] Ibid 406.

[9] Sherman Garnett, “Challenges of the Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership,” Washington Quarterly 24:4 (2001), 41.

[10] Rajan Menon,, “After Empire: Russia and the Southern ‘Near Abroad,’” The New Russian Foreign Policy, Michael Mandelbaum, ed. (New York: Brookings Institutions Press, 1998), 183.

[11] Ibid

[12] Garnett, “Challenges,” 42.

[13] “Vladimir Putin Creating Anti-USA Axis?” Pravda On-line, 12/09/2002, [online], available: <http://English.pravda.ru/main/2002/12/09/40548.html>, (Accessed 3 April 2004).

[14] Alexander Lukin, “Russia’s Image of China and Russian-Chinese Relations,” Working Paper, [database online], available: CIAO Database: search terms Lukin, Russia, foreign policy, (Accessed 7 February 2004).

[15] Ibid

[16] Dmitri Trenin, “Pirouettes and Priorities: Distilling the Putin Doctrine,” The National Interest (Winter 2003), [online], available: <http://www.findarticles.com/cf_dls/m2751/74/112411721/print.jhtml>, (Accessed 3 April 2004).

[17] Tor Bukkvoll, “Putin’s Strategic Partnership with the West: the Domestic Politics of Russian Foreign Policy,” Comparative Strategy 22 (2003), 223.

[18] Alastair Iain Johnston, “Realism(s) and Chinese Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Period,” in Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War, Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, eds., (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).

[19] Ibid

[20] Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics 5:1 (1998), 149.  

[21] Robert G. Herman, “Identity, Norms, and National Security: The Soviet Foreign Policy Revolution and the End of the Cold War,” The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, Peter J. Katzenstein, ed (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

[22] Leon Aron, “Russia’s New Foreign Policy,” Russian Outlook (Spring 1998), [Database online], available: <http://0-www.ciaonet.org.opac.sfsu/wps/arl02/arl02.html>, (accessed 20 April 2004).

[23] Herman, “Identity, Norms, and National Security.”

[24] Johnston, “Realism(s) and Chinese Security Policy.”

[25] Ibid

[26] Rose, “Neoclassical Realism,” 149.

[27] Ibid

[28] Ibid

[29] Randall L. Schweller, “The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism,” Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field, Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, eds. (Cambridge: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2003), 334.

[30] Johnston, “Realism(s) and Chinese Foreign Policy.”

[31] Ibid

[32] Ibid

[33] Ibid

[34] Stephen M. Walt, “The Progressive Power of Realism,” American Political Science Review 91, no. 4 (December 1997), 933.

[35] Ibid

[36] Rose, “Neo-Classical Realism,” 150.

[37] Randall Schweller, “The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism,” 340.

[38] Ibid 320.

[39] Rose, “Neoclassical Realism,” 157.

[40] Ibid

[41] Ibid 161

[42] Ibid

[43] Rose, “Neo-classical Realism,” 148.

[44] Aron, “The New Russian Foreign Policy.”

[45] Ibid

[46] Avery Goldstein, “Great Expectations: Interpreting China’s Arrival,” Occasional Paper, (University of Pennsylvania: Brown Center for International Politics, September 1996).

[47] Ibid

[48] Robert Powell, “Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory,” in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: the Contemporary Debate, David Baldwin, ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993),  211.

[49] Herman, “Identity, Norms, and National Security.”

[50] Ibid

[51] Ibid

[52] Ibid

[53] Ibid

[54] Ibid

[55] Ibid

[56] Johnston, “Realism(s) and Chinese Security Policy.”

[57] Ibid

[58] “Vladimir Putin Creating Anti-USA Axis?” Pravda On-line, 12/09/2002, [online], available: <http://English.pravda.ru/main/2002/12/09/40548.html>, (Accessed 3 April 2004).

[59] Garnett, “Challenges,” 41.

[60] Vladimir Shlapentokh, “Is the ‘Greatness Syndrome’ Eroding?” Washington Quarterly 25:1 (Winter 2002), 136.

[61] Ibid 142

[62] Johnston, “Realism(s) and Chinese Security Policy.”

[63] Ibid

[64] John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 55-56.

[65] Shlapentokh, “Greatness Syndrome,” 142.

[66] Walt, “The Progressive Power of Realism,” 933.

[67] Ibid

[68] Johnston, “Realism(s) and Chinese Security Policy.”

[69] Andrei Tsygankov, “The Final Triumph of Pax Americana? Western Intervention in Yugoslavia and Russia’s Debate on the Post-Cold War Order,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 34 (2001), 136.

[70] Roland Dannreuther, “Russia’s Eurasian Security Policy,” (Geneva Centre for Security Policy: Joint Workshop on Europe and Transatlantic Security, held in Kandersteg, Switzerland, Aug. 25-27, 2000).

[71] Meena Singh Roy, “Russia and Central Asia: Problems and Prospects,” Strategic Analysis: A Monthly Journal of the IDSA 25, no. 3 (June 2001).

[72] Marian Leighton, “From KGB to MFA: Primakov Becomes Russian Foreign Minister,” Post-Soviet Prospects 4, no. 2 (Feb96), [online], available: <http://www.csis.org/ruseura/psp/pspiv2.html>, (28 September 2003).

[73] Dannreuther, “Russia’s Eurasian Security Policy.”

[74] Baidya Bikash Basu, “Russian National Security Thinking,” Strategic Analysis: A Monthly Journal of the IDSA 24, no. 7 (Oct00).

[75] Richard F. Staar, “Russia Reenters World Politics,” Mediterranean Quarterly (Fall 2000), 27.

[76] Walt, “The Progressive Power of Realism,” 933.

[77] Garnett, “Challenges,” 45.

[78] Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” 146.

[79] Ibid 147

[80] Ibid 157

[81] Rajan Menon,, “After Empire: Russia and the Southern ‘Near Abroad,’” The New Russian Foreign Policy, Michael Mandelbaum, ed. (New York: Brookings Institutions Press, 1998), 183.

[82] Staar, “Russia Reenters World Politics,” 37.

[83] Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” 147.

[84] Schweller, “The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism,” 338.

[85] Alexander Lukin, The Bear Watches the Dragon: Russia’s Perception of China and the Evolution of Russian-Chinese Relations since the Eighteenth Century, (Armonk: ME Sharpe, 2003), 305.

[86] Ibid 306

[87] Dmitri Trenin, “Pirouettes and Priorities,” The National Interest, (3/2/2004), [online], available: http://www.nationalinterest.org/ME2/dirmod.asp?sid=&nm=&type=pub&mod=Publications%3A%3AArticles&mid=8F3A7027421841978F18BE895F87F791&tier=3&aid=C50D015F6ED643F28C9850ADD3AE4949, (4/16/2004).

[88] Lukin, The Bear Watches the Dragon, 309.

[89] Andrew Kuchins, “Russian Foreign Policy Towards the East,” 205 Days of Putin: Geopolitics and Nuclear Security, (Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, 2000), [online], Available: <http://www.ceip.org/files/daysofputin/205days_transcipt.htm>, (3 April 2004).  

[90] Trenin, “Pirouettes and Priorities.”

[91] Tsygankov, “Pax Americana?” 136.

[92]Richard F. Staar, “Russia Reenters World Politics,” Mediterranean Quarterly (Fall 2000), 36.

[93] Trenin, “Pirouettes and Priorities.” 

[94] Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” 161.

[95] Alexander Lukin, “Russia’s Image of China and Russian-Chinese Relations,” Working Paper, [database online], available: CIAO Database: search terms Lukin, Russia, foreign policy, (Accessed 7 February 2004).

[96] Lukin, The Bear Watches the Dragon, 301.

[97] Alexei Timofeyey, and Alexei Bausin, “Primakov Forging Military Partnership,” Moscow News, 12/24/1998, [Database online], available from LexisNexis, (4/16/2004.)

[98] Tor Bukkvoll, Putin’s Strategic Partnership with the West: The  Domestic Politics of Russian Foreign Policy, Comparative Strategy  22  (2003), 224.

[99] Ibid

[100] Ibid

[101] Ibid 228.

[102] Timofeyev and Bausin, “Primakov Forging Military Partnership,” Moscow News, 12/24/1998.

[103] Herman, “Identity, Norms, and National Security.”

[104] Ibid

[105] Robert H. Donaldson, and John A. Donaldson, “The Arms Trade in Russian-Chinese Relations: Identity, Domestic Politics, and Geopolitical Positioning,” International Studies Quarterly 47 (2003), 726.

[106] Herman, “Identity, Norms, and National Security.”

[107] Evgueni Volk, “Who’s Who In Primakov’s New Russian Government,” Executive Summary #1232 (6 November 1998), [online], available: <http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/BG1232es.cfm>, (9 May 2004).

[108] Leighton, “From KGB to MFA.”

[109] Ibid

[110] Ibid

[111] Ibid

[112] Ibid

[113] Lukin, The Bear Watches the Dragon, 305.

[114] Lukin, “Russia’s Image of China.”

[115] Ibid

[116] Paul J. Saunders, “The Real Vladimir Putin,” Washington Times, January 6, 2000, [online], available: <http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/articles/1_6_00Putin.htm>, (9 May 2004).

[117] Lukin, “Russia’s Image of China.”

[118] Aron, “The New Russian Foreign Policy.”

[119] Goldstein, “Great Expectations: Interpreting China’s Arrival.”

[120] Staar, “Russia Reenteres World Politics,” 33.

[121] Ibid


 [CF1]Sipri 2004

 [p2]Freedom house 2004